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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays on investor sentiment and the cross-section of stock
returns.
The first essay extends Delong, Shleifer, Summer and Waldmann’s (1990) noise trader
risk model into a model with multiple risky assets to show the asymmetric effect of sentiment
in the cross-section. Guided by my model, I also find that the effect of investor sentiment
can be decomposed into long- and short-run components. The empirical tests in the first
essay of the thesis present a negative relationship between long-run sentiment component
and subsequent stock returns and a positive association between the short-run sentiment and
contemporaneous stock returns.
The second essay explores a previously unexamined sentiment channel through which
technical analysis can add value. I construct a daily market TA sentiment indicator from a
spectrum of commonly used technical trading strategies. I find that this indicator significantly
correlates with other popular sentiment measures. An increase in TA sentiment indicator
is accompanied by high contemporaneous returns and predicts high near-term returns, low
subsequent returns and high crash risk in the cross-section. I also design trading strategies to
explore the profitability of my new TA sentiment indicator. My trading strategies generate
remarkable and robust profits.
The third essay focuses on exploring the profitability of trading strategies based on
Implied Volatility indicator (VIX) from the sentiment perspective. My trading strategies
viii
involve holding sentiment-prone stocks when VIX is low and sentiment-immune stocks when
VIX is high. This shifting asset allocation strategies are based on Abreu and Brunnermeier’s
(2003) delayed arbitrage theory and the asymmetric effect of investor sentiment in the cross-
section. I find sentiment-prone stocks have larger one-day forward returns following high
sentiment and vice versa. My trading strategies generate substantial higher returns than
benchmark portfolios, and the excess returns are not subsumed by well-known risk factors or
transaction costs.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Qingwei Wang
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Khelifa Mazouz
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Chapter 1
Preface
This thesis explores the effect of investor sentiment on the US market cross-sectional stock
return. My focus is on 1) demonstrating the asymmetric effect of investor sentiment in the
cross-section as stocks have different sentiment-prone level, 2) investigating not only the
reversal effect of investor sentiment on future return in the long-run but also the momentum
effect of investor sentiment in the short-run based on the delayed arbitrage theory, and 3)
testing the profitability of the short-run momentum caused by investor sentiment and delayed
arbitrage. This thesis aims at contributing to existing literature on investor sentiment and
asset pricing.
1.1 Background
"I could calculate the motions of the heavenly bodies, but not the madness of the
people."
The quote may have or have not been uttered by Issac Newton but the story that he
pocketed massive profit during the South Sea Bubble and suffered a greater loss during the
1
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following burst of that bubble is grounded in truth. Even one of the greatest physicists in
human history found it hard to be entirely rational and form an unbiased belief on asset
prices.
Traditional finance models assume agents are rational. Rational investors have the correct
belief on asset pricing following Bayes’ Law and make decisions on Savage’s notion of
Subjective Expected Utility. Though traditional finance models deliver appealingly clear and
straightforward message, they do not match with data in reality very well. Prof. Richard
Thaler, the laureate of 2017 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, once said that
"When an economist says the evidence is ’mixed’, he or she means that the theory says one
thing and the data says the opposite". The most striking anomalies that traditional finance
models fail to explain include the Equity Premium Puzzle (i.e., the stock market generates
a substantial excess return), the Volatility Puzzle (i.e., the stock market returns are more
volatile than expected in models), and the Return Predictability Puzzle (i.e., the stock returns
are predictable, which does not fit the Efficient Market Hypothesis).
Behavioural Finance relaxes the assumption on investor rationality, allowing some agents
to be not fully rational. Another important founding block of behavioural finance is the
concept of limit on arbitrage. The traditional finance campus may argue that rational agents
will push irrational ones out of the market through arbitrage action in an economy without
market friction. However, a series of theoretical and empirical studies show that limits
on arbitrage exist in the market (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), which enables irrational
investors to be long-lived and have an essential impact on asset prices.
Irrationality arises when people form beliefs and arises on people preferences. Ample
experiments compiled by cognitive psychologists demonstrate extensive evidence that in-
vestors can have biased belief, such as Overconfidence, Representativeness, Conservatism,
Anchoring, Belief Perseverance, and so on (see Barberis and Thaler (2003) for a more
detailed description). The following are some examples of biased behaviour. One kind of
2
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Overconfidence is that investors place more weight on the private information they work
hard to obtain. A typical example of Representativeness behaviour is that people expect
a small sample reflect the properties of the whole population. Conservatism means the
tendency of investors underweight new information compared with the prior information.
The irrationality assumption better fits the reality.
The two cornerstones for behavioral finance is the investors’ irrationality and the limit of
arbitrage. The first core argument of behavioural finance is that the market is not perfect and
investors are not always rational. Irrational investors matter when there is limit on arbitrage.
The irrational bullish/bearish belief can leads to overprice/underprice, and the mispricing
persists when arbitragers fail to effectively bet against irrational investors.
The limit of arbitrage is a theory that price could remain in a non-equilibrium state for
protracted periods due to the restrictions on the rational investors’ capital to arbitrage away
the mispricing. Different from the textbook definition, arbitrage in reality requires capital
and entails risk. The restrictions on arbitrage comes from several sources1. For example,
arbitragers might be forced to liquidate their position when the asset price move against them;
short-selling are costly and not always available; the arbitragers fund managers has short
investment horizon as their performance are evaluated frequently by their creditors/investors.
To better understand the effect of agents’ irrationality on asset prices, this thesis investi-
gates the effect of investor sentiment on stock market returns in the first essay. The other two
essays focus on a certain kind of limit of arbitrage, i.e. the delayed arbitrage action due to
the lack of coordination among arbitragers. I show that sentiment-induced mispricing can
deepen in the short-run because of the delayed arbitrage.
Broadly defined, investor sentiment is a biased belief about future cash flows and in-
vestment risk. When there is a limit to arbitrage, investor sentiment pushes asset prices
away from fundamental values. The link between investor sentiment and asset returns has
1Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provides a detailed description on how arbitrage are constrained in their model.
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received considerable attention in the past two decades. The concept of investor sentiment
is repeatedly mentioned in the studies of bubbles and crashes. Investor sentiment has been
demonstrated to have a vital influence on the stock market. For instance, Datst (2003) shows
that the effect of investor sentiment on stock return far exceeds the effect of fundamental
factors during the extreme low or high sentiment periods.
This thesis consists of three essays on the relationship between investor sentiment and the
cross-section of stock returns. This research on investor sentiment is of essential importance
to better understand the patterns in the stock market and of practical value in forming
investment decisions. In short, I theoretically demonstrate how sentiment-sensitivity leads to
stronger predictability of investor sentiment in the cross-section than on the aggregate market
in the first essay. The second essay shows that the usefulness of technical analysis could be
connected with investor sentiment. Combining the delayed arbitrage theory with the effect of
investor sentiment, I find a strongly profitable sentiment-induced return momentum in the
cross-section. Table 1.1 gives a map road of this thesis.
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1.2 Motivations
1.2.1 Asymmetric Effect of Sentiment in the Cross-Section
There are some interesting gaps in the existing literature on investor sentiment. For instance,
empirical studies predominately show that investor sentiment has a strong predictive effect in
the cross-section but little effect on the aggregate market level, despite almost all investor
sentiment models containing only one risky assets. With one risky asset in the model setting,
the model provides propositions for the aggregate market rather than the cross-sectional
market. Whatever conclusion holds in the aggregate market does not necessarily hold in
the cross-section in the existing theoretical models. Therefore, Chapter 3 presents the first
rigorous and parsimonious model demonstrating the effect of sentiment on the cross-sectional
return of a sentiment-prone asset over a sentiment-immune asset.
Why is it essential to look into the cross-sectional stock market for the effect of in-
vestor sentiment? The reason is that stocks differs in their sensitivity to investor sentiment.
Sentiment-prone stocks are more attractive to speculative demands and more difficult to
arbitrage. This thesis extends the DSSW model by introducing multiple risky assets that
differ in their exposure to market-wide sentiment. Suppose that there are two risky assets,
A and B, and that irrational investors’ beliefs are biased more upwards (downwards) to-
wards A than B when market sentiment is high (low). Thus, asset A has higher exposure
to market-wide sentiment (more sentiment prone) than asset B. When investor sentiment
is unpredictable, this assumption also implies that the equilibrium returns of asset A will
fluctuate more with the shifts in market sentiment, hence posing higher noise trader risk
to rational arbitrageurs, than those of asset B. My extended model effectively captures the
intuitive observation that stocks more prone to investor sentiment are also more difficult to
arbitrage (Baker and Wurgler, 2006). It also predicts that market-wide sentiment leads to
relatively higher contemporaneous returns and lower subsequent returns for stocks more
6
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prone to sentiment and difficult to arbitrage.
Guided by my extended noise trader risk model, I also find that the effect of investor
sentiment could be decomposed into long- and short-run components. Prior studies has
investigated the relationship between investor sentiment and short-run return and long-run
returns, but the effect of long-run investor sentiment and short-run sentiment on the future
return are not explicitly clarified. In reality, investor sentiment could be persistently bullish
for several periods; hence, decomposing investor sentiment into the long-run component and
the short-run shock is of essence. Empirical studies either show that stock return is positively
related to contemporaneous investor sentiment changes or that it is negatively associated with
the previous investor sentiment level. By decomposing investor sentiment into the short-term
incremental component and the long-term average component, I integrate the opposite effect
of the two decomposed components. The empirical evidence shows that long-run sentiment
negatively predicts cross-sectional returns while short-run sentiment contemporaneously
correlates with the returns.
1.2.2 Technical Analysis: Mumbo Jumbo or A Crystal Ball
Technical analysis is a method of forecasting the direction of price movement through study-
ing past price (volume) pattern. Long deemed as ’mumbo jumbo’ by financial economists,
technical analysis (TA) has been puzzlingly popular among experienced traders over hundreds
of years.
Financial economists generally have unbalanced views on technical analysis. The most
prevailing view is that technical analysis is of no value. Traditional academic wisdom posits
that publicly available information such as past prices or trading volumes, which serve as the
basis of technical analysis, should have already been incorporated into current asset prices,
with any attempt to predict future returns based on technical analysis having to "share a
7
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pedestal with alchemy" (see Page 157 in Burton G. Malkiel (1973)). A less popular view is
that technical analysis is an effective means of extracting useful fundamental information
(Lo et al., 2000). Despite the lack of supporting theories for technical analysis, majority of
empirical tests favor technical analysis. However, one may cast doubt on the strong empirical
evidence on technical analysis because of publication bias or data snooping bias (Sullivan
et al., 1999).
The financial industry, on the other hand, sees technical analysis as a crystal ball. Tech-
nical analysis has been part of industrial practice over many years: it was first documented
in Dutch markets in the 17th century, and in Japan in the early 18th century. Technical
analysis is popular among practitioners; according to the survey conducted by Taylor and
Allen (1992), 90% of experienced traders place some weight on it during costly trading
activities. It is also widely discussed in media and commonly covered in education. Even
someone transferring from academia to practice admitted that "overcoming the prejudice
against technical analysis was the most important lesson he had to learn when moving from
the ivory tower into the laboratory of real-life experience as a trader" (Sushil Wadhwani, an
LSE academic, a central banker and later a fund manager, said in an interview by Financial
Times)2.
To solve this conundrum, I argue that technical analysis captures investor sentiment.
Chapter 4 is the first attempt to bridge the gap between academic finance and industry
practice through the sentiment channel. The connection between investor sentiment and
technical analysis is indicated in the previous literature. For instance, Menkhoff (1997) states
that "technical analysis is a means of processing non-fundamental information". Technical
analysis, especially positive feedback trading, is also a prominent example of biased belief in
investor sentiment models, for instance, De Long et al. (1990b). To quote Zhou (2017),
"In technical analysis, there are many over-bought and over-sold indicators,
2See "Technical analysis pulled out of the bin", October 17, 2010, Financial Times.
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which are precisely designed to capture the unsustainable levels of optimism and
pessimism".
I propose and validate a market-wide sentiment measure based on forecasts of a broad
spectrum of technical trading rules. I apply 2,127 technical trading rules on S&P 500 Index
every day, assign values to the forecasts of those 2,127 technical trading rule (buy forecast=1,
sell forecast=-1, neutral=0), and then calculate the average of 2,127 forecast as the daily TA
sentiment indicator.
The theoretical motivation is that equilibrium price is a function of cross-generation
sentiment and current sentiment level in De Long et al. (1990a) model. Accordingly, current
sentiment could also be valued through current equilibrium price and historical equilibrium
prices. Combining past prices and current price potentially allows more accurate investor
sentiment inferences. Some of those who use technical trading rules to make investment
decisions believe that the forecasts actually give signals about how optimistic the investors in
the market are. A broad spectrum of technical trading rules provide more information on the
investor sentiment level.
In Chapter 4, there are two ways to validate that this TA indicator captures sentiment. The
first way is to show that this sentiment measure significantly correlates with other sentiment
indicators. The second way is to test whether this TA indicator could predict the returns
in the same pattern that a sentiment indicator does. I find that high TA sentiment indicator
indicates the returns of more sentiment-prone stocks relative to sentiment-immune stocks are
contemporaneously higher, subsequently remain higher due to the delayed arbitrage theory
before they eventually reverse. High TA indicator also indicates higher future crash risk, and
this predictability is stronger among sentiment-prone stocks than among sentiment-immune
stocks. In this way, I connect technical analysis with investor sentiment to demonstrate that
technical analysis has value in capturing investor sentiment.
9
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1.2.3 Profitability of Exploring Sentiment-Driven Momentum
One of the contributions of this thesis is to look into the momentum effect of investor sen-
timent on short-run returns. Most prior studies use monthly investor sentiment to predict
monthly returns and therefore only capture the reversal effect. I find that not only investor
sentiment can predict long-term return reversal but also can predict short-term return momen-
tum. A high-frequency investor sentiment indicator enables the test the momentum effect of
investor sentiment on short-run returns. I find that investor sentiment positively relates to the
short-run return before the return reverses, and this return momentum is due to the lack of
coordination among arbitrageurs. Both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 rely on the hypothesis of the
momentum effect of investor sentiment from the delayed arbitrage model.
Mispricing arises from the irrational bias and limit on arbitrage. Abreu and Brunnermeier
(2003) propose the delayed arbitrage model to show how mispricing persists due to the lack
of coordination among arbitrageurs. In their model setting, sentiment-driven overpricing
emerges, and arbitrageurs become sequentially aware of it but do not know their sequence or
their peers’ opinions. For a bubble to burst, a critical mass of rational arbitrageurs need to
agree on coordinated arbitrage actions. In actuality, rational arbitrageurs face performance
evaluations in short horizon and care about the resale price and liquidation risk. Hence,
instead of arbitraging right after realizing there has been mispricing, they become reluctant to
arbitrage at an early stage and try to forecast their peers’ action. Some rational arbitrageurs
may even jump on the bandwagon, ride the bubble, and try to "beat the gun" before it
collapses. With them switching sides from the rational to the irrational group, the mispricing
could be enlarged by an increase in sentiment-induced trading. The lack of coordination
among arbitrageurs leads to delayed arbitrage actions that make the bubble persist. If the
investor sentiment become more extreme or the arbitrageurs decide to ride the bubble, the
bubble may even grow bigger. Eventually, the bubble becomes prominent enough to trigger
coordinated arbitrage actions and the return reverses. Hence, high investor sentiment has a
10
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momentum effect on the return before the reversal effect starts to take place.
While Chapter 4 focuses on explaining the predictability and profitability of technical
analysis through an investor sentiment channel, Chapter 5 focuses on two things: to better
predict future return and to profit from the predictive power of investor sentiment. I find that
not only investor sentiment predicts long-term return reversal but it also predicts short-term
return momentum. However, the predictive power of a factor does not necessarily guarantee
its strong profitability. Therefore, I implement the investor sentiment in trading and test the
profitability of investor sentiment.
Due to existing literature generally seeing investor sentiment as a contrarian indicator
of future return, the trading strategies based on sentiment in existing literature are mostly
contrarian trading strategies that aim to profit from the return reversal predicted by investor
sentiment. The predictive power of a factor does not necessarily guarantee its strong prof-
itability. After demonstrating the predictability of investor sentiment on the short-run return,
I test the profitability of the momentum effect of investor sentiment caused by delayed
arbitrage. I design trading strategies that aim at benefiting from the momentum effect of
investor sentiment.
Every trading strategy has to answer two key questions: when to buy/sell and what to
buy/sell. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 answer the first question with a similar method using two
different sentiment indicators, a newly-proposed TA sentiment indicator and VIX indicator.
However, the two chapters differ in their answer to the second question. Unlike Chapter 4,
Chapter 5 chooses to shift asset allocation among stocks to generate higher profitability and
avoid short-selling constraints and high short-selling costs.
This shifting asset allocation strategy is based on delayed arbitrage theory and the
asymmetric effect of investor sentiment in the cross-section. My trading strategies involve
holding sentiment-prone stocks when VIX is low and sentiment-immune stocks when VIX
11
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is high. I also find that following low sentiment periods the sentiment-immune stocks
outperform the sentiment-prone stocks. I test the robustness of the profitability of my trading
strategy and also demonstrate that this profitability is not subsumed by the well-known risk
factors and can survive transaction costs.
In summary, this thesis contributes to existing literature in three aspects. Initially, the
first essay provides the first theoretical model illustrating the asymmetric effect of investor
sentiment on cross-sectional stock returns. Second, the second essay connects technical
analysis with investor sentiment and provide evidence on the value of technical analysis
as a sentiment indicator from a behavioural finance perspective. Third, the last two essays
emphasize the momentum effect of investor sentiment and the profit opportunity provided
by sentiment-induced return momentum, which has not been thoroughly tested in previous
research. The profitability of my sentiment-based trading strategies demonstrates a practical
significance for studying investor sentiment.
12
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Literature Review
This section summarizes the findings and gaps in the previous literature. In short, strong
empirical evidence of the predictability of investor sentiment has been found in the cross-
sectional stock market. Almost all theoretical models looks into an economy with only one
risky asset. Such a gap in the literature motivates me to build a two-risky-asset model to
demonstrate the asymmetric effect of investor sentiment rigorously. Empirical studies also
focus on the reversal effect of investor sentiment on future returns, and therefore most papers
test the contrarian trading strategies based on investor sentiment.
This session also sums up the research related to the delayed arbitrage model proposed
by Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) to draw attention to the momentum effect of investor
sentiment. The delayed arbitrage theory inspires me to test the momentum effect of investor
sentiment and to investigate the profitability of exploring the momentum caused by investor
sentiment and delayed arbitrage.
Finally, I review the literature on the connections between investor sentiment and technical
analysis. I briefly sort out the opinions of the academia on the effectiveness of technical
analysis and use existing research to support my attempt to explain technical analysis from a
13
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sentiment channel.
2.1 Investor Sentiment Measures
The literature on investor sentiment measures answers two key questions: 1) how to measure
investor sentiment; 2) how to tell it is a good proxy or not. Generally speaking, the choice
the sentiment index should be based on the economic logic and theoretical rationale. Apart
from the theoretical reasoning, there are practically three ways to validate the performance
of sentiment index. First is to see whether the high and low sentiment period matches with
anecdotal bubbles and crashes history. Second is to calculate and test the correlation of
any new sentiment index with sentiment-related macroeconomic variables and other widely-
acknowledged sentiment indicators. More importantly, those papers use the remarkable
performance of a sentiment index in explaining or predicting the equity premium as validity
evidence of the index.
Investor sentiment measures fall into three categories, namely the survey-based sentiment,
textual analysis based sentiment, and market-based sentiment.
2.1.1 Survey-Based Sentiment Indicators
The survey-based measures include University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index,
Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index, Investors’ Intelligence Index, the institutional
(individual) Bull-Bear spread surveyed by the American Association of Individual Investor,
etc.
Different types of interviewees of the survey make the sentiment indicator measure
the sentiment of different groups of people. University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment
Index is a retail-based sentiment measure (Fisher and Statman, 2003). Conference Board
14
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Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) is a more widely employed survey-based sentiment
indicator. Investor Intelligence Index is a measure of institutional sentiment, as it represents
the bullish/bearish expectation of over 120 market newsletters. This sentiment proxy could
either be the percentage difference or the ratio of bullish and bearish newsletters (e.g., Brown
and Cliff, 2005; Kurov, 2010; Lee et al., 2002).
The complex index could also be constructed from the several survey-based sentiment
indicators. Ho and Hung (2009) use all three survey indexes and create an index containing
the common component of those three indexes to examine the role of investor sentiment in
conditional asset-pricing models.
2.1.2 Textual-Analysis Sentiment Indicators
The textual analysis sentiment measures are not the mainstream, yet it is attracting attention.
Different types of text content one analyses measure the sentiments of different agent groups.
Most textual analysis on sentiment digs into the corporate filings and disclosures to gauge
corporation-expressed sentiment. For example, Jiang et al. (2017) construct managers’
sentiment from the textual analysis of financial reports, earning disclosure conference, and
they show that the overall market managers’ sentiment performs very well as a contrarian
predictor of future aggregate stock market returns. Tetlock (2007), Garcia (2013) and
Engelberg et al. (2012), among many others, point out the importance of media-expressed
sentiment. Those papers analyses the tones in major newspapers the Wall Street Journal, the
New York Times, and the Dow Jones News Service.
This thesis is more interested in the Internet-based sentiment from textual analysis, which
measures the mood of investors all over the market. Da et al. (2014) create a market-wide
sentiment measure called Financial and Economic Attitudes Revealed by Search (FEARS)
index by aggregating the US household Google Trend search volume of negative words such
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as "bankruptcy", "unemployment", "recession". Da et al. (2014) find that their FEARS index
is a contrarian measure of investor sentiment; high FEARS index indicates low investor
sentiment and vice versa. Sun et al. (2016) provide an intraday sentiment measure from
textual analysis and find their half-hour lagged sentiment measure strongly predicts the
hourly return of S&P 500 index.
2.1.3 Market-Based Sentiment Indicators
The market-based sentiment indicators include retail investor trades; mutual fund flows;
trading volume; premium on dividend-paying stocks; closed-end fund discounts; option
implied volatility; first-day returns on initial public offerings; number of initial public
offerings; new equity issues; insider trading; complex index constructed from several market-
based indexes.1
Retail Investor Trades. Retail investors’ intention to buy or sell proxies investor sen-
timent. (Barber et al., 2008; Kumar and Lee, 2006) find that retail investors tend to buy or
sell stocks in concert, and their behavior pattern is consistent with the systematic sentiment.
Ritter and Welch (2002) conjecture that the bullish investor sentiment among retail investors
explains the IPOs’ high first day return and low future return. Greenwood and Nagel (2009)
find that inexperienced retail investors tend to hold more stocks during the peak of the
Internet Bubble than the sophisticated institutional investors. In addition, retail investors are
more likely to be sentiment-prone than sophisticated investors. A series of papers support
this argument by showing that retail investors prefer sentiment-prone stocks more than
sophisticated investors. Qiu and Welch (2004) see the retail investors demand as a proxy
for sentiment-prone level and build cross-sectional portfolios based on the characteristics
representing retail investors’ demand. Stocks held disproportionately by retail investors
(such as young and small stocks) are more sentiment-prone than stocks held by institutional
1see a comprehensive survey in Baker and Wurgler (2007).
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investors. In addition, they argue that the reason closed-end fund discount captures investor
sentiment is due to the fact that closed-end funds are predominately held by retail investors.
Mutual fund flows. Neal and Wheatley (1998) use the closed-end fund discount, the
ratio of odd-lot sales to purchases, and net mutual fund redemptions to measure the investor
sentiment level, and they find mutual fund redemption predictive for the small premium.
Similar to the net mutual fund redemption, Liao et al. (2011) employ net mutual fund
purchase to proxy for sentiment. Brown and Cliff (2004) argue that net purchases by mutual
funds positively indicate the optimistic magnitude in the stock market. Investors tend to
buy when they are bullish about the market and prefer to sell when lack of confidence or
in a bad mood. Ben-Rephael et al. (2012) use aggregate net exchanges of equity funds, the
monthly shift between bond funds and equity funds, to gauge investor sentiment. They find it
weakly correlates with sentiment the measures used in Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006),
but it works well in explaining contemporaneous excess return especially for small and
growth stocks. Frazzini and Lamont (2008) use mutual fund flow to measure the sentiment
of individual stocks.
Trading Volume. Liquidity measures such as trading volume, market turnover and
bid-ask spread can predict future return on the firm- and market-level (Baker and Stein,
2004). When irrational investors overreact to private signals, both negative and positive
sentiment shock tend to boost the liquidity in a market without short-selling constraints.
However, irrational investors are usually kept out of the market in face of the short-selling
constraints when sentiment is negative. Baker and Stein (2004) build a mathematical model
to demonstrate that an increases in trading volume implies higher participation of bullish
irrational investors in the market, and hence high trading volume indicates bullish investor
sentiment. Another line of studies demonstrate that innovations in trading volume proxy
for the divergence of opinion among investors (Chen et al., 2001; Hong and Stein, 1999),
and hence Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Baker and Wurgler (2007) point out that the
17
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aggregate trading volume level measures the bullishness of investors when short-selling is
difficult. However, with the development of high-frequency trading algorithm in the stock
market, turnover is no longer suitable for capturing investor sentiment. Therefore, Jeffrey
Wurgler leave the turnover out of the construction of the latest version of Baker-Wurgler
Sentiment.
Option Implied Volatility. VIX is, by definition, a measure of market expectation of
stock return volatility implied from the supply and demand of S&P index options over the
next 30 calendar days. The Chicago Board Options Exchange’s implied volatility index
(VIX) is first introduced by Whaley (2000) as a premier barometer of investor sentiment by
scholars and practitioners (Bekaert and Hoerova, 2014; Da et al., 2014; Giot, 2005). The
Wall Street Journal and many other major media assigned VIX the nickname "the fear gauge"
or "the sentiment index". Fleming et al. (1995) show that though VIX is a good predictor
for future volatility, it contains misperception. Low (2004) argues that VIX is a collective
best guess of all option traders on the S&P index options and therefore regardless of its
forecast accuracy VIX encompasses the bias and exuberance of a sample of sophisticated,
well-informed professional market participants.
Closed-End Fund Discount. A strand of research presents a very intriguing and heated
debate on whether closed-end fund discount (CEFD) associates with investor sentiment (Chen
et al., 1993; Chen and Miller, 1993; Chopra et al., 1993a,b). Lee et al. (1991) infer that CEFD
proxy for investor sentiment and the changes in CEFD highly correlates with returns of stock
stocks. Elton et al. (1998) consider CEFD as an indicator of investor mood of individual
investors because closed-end funds are disproportionately held by retail investors. A more
prominent discount value means a more bearish investor sentiment. Neal and Wheatley
(1998) find the net redemption captures investor sentiment in CEFD.
Complex Index. Baker and Wurgler (2006) use principal component analysis to extract
the common component of six measures of investor sentiment, which are the closed-end
18
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fund discount, the number and the first-day returns of IPOs, NYSE turnover, the equity
share in total new issues, and the dividend premium. They provide a detailed illustration on
the relation of each measure with sentiment. They also compare the fluctuation of the BW
sentiment index with anecdotal history from 1961 to 2002 and find it consistent with reality.
Huang et al. (2015) point out a potential problem of using principal component analysis:
the six indexes all contain approximation error and those errors contribute partially to their
variations, thus the first principal component of the six indexes may also contain the common
component of approximation errors which has no explanatory power on the future return.
They use partial least square method (PLS) to gather the common component of those six
proxies that most aligned with the aggregate market return. They consider PLS index a better
proxy, as it has better performance in predicting the future aggregate market return and it
highly correlates with macroeconomic variables.
2.1.4 Comparison of the Three Categories of Sentiment Measures
The survey-based sentiment indicators are the most direct measures for sentiment and quite
often serve as the benchmark indicator in the validation of other sentiment measures. The
correlations with the direct survey-based sentiment indicators have been widely used to
test the validity of other market-based or textual-based sentiment measures. For instance,
Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) argue that consumer confidence measures are good proxies
for sentiment as they are highly correlated to the Bull-Bear spread. Qiu and Welch (2004)
also argue that correlations of a new measure with direct survey indicators provide a more
convincing validation because direct survey indicators directly show opinions of investors.
Previous literature points out two disadvantages of survey-based indicators. First, those
measures are usually in low frequency. Second, Singer et al. (2002) cast doubts on the quality
of survey-based indicators due to the lack of incentives for interviewees to truthfully and
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carefully answer the survey questions, especially when the questions are sensitive.
The advantage of textual sentiment indicator is that it could be measured in different
frequency and have easier access than the survey-based sentiment indicator. However, the
quality of textual analysis based sentiment indicator, to a large extent, relies on finding the
right and comprehensive negative and positive words dictionary.
The advantage of market-based sentiment indicators is their availability and high-frequency
availability relative to survey-based sentiment indicator. The disadvantage is that the market-
based sentiment indicators are the equilibrium of many economic forces other than investor
sentiment. Also, it faces a problem pointed out by Qiu and Welch (2004) succinctly: "How
does one test a theory that is about input → outputs with an output measure?". This is why
current literature mostly verify a market-based sentiment indicator by testing its correla-
tion with survey-based sentiment indicator. To better address this issue, future research
should contribute more on designing a better framework or finding a better test-field for the
validation of market-based sentiment indicators.
2.2 Investor Sentiment and Stock Returns
2.2.1 Effect on Aggregate Market and Cross-Sectional Returns
Theoretical Models
Models like Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Black (1986), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Daniel
et al. (1998), among others, are designed to illustrate the effect of sentiment on asset returns
from the aspect of limits on arbitrage. Another strand of theoretical works illustrates the
effect of investor sentiment on asset price with belief-based models. For instance, Barberis
et al. (1998) propose a model which measures investors’ attention on the strength and the
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statistical weight of information; they prove investors’ overreaction or underreaction to
information cause cross-section return premium. They argue that investors wrongly allocate
their attention on the strength and the statistical weight of information, and therefore their
biased perceptions will lead to cross-section return disparity between stocks. Barberis et al.
(1998) incorporate the conservatism and representativeness bias in this belief-based model.
Daniel et al. (2001) model the effect of overconfidence in private information on asset prices.
Instead of capturing only a few aspects of biased belief, De Long et al. (1990a) propose a
noise trader model to incorporate all kinds of biased belief into one parameter and theoreti-
cally relate prices to sentiment level and returns to sentiment changes. The selling point of
DSSW model is that the uncertainty of stochastic investor sentiment create noise trader risk
can prevent rational investors to eliminate the mispricing with limits on arbitrage entirely,
and investor sentiment can drive a wedge between the price and the fundamental value. This
model also shows that current sentiment change positively varies with current return and the
lagged sentiment negatively predicts returns.
Aggregate market and Cross-Sectional Returns
Almost all theories of investor sentiment including De Long et al. (1990a) apply most
appropriately to market portfolios since there is only one risky asset in the models (Huang
et al., 2015), yet empirical literatures suggest that the role of sentiment is at best controversial
at the aggregate market level (Baker et al., 2012; Brown and Cliff, 2004; Elton et al., 1998;
Solt and Statman, 1988). Instead, there is ample evidence that market sentiment helps explain
the asset returns in the cross-section (Baker and Wurgler, 2007, ,among others.).
Why is the effect of investor sentiment is stronger in the cross-section than in the aggregate
market? The answer is that stocks may have asymmetric sensitivities to investor sentiment
(Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Zhou, 2017). Baker and Wurgler (2007) explain with a see-saw
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graph to show that the predictive effect of investor sentiment weakens if the sentiment-
immune stocks possibly have opposite response to a sentiment shock compare with the
sentiment-prone stocks due to "flight to quality".
Sentiment often acts at the level of categories (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003; Barberis et al.,
2005). Cohen and Lou (2012) find when facing up with the same information, complicated
firms are more difficult to categorise, and therefore they are less likely to be affected by
investor sentiment which acts at the categorical level. Baker and Wurgler (2006) indicate
that sentiment-prone stocks tend to be small, young, volatile, unprofitable, non-dividend-
paying, distressed or with extreme growth potential and contains relatively high percentage
of intangible assets, because this kind of stocks is more difficult to evaluate and more likely
to be misperceived by sentiment-biased investors. Berger and Turtle (2012) look into whether
stocks with those characteristics are sentiment prone. They use each characteristic to construct
ten decile portfolios and calculate the average sentiment sensitivity measured by sentiment
beta in the asset pricing regression. They conclude that investor sentiment sensitivities are
significantly correlated with those categorisation measures in the cross-section, and greater
extent of opacity means higher sentiment sensitivities. Therefore, it is practical to divide the
stocks into categories based on its sensitivity to investor sentiment and check how they react
differently to investor sentiment.
Long-Run and Short-Run Effect
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), who illustrate that the agency problem, arbitrage cost, long
liquidation risk and funding constraints of rational investors will prevent them from taking
long-term positions against mispricing. If investors are not sophisticated enough to under-
stand a money manager’s strategies, they will use short-term returns as a way of judging his
competence and withdraw funds after a poor performance, which threatens arbitrageurs to
take a short-term view. The holding cost of counteracting the mispricing is high for the long-
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run holding period, especially for short selling. Arbitragers may even be forced to liquidate
their positions at a loss when running out of capital. However, the mutually-exclusive effects
of long- and short-term sentiment on predicting future return have so far not been emphasised
in the literature. Most researchers focus on the short-term relation between sentiment and
return, while few look into how long-term and short-term investor sentiments affect either
long-term or short-term return. For example, Brown and Cliff (2005) prove that short-term
sentiment will have a stronger predictive power on long-term future return than on short-term
future return. It is of essential importance to look at the effect of investor sentiment in both
the long and the short run.
2.2.2 Momentum and Reversal Effects of Sentiment on Returns
In short, previous empirical studies on the link between investor sentiment and stock re-
turns generally show two findings: first, investor sentiment is negatively related to future
stock returns; second, the predictive power of investor sentiment on stock returns is more
pronounced in the cross-section. The contrarian predictive power of investor sentiment on
future returns is usually tested with low-frequency data. Most of the commonly used investor
sentiment measures, such as mutual fund flow, consumer confidence index, closed-end fund
discount, Baker Wurgler index, are in monthly frequency (Baker and Wurgler, 2007; Brown
and Cliff, 2005; Neal and Wheatley, 1998, among many others.). Those papers look into
the predictability of those monthly sentiment level on monthly, quarterly or longer-term
future return. They argue that bullish investor sentiment pushes current price high and the
mispricing will be corrected in the future which means lower future return, and vice versa.
It has come to my attention that the negative relationship between investor sentiment
and future returns may not hold in the short run with high-frequency data. A strand of
studies demonstrates the prominent profitability of trading strategies that capture the return
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momentum induced by the news-based sentiment (Huynh and Smith, 2017; Sun et al., 2016;
Uhl, 2017). Even without using intraday data, Lee et al. (2002) show the positive short-term
relationship between investor sentiment and stock return with weekly data. Recently, more
empirical works show that investor sentiment also predicts short-term momentum (see, e.g.,
Chou et al., 2016; Han and Li, 2017).
Mispricing arises due to uninformed demand and limit of arbitrage. Investor sentiment
indicates how far the price is away from the fundamental value. Assume the sentiment-
induced momentum comes through the uninformed demand channel. Liang (2016) argue
that the momentum effect of sentiment shock may come from the underreaction of sentiment-
driven investors, i.e. the persistent high return after a positive shock is due to the delayed
reaction of sentiment-driven investors. However, the under reaction proposition does not
explain the future return reversal. In another word, bubbles exist in a market where some
investors are biased and arbitrage trading is constrained.
Consider the momentum comes from the limit of arbitrage channel. Limit of arbitrage
comes from various sources, namely fundamental risk, noise trader risk, implementation
costs, short-selling constraints and synchronisation risk. One source of limit on arbitrage,
synchronisation risk, could serve well in explaining the momentum effect of investor senti-
ment. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) argue that arbitrageurs may fail to coordinate their
betting against the mispricing due to the dispersion of strategies to find the market turning
points. Rational arbitrageurs may even choose to capture the momentum gains and ride the
bubble, and they correct mispricing until a sufficient mass of arbitrageurs takes synchronised
actions.
A series of empirical works support the argument that rational arbitrageurs delay arbitrage.
McQueen and Thorley (1994) assume the probability to predict the end of a sentiment episode
is low at the beginning and this probability increases when coming to the end of a sentiment
episode. Multiple anecdotal studies have contended that institutional investors managerially
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ride the bubble and exacerbate mispricing (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004; DeVault et al.,
2014; Griffin et al., 2011; Xiong and Yu, 2011). Rather than selling to bring the price back
to fundamental value, some institutional investors choose to buy, knowing that positive
feedback will attract more irrational traders, leading to a higher price where they can exit a
profit. The market timing behaviour of institutional investors makes the mispricing sustaining
for the more extended consecutive period before correction. This mispricing component
accumulates till the point that it becomes attractive enough for sophisticated investors to
counteract the mispricing (Berger and Turtle, 2015).
Previous studies on the behaviour of individual investors versus institutional investors
justify this thesis using delayed arbitrage theory to explain the profitability of technical
analysis. Empirical findings show sophisticated investors ride the bubbles and benefit from
chasing the trend, while individual investors are the contrarian traders. In line with Abreu
and Brunnermeier (2003) model, Griffin et al. (2011) find that during tech bubble period
institutional investors were the major buyers of technology stocks and they were also the
dominant selling force when bubble crashed. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) report hedge
funds ride the technology bubble by heavily investing in technology stocks. In the same
vein, Temin and Voth (2004) present through a case study that one sophisticated investor
knowingly invested in the South Sea bubble and earned profits from riding the bubble. Since
no short-selling constraints or agency problems exist for this sophisticated investor, Temin
and Voth (2004) argue that it is synchronisation problem among rational investors that lead
to the bubble and the subsequent crash.
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2.3 Technical Analysis and Investor Sentiment
2.3.1 The Efficiency of Technical Analysis
Earlier empirical works about the efficiency of technical analysis are inconclusive. Generally
speaking, evidence of the profitability of technical analysis is much stronger in foreign
exchange markets (Allen and Taylor, 1990; Lui and Mole, 1998; Narayan et al., 2015; Neely
and Weller, 2003; Osler, 2003; Qi and Wu, 2006; Taylor and Allen, 1992). With regard to
other asset classes, Goh et al. (2013) find that technical indicators have salient forecasting
power on bond risk premium. Lukac et al. (1988) find supporting evidence in the commodity
futures market. Glabadanidis (2014) shows the predominate profitability of applying the
Moving Average trading rule on REIT indexes.
Efficacy of technical analysis in the stock market is much weaker relative to futures
markets or foreign exchange markets during the 1960s and 1970s. One of the earliest work,
Cowles (1933), shows that Hamilton’s forecasts based on Dow Theory over 1904 to 1929 only
have a success rate of 55%. Fama and Blume (1966) find the Filter Rules was not profitable
over 1956-1962. Allen and Taylor (1990) see little profitability of generic algorithms in the
stock market. Sullivan et al. (1999) find profitability of technical analysis vanishes after
adjusting for data-snooping bias2. Their finding indicates that profits of technical analysis
are not due to fundamental changes but rather driven by sentiment.
There are also various studies supporting the effectiveness of technical trading rules in
stock markets. Take some recent papers for instance, Brock et al. (1992) present evidence
that uptrend signals of technical analysis indicators made by DJIA consistently predict
higher subsequent returns than downtrend signals. Nagel (2012) strengthens the liquidity
2Data-snooping bias arises when a set of data is over-reused for the purposes of model selection or making
inference. When data is used repeatedly, there is always a chance that the satisfactory results are obtained due
to pure-luck rather than to any underlying economic rationale. In a case of data-snooping bias, the significant
statistical tests results are overvalued and does not show merit.
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explanation with proof that both the short-term reversal strategies and trend factors do well
during recessions because of evaporating liquidity. Ülkü and Prodan (2013) show that
return persistence is a principal determinant of trend-following rules’ profitability, and return
volatility will also contribute to the profitability. Antoniou et al. (2013) test specific technical
rules in isolation. Consistent with the informational diffusion model, Han et al. (2016)
construct a pricing factor from trend-following strategy and find it performs better when
information is more uncertain.
Park and Irwin (2007) point out the difficulty of proving the efficiency of technical
analysis lies in statistical methodology. The riskiness of technical trading rules should be
taken into consideration; the trading rule profits should be adjusted for data snooping biases
and be tested for its statistical significance. Data-snooping bias occurs when a given set
of data is used more than once for the purpose of inference or model selection. Sullivan
et al. (1999) test 7846 trading rules that belongs to five commonly used classes, namely the
Filter Rules, Moving Averages, Support and Resistance, Channel Breakouts and On-balance
Volume Averages. They find that during the 1987 to 1996 technical trading rules are of little
value after applying Bootstrap Reality Check methodology to account for the data-snooping
bias. There is also a possibility that certain technical analysis rules may perform well due to
pure luck. The universe of technical trading rules should be set up to show the profitability of
technical trading strategies is artificial by data-mining and picking out the trading strategies
that work well.
2.3.2 Theoretical Explanations for the Use of Technical Analysis
Typical theoretical explanations for the use of technical analysis include the following three
groups. The first group argue technical analysis users are not fully rational. The second
group argues that technical analysis is valuable in processing information of fundamental
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influences on price. The third group proposes that technical analysis exploit information of
the non-fundamental impacts on price.
Irrational Action. Some argue that using technical analysis is an unreasonable action.
Technical analysis challenges the Efficiency Markets Hypothesis, which indicates technical
analysis is of no value when information on past prices has been embedded into the current
price (Fama and Blume, 1966; Jensen and Benington, 1970). However, the consistent
popularity of technical analysis does not fit EMH. The Efficient Market Hypothesis suggests
that irrational investors will be forced out of the market after making losses to rational
investors. Some hold the opinion that technical analysis users have suboptimal behaviour.
For instance, Ebert and Hilpert (2016) point out that even when technical analysis is not
profitable it is still attractive due to investors’ preference for positive skewness return, and
technical analysis induces lottery-like returns that is more right-skewed. De Long et al.
(1990b) propose that technical analysis users may underestimate the asset risk. Some claim
that financial intermediaries promote technical analysis as its forecasts generate fee and
commission.
However, many economists do not agree with the irrational behavioural explanation
and insist that technical analysis is of value in making investment decisions. Technical
analysis is still appealing and popular among financial practitioners, including a large part
of sophisticated investors who are from the buy-side and are not likely to have suboptimal
behaviour or underestimate the risk. For example, Lo and Hasanhodzic (2010) and Schwager
(2012) find in their interviews that many top traders and fund managers believe in and employ
technical analysis to make decisions accordingly. Their interviewees see technical analysis
at least as critical as fundamental analysis. Menkhoff (2010) finds technical analysis is the
most important form of analysis among fund managers at a forecasting horizon of weeks,
and it is more popular in smaller asset management firms.
Under the irrational explanation, technical analysis is deemed as much less profitable
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for individual investors relative to institutional investors. Smith et al. (2016) demonstrate
that hedge fund managers who use technical analysis have superior performance, lower
risk and better market-timing ability than the non-users during high sentiment periods, and
those advantages disappear and even reverse in low sentiment periods. However, individual
technical analysis users have poor performance. Neely (1997) points out that it is much
less useful for individual investors in foreign exchange market due to higher transaction
cost, the opportunity cost of time and the risk entailed in the trading strategy. Hoffmann
and Shefrin (2014) show that individual technical analysis users are disproportionately less
capable of earning higher returns. These findings are all consistent with the predictions in
Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), that when unsophisticated investors sentiment is predictable
to some extent, rational speculators profit from riding the bubble supported by inexperienced
investors.
Fundamental Explanation. The second group sees technical analysis as an approach to
obtain information of fundamental influences on price. The notion that the process towards
equilibrium prices could be time-consuming throws a lifeline to the efficacy of technical
analysis. In an economy where investors receive information at different times, past prices
are useful in assessing whether the information has been incorporated into current price
(Brown and Jennings, 1989; Hellwig, 1982; Treynor and Ferguson, 1985). Even if investors
receive information at the same time, when investors are heterogeneously informed or process
information at different speeds, past price are also valuable to help investors to make more
price inferences about the signals contained in the information (Brown and Jennings, 1989;
Grundy and McNichols, 1989).
Technical analysis is valuable in analysing the information that reveals in a sequence of
security prices rather than a single price. Treynor and Ferguson (1985) argue that the value
of technical analysis is to evaluate whether the non-public information has been priced into
current price, so it is the non-public information that creates profit opportunity rather than
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technical analysis. Lo et al. (2000) propose that technical analysis adds value to the investment
process based on their novel approach by comparing the distribution conditional on technical
patterns with the unconditional distribution. Edmans et al. (2015) theoretically validate
the use of positive feedback trading strategy by showing that firm decision makers learn
information from market trading and improve the underlying asset value, which increases the
profitability of buying on good news and reduces the profitability of selling on bad news.
Liquidity Explanation. In the same vein, liquidity is another reason for the use of
technical analysis. Cespa and Vives (2015) and Guo and Xia (2012) show that price can differ
from the fundamental value in a market with liquidity traders, and that technical analysis can
be used to capture price trend. Hence, the trend-following strategies based on past prices
could be profitable. In Blume et al. (1994) model, traders receive signals with differing
quality, and volume provides information on the quality of these signals, which enables
traders to use technical analysis as a method of learning. They show that technical analysis
users could do better than the non-users.
Some other fundamental theories try to explain technical analysis from different aspects,
such as better asset allocation, better prediction of market intervene, and so on. Neely and
Weller (2001) argue that technical analysis may capture the trend or support and resistance
levels created by major market participants in a market. The test-ground for this idea is
foreign exchange markets, where central banks are influential traders and can intervene
foreign exchange rates. LeBaron (1999) find the profitability of technical analysis diminishes
after removing the sample periods intervention happens. However, evidence supporting the
overall market intervention argument for the consistent use of technical analysis in the stock
markets is thin.
Behavioural Explanation. The behavioural rationale for the use of technical analysis
is the foundation of this thesis. Some argue that technical analysis is applied to processing
information of the non-fundamental influence on price. Noise traders’ demand for stocks
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could be somewhat disconnected from the news or fundamental factors. Other models
highlight that market participants’ bounded rationality is the reason why technical analysis is
profitable, which enables me to connect technical analysis indicator with investor sentiment.
In Shleifer and Summers (1990) model, noise traders are momentum traders. In Shleifer
and Summers (1990) noise trader models, noise traders buy when prices rise and sell
when prices fall, and the non-fundamental behaviour is not chaotic but has a systematic
component. Their paper infers that technical analysis may serve as an instrument to analyze
this component. Zhu and Zhou (2009) demonstrate that technical analysis improves an
investor’s utility substantially in a standard asset allocation model due to the presence of
irrational noise traders. Some argue that technical analysis predicts the intervene of traders
with influential power, for instance, the intervene of central banks in foreign exchange
markets. The profitability of technical analysis can also stem from investors’ underreaction
to relevant public information in the past prices (Chan et al., 1996; Jegadeesh and Titman,
2001).
Menkhoff and Taylor (2007) argue that the last group of behavioural explanation for
technical analysis is most plausible. However, formal evidence supporting this argument
is weak. My empirical findings are strongly consistent with theories in the last group. The
first three groups do not explain the spike-reversal pattern in cross-sectional returns after a
high technical analysis forecast. On one hand, some models such as information diffusion
model cannot explain the asymmetric profitability of applying technical analysis in the
cross-sectional stock market. On the other hand, theories such as asset allocation model
could not explain why the long-short portfolio returns spike immediately after high technical
analysis forecasts and reverse in subsequent trading days.
Current literature challenges the first group’s opinion that sees technical analysis as
a pure irrational behaviour of irrational investors. It is found that, institutional investors
and experienced practitioners, who are commonly deemed as rational investors, also use
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technical analysis. For instance, Taylor and Allen (1992) find in their survey that over 90%
of experienced traders place some weight on technical analysis in trading activities.
2.3.3 Connections between Sentiment and Technical Analysis
Technical analysis users argue that technical analysis reflect investor sentiment. Menkhoff
(2010) claims that technical analysis could be an instrument to analyze the systematic
component of noise traders trading if the non-fundamental behaviour is assumed not all
chaotic but has a symmetric component. Menkhoff (2010) shows that fund managers who
use technical analysis hold the view that prices are heavily determined by psychological
influences and consequently they react to this view with trend-following strategies. Feng
et al. (2016) state that "One of the core foundational assumptions of technical analysis is
that prices reflect all economically rational factors, as well as all irrational or psychological
factors". One essential technical trading strategy, feedback trading, is primarily driven by
sentiment-related noise trading (Chau et al., 2011; Feng et al., 2016; Kurov, 2008). De Long
et al. (1990b) also explain the mispricing with a model where rational speculators can actively
induce positive feedback trading of more forward-looking speculators.
Another strand of literature links technical analysis with sentiment by looking into the
existence and efficacy of technical analysis during high and low sentiment period. Kurov
(2008) find that positive feedback trading in index futures markets increases when sentiment
is optimistic. Chau et al. (2011) model that feedback traders’ demand for shares also partially
depends on investor sentiment, and they empirically prove that for the largest three US ETF
contracts positive feedback trading significantly exists and the level of feedback trading
increases during high sentiment period. Feng et al. (2016) find that profitability of technical
trading is more prevalent in high sentiment period and is stronger on difficult-to-arbitrage
securities due to impediments on short-selling. When the market is in negative or neutral
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sentiment environment, asset prices should be close to fundamental value as arbitragers
can eliminate mispricing simply by buying. Short-selling constraints lead to higher and
long-lasting asset overpricing in high sentiment periods, therefore making technical analysis
more effective and valuable. Smith et al. (2016) compare the performance of technical
analysis users and non-users among hedge funds and find that technical analysis users exhibit
better performance than non-users, especially during high sentiment periods.
Another vein of studies links sentiment with technical analysis is on anomalies such as
momentum. Numerous studies show asset-pricing anomalies, indicating that predictable
patterns exist in stock returns. Shleifer and Summers (1990) argue that empirical findings
of positive serial correlation of returns in short horizon in the market imply the presence of
positive feedback trading which could not be fully eliminated by arbitragers. Antoniou et al.
(2013) find that momentum effect is stronger during high sentiment period and weaker in low
sentiment period. They suggest that investors may underreact more strongly to information
when it contradicts their sentiment due to cognitive dissonance and subsequently momentum
effect may have asymmetry effect between high and low sentiment period because of short-
selling constraints. Taylor (2014) finds the profits of momentum-based technical trading
rules evolve slowly over time and profits positively rely on investors’ short-selling ability.
All those studies connect technical analysis with sentiment by showing the effectiveness of
technical analysis in different investor sentiment environment.
Technical trading has also long been a prominent example of investor sentiment in
theoretical papers, where investors form their belief based on mechanical trading rules
without consideration of fundamentals. In the noise trader models, irrational noise trader
may employ trading strategies that is based on technical analysis rules, for instance, positive
feedback trading and momentum trading. In Shleifer and Summers (1990), positive feedback
trading leads to an autocorrelation of returns over a short horizon and negative autocorrelation
of returns over a long horizon. Technical analysis is valuable when prices are predictable.
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Menkhoff and Taylor (2007) review literature and argue the most plausible explanation for
technical analysis is that historical prices may reflect not only fundamental information
but also the influences of noise traders or self-fulfilling effect of technical analysis. When
mispricing could be predicted, technical analysis will be valuable. Pring (1991) also argues
that technical analysis holds the key to monitoring investor sentiment. Zhou (2017) highlights
that the importance of linking investor sentiment with technical analysis as well. He points
out that many over-bought and over-sold indicators are designed to capture the unsustainable
sentiment level in the market. With the popularity of technical analysis in practice, technical
analysis provides concrete examples and ways of how investors’ biased beliefs are formed
and therefore could be used to capture investor sentiment.
34
Chapter 3
Investor Sentiment and the
Cross-Section of Stock Returns: New
Theory and Evidence
3.1 Introduction
Several theoretical studies, such as Delong, Shleifer, Summer and Waldmann (1990) (here-
after referred to as DSSW), demonstrate that investor sentiment affects asset prices when
rational arbitrageurs face limits to arbitrage.1 These studies focus on a single risky asset and
accordingly their models are more suitable for empirical tests involving aggregate market
portfolios (Huang et al., 2015). However, while there is ample evidence that market sentiment
affects the cross-section of asset returns2, there is no rigorous theory on the role of investor
sentiment in the context of multiple assets.
1 Several other models, including Campbell and Kyle (1993), Daniel et al. (1998), Barberis et al. (1998),
Hirshleifer (2001), also illustrate the effect of sentiment on signal asset returns.
2 For example, Brown and Cliff (2004), Brown and Cliff (2005), Baker and Wurgler (2006), Lemmon and
Portniaguina (2006), Qiu and Welch (2004), Kumar and Lee (2006), Frazzini and Lamont (2008), Stambaugh
et al. (2012), Ben-Rephael et al. (2012), Da et al. (2014), Huang et al. (2015), among many others.
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The DSSW illustrate that investors’ stochastic biased misperception (which is interpreted
as investor sentiment in this thesis) affect the risky asset’s price in a single risk-asset market.
Predictions from a single-asset model do not necessarily hold in multi-asset economies
(Verrecchia, 2001). For example, Cochrane et al. (2008) show that contrary to a constant
price-dividend ratio and i.i.d. returns in one-tree model of Lucas (1978), the price-dividend
ratio varies over time and predicts future returns in a two-tree model. Therefore, it is unclear
whether DSSW’s predictions can be generalized to markets with more than one risky assets.
In this chapter, I provide a parsimonious model of how investor sentiment affects the
cross-section of stock returns. I introduce the idea that in a multiple risky-asset market
risky assets are prone to two kinds of sentiment: the overall market sentiment and the
idiosyncratic sentiment component. By introducing this new assumption into the DSSW
model, I demonstrate the effect of investor sentiment in the cross-section, which has not been
derived in theory.
Suppose that there are two risky assets, asset A and B. Assume irrational investors’ beliefs
are biased upwards (downwards) more towards A than B when market sentiment is high
(low). Thus, asset A has higher exposure to market-wide sentiment (more sentiment prone)
than asset B. When investor sentiment is unpredictable, this assumption also implies that the
equilibrium returns of asset A will fluctuate more with the shift in market sentiment,hence
posing higher noise trader risk to rational arbitrageurs, than those of asset B. My tractable
model effectively captures the intuitive observation that stocks more prone to investor
sentiment are also more difficult to arbitrage (Baker and Wurgler, 2006).
When market sentiment changes and rational investors trade against the misperception
of irrational investors only partially due to noise trader risk, the contemporaneous returns
of asset A change more than those of asset B. In the subsequent periods, asset A’s returns
reverse more as investor sentiment reverts to its mean. Therefore, my model predicts the
return difference between the more sentiment-prone asset and the less sentiment-prone asset
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to be positively associated with the change in contemporaneous sentiment and negatively
related to the level of lagged sentiment. These predictions are consistent with the existing
empirical evidence on the link between sentiment and cross-sectional stock returns.
Similar to DSSW, my model features the long- and short-run investor sentiment com-
ponents. The long-run sentiment reflects the average bullishness of noise traders, while the
short-run sentiment represents the transitory deviations from the long-run sentiment. Both
components affect the price of the single risky asset in the DSSW model. Unlike DSSW,
the two components in my model have cross-sectional implications. When the short-run
component increases relative to the long-run component, irrational investors become more
bullish and drive up the relative returns of more sentiment-prone stocks. Hence, I predict
a positive correlation between contemporaneous changes in short-run sentiment and the
relative returns of sentiment-prone stocks. However, a higher long-run sentiment exerts
more upward pressure on the prices of more sentiment prone stocks, reducing the expected
future return on these stocks.3 Therefore, I predict the long-run component to be a contrarian
predictor of cross-sectional returns.
Motivated by my model, I empirically decompose investor sentiment into a short-run
sentiment component constructed as incremental changes of sentiment, and a long-run
sentiment component measured by a moving average of investor sentiment during the past
two years.4 I test the cross-sectional pricing effect of both components with all common
stocks on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ between July 1965 and Sep 2015. I follow Baker and
Wurgler (2006) and construct sixteen long-short portfolios that take a long position on more
sentiment-prone stocks and a short position on less sentiment-prone stocks. Sentiment-prone
stocks tend to be small, young, more volatile, unprofitable, non-dividend-paying, financially
3I do not model the time-varying long-run sentiment explicitly. Instead, I rely on comparative statics to
obtain predictions on the pricing effect of long-run sentiment. Allowing long-run sentiment varying with time
complicates the model, although I expect the effect of long-run sentiment to remain the same.
4I also consider alternative measures of short-run and long-run sentiment components and find similar
results.
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distressed, with extreme growth potential or with a relatively high percentage of intangible
assets.
Consistent with my theoretical predictions, I find a positive association between short-run
sentiment and the contemporaneous cross-sectional stock returns and a negative association
between long-run sentiment component and the subsequent cross-sectional stock returns.
These findings are robust after accounting for systematic risk and time-varying factor loadings
as well as to alternative sentiment measures, alternative constructions of portfolios, and
alternative decomposition of sentiment. Further analysis suggests that the effect of the
sentiment components on returns is generally stronger for stocks that are small, young,
volatile, unprofitable/non-dividend paying, financially distressed and have high growth
potential.
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, I contribute to theory by presenting
the first parsimonious model that explicitly examines the effect of market-wide sentiment
on the cross-sectional asset returns. My model formalises Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) idea
that more sentiment-prone assets are also more difficult to arbitrage. The type of limits
to arbitrage I consider here is the noise trader risk, while limits to arbitrage in Baker and
Wurgler (2006) take many other forms, such as transaction costs and idiosyncratic risk.
My model complements existing knowledge on investor sentiment with a single risky asset
by providing theoretical support for the well-documented evidence that investor sentiment
affects the cross-sectional asset returns.
Second, I contribute to the empirical literature on investor sentiment by decomposing
investor sentiment into short- and long-run components, showing that both components affect
cross-sectional stock returns. Existing empirical studies on the pricing impact of investor
sentiment find that change in investor sentiment is positively associated with contempora-
neous returns (e.g., Ben-Rephael et al., 2012; Brown and Cliff, 2004; Lee et al., 2002) and
that the sentiment level is negatively related to future returns(e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2007;
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Brown and Cliff, 2004; Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006; Stambaugh et al., 2012, 2014).
These studies do not decompose sentiment into long- and short-run components. Instead,
most focus on the short-run relations between (undecomposed) sentiment and returns, with
only a few papers investigating the long-run sentiment-return relationship. For example,
Brown and Cliff (2005) document a strong predictive effect of sentiment level on long-run
pricing error in size and value portfolios. Unlike existing studies, I examine the empirical
predictions of my theoretical model by simultaneously examining the effects of long- and
the short-run sentiment components on cross-sectional returns. I find that stock returns are
negatively associated with the long-run sentiment component and positively related to the
short-run sentiment component.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 illustrates the model and
derives the two main hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the data. Section 3.4 discusses the
empirical results and the robustness checks. Section 3.5 summarises the conclusions.
3.2 A Cross-Sectional Noise Trader Risk Model
DSSW (1990) propose a simple overlapping generation model of a market with one risky
asset, one risk-free asset, and two types of two-period-lived agents, rational investors and
irrational noise traders with stochastic misperception. The uncertainty of noise traders’
misperception creates "noise trader risk" that deters rational investors from fully arbitraging.
Because of its focus on a single risky asset, DSSW model is presumably better suited for
examining the impact of investor sentiment at the aggregate levels (Huang et al., 2015).
Since the claims or results in a single-asset model can sometimes be reversed in multi-asset
economies (Verrecchia, 2001), it is unclear whether predictions of DSSW can be generalized
to markets with more than one risky assets. In this study, I extend the single risky asset model
of DSSW to a noise trader risk model with multiple risky assets that vary in their exposure to
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market-wide investor sentiment.
Similar to DSSW, my model is also an overlapping-generation model with two-period-
lived agents. There are two agents in the economy: sophisticated investors (denoted as i),
who have rational expectations, and noise traders (denoted as n), who hold biased beliefs and
trade on noise. The percentage of noise traders in the market is given as µ , and the percentage
of sophisticated investors is 1−µ . Both noise traders’ and sophisticated investors’ utility
function is a CARA (constant absolute risk aversion) function of wealth, U =−e−(2γ)ω ,
where γ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and ω is wealth. If holding period returns
are normally distributed, solving expected utility optimization is equivalent to maximizing
ω−γσ2ω , where ω is the expected final wealth, and σ2ω is one period ahead variance of wealth.
Unlike DSSW, my model has one risk-free asset and two risky assets, u1 and u2.5 The
difference between the risk-free asset and the unsafe assets lies in their supply. The risk-free
asset is in perfectly elastic supply, which implies that its price is fixed. However, the supply
of each unsafe asset is set at one unit, which means that their prices fluctuate along with
the change in demand. In each period the risk-free asset has a fixed real rate of r and the
risky assets have fixed dividend rate r, which means both risk-free asset and risky asset
have the same fixed income rate of r. Sophisticated investors choose a portfolio of holding
λ it,1 amount of risky asset u1 and λ
i
t,2 amount of risky asset u2 to maximize their expected
utility. However, given their misperception, noise traders maximize their expected utility by
choosing a portfolio of holding λ nt,1 amount of risky asset u1and λ
n
t,2 amount of risky asset
u2.
I assume that the overall market sentiment ρt follows a normal distribution with ρt ∼
N(ρ∗,σ2ρ). To examine the cross-sectional effect of investor sentiment and noise trader risk,
5 Extending the model further with more than two risky assets is straightforward. I focus on the two risky
assets model since it is sufficient to shed the lights on the cross-sectional effect of investor sentiment.
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I further assume that noise traders have different misperceptions of the risky assets u1and u2.
ρt,1 = α1ρt+ εt,1, εt,1 ∼N (0,σ2ε1) (3.1)
ρt,2 = α2ρt+ εt,2, εt,2 ∼N (0,σ2ε2) (3.2)
cov(εt,1,ρt) = 0, cov(εt,1,εt,2) = 0 (3.3)
For simplicity, I also assume σ2ε1= σ
2
ε2 . Equations (3.1) and (3.2) show that noise traders’
misperception of a risky asset contains a systematic component proportional to market senti-
ment and an idiosyncratic component. The equations above also imply that σ2ρ1=α1
2σ2ρ+σ2ε1
and σ2ρ2=α2
2σ2ρ+σ2ε2 .Without the loss of generality, assume α1>α2 > 0, then u1 are more
exposed to market sentiment than asset u2.6 This implies σ2ρ1>σ
2
ρ2 . Later I show that equilib-
rium price volatility of asset u1 is larger than that of asset u2 due to higher noise trader risk
(σ2ρ1>σ
2
ρ2). Higher noise trader risk poses stronger limits to arbitrage for rational investors to
trade against irrational investors. As a result, my model parsimoniously captures the intuitive
observation of Baker and Wurgler (2006) that more sentiment-prone assets are also more
difficult to arbitrage, although the limits to arbitrage in Baker and Wurgler (2006) are broader
and not necessarily related to noise trader risk.
For sophisticated investors maximization of their expected utility is equivalent to maxi-
mize
wi− γσ2wi = c0+λ it,1 (r+ t pt+1,1− pt,1 (1+ r))+λ it,2 (r+ t pt+1,2− pt,2 (1+ r))
− γ[λ it,12tσ2pt+1,1 +λ it,2
2
tσ2pt+1,2 +2λ
i
t,1λ
i
t,2tcov(pt+1,1, pt+1,2)]
(3.4)
6 I relax the assumption of positive α1and α2 in the discussions at the end of this section.
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For noise traders maximization of their expected utility is equivalent to maximize
wn− γσ2wn = c0+λ nt,1 (r+ t pt+1,1− pt,1 (1+ r))+λ nt,2 (r+ t pt+1,2− pt,2 (1+ r))
− γ[λ nt,12tσ2pt+1,1 +λ nt,22tσ2pt+1,2 +2λ nt,1λ nt,2tcov(pt+1,1, pt+1,2)]
+λ nt,1(α1ρt+ εt,1)+λ
n
t,2(α2ρt+ εt,2)
(3.5)
where t pt+1,1 is the conditional expectation of the one-step-ahead price of risky asset u1 at
time t, tσ2pt+1,1 is the conditional expectation of one-step-ahead variance of pt+1,1 , and tσ
2
pt+1,2
is the conditional expectation of one-step-ahead variance of pt+1,2, and tcov(pt+1,1, pt+1,2) is
the conditional expectation of the covariance of the one-step-ahead risky assets’ price pt+1,1
and pt+1,2. The anterior subscript t means that an expectation is taken at time t. Solving the
above optimization problem with first-order condition yields the portfolio holdings of the
two risky assets:
λ it,1 =
kRt+1,2−σ22Rt+1,1
2γ(k2−σ21σ22 )
(3.6)
λ it,2 =
kRt+1,1−σ21Rt+1,2
2γ(k2−σ21σ22 )
(3.7)
λ nt,1 =
k(Rt+1,2+α2ρt+ εt,2)−σ22 (Rt+1,1+α1ρt+ εt,1)
2γ(k2−σ21σ22 )
(3.8)
λ nt,2 =
k(Rt+1,1+α1ρt+ εt,1)−σ21 (Rt+1,2+α2ρt+ εt,2)
2γ(k2−σ21σ22 )
(3.9)
where Rt+1,1 = r+ t pt+1,1− pt,1(1+r), Rt+1,2 = r+ t pt+1,2− pt,2(1+r), k= tcov(pt+1,1, pt+1,2),
and σ21 = tσ
2
pt+1,1 , σ
2
2 = tσ
2
pt+1,2 .
Market clearing requires the holding of the two risky assets from the noise traders and
the sophisticated investors to be equal to their supply.

(1−µ)λ it,1+µλ nt,1 = 1
(1−µ)λ it,2+µλ nt,2 = 1
(3.10)
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By assuming that equilibrium prices in all periods have identical distributions, I can obtain
the equilibrium pricing functions by solving the following function recursively:
pt,1 =
1
1+ r
[r+ t pt+1,1−2γ(k+σ21 )+µ(α1ρt+ εt,1)] (3.11)
pt,2 =
1
1+ r
[r+ t pt+1,2−2γ(k+σ22 )+µ(α2ρt+ εt,2)] (3.12)
If the conditional variance of the price is constant, substituting the conditional one-step-ahead
price forward yields:
pt,1 = 1+
µα1(ρt−ρ∗)
1+ r
+
µα1ρ∗
r
− 2γ(k+σ
2
1 )
r
+
µεt,1
1+ r
(3.13)
pt,2 = 1+
µα2(ρt−ρ∗)
1+ r
+
µα2ρ∗
r
− 2γ(k+σ
2
2 )
r
+
µεt,2
1+ r
(3.14)
The equilibrium price is a function of both the misperception and the risk induced by
stochastic misperception. The second term in the equilibrium price functions shows the
change in the price caused by the fluctuations of the overall market misperception around its
long-run mean. When noise traders become more bullish relative to the average overall market
misperceptions, their demand pushes the price up. The third term captures the deviation of
the price from the fundamental value caused by the average overall market misperception.
The fourth term captures the compensation for bearing the "noise trader risk" caused by
uncertainty of the next period’s misperception. Noise trader risk makes sophisticated investors
unwilling to trade fully against noise traders since future misperceptions of noise traders can
become extreme. The last term captures the fluctuation in price caused by the variation of
idiosyncratic misperceptions towards risky asset u1. Equations (3.13) and (3.14) imply that
the unconditional price volatility and the price covariance of the two risky assets at time t+1
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are given as:
σ2t+1,1 =
α21µ
2σ2ρ
(1+ r)2
+
µ2σ2ε1
(1+ r)2
(3.15)
σ2t+1,2 =
α22µ
2σ2ρ
(1+ r)2
+
µ2σ2ε2
(1+ r)2
(3.16)
cov(pt+1,1, pt+1,2) =
α1α2µ2σ2ρ
(1+ r)2
(3.17)
I also solve the Equation (3.6) to (3.9) to obtain the portfolio holdings for sophisticated
investors and noise traders:
λ it,1 = 1−
µ(kα2−σ22α1)
2γ(k2−σ21σ22 )
ρt− µ(kεt,2−σ
2
2 εt,1)
2γ(k2−σ21σ22 )
(3.18)
λ it,2 = 1−
µ(kα1−σ21α2)
2γ(k2−σ21σ22 )
ρt− µ(kεt,1−σ
2
1 εt,2)
2γ(k2−σ21σ22 )
(3.19)
λ nt,1 = 1+
(1−µ)(kα2−σ22α1)
2γ(k2−σ21σ22 )
ρt+
(1−µ)(kεt,2−σ22 εt,1)
2γ(k2−σ21σ22 )
(3.20)
λ nt,2 = 1+
(1−µ)(kα1−σ21α2)
2γ(k2−σ21σ22 )
ρt+
(1−µ)(kεt,1−σ21 εt,2)
2γ(k2−σ21σ22 )
(3.21)
Given the obtained price volatility and covariance, 2γ(k2−σ21σ22 ) < 0, kα2−σ22α1 < 0,
and kα1−σ21α2 < 0. Thus, the sophisticated investors’ holdings of the two risky assets are
inversely proportional to current market sentiment, while the noise traders’ holdings of these
risky assets are proportional to current market sentiment. That is, sophisticated investors
reduce their demand for sentiment-prone assets while noise traders increase their demand for
sentiment-prone assets when overall market sentiment becomes more bullish.
The exposure of the risky assets to the overall market misperception also affects the
cross-section of holdings. The sophisticated investors’ holdings of u1(u2) are positively
related to α1(α2). Since α1 > α2, the current market sentiment will have a greater effect on
investors’ (both sophisticated and irrational) holdings of asset u1. This also means that when
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overall market sentiment becomes more bullish, sophisticated investors will reduce their
demand for asset u1 more than asset u2 and irrational investors will increase their demand for
asset u1 more than on asset u2.
Recall that the excess return from date t to date t+1 is defined as: Rt+1 = r+ t pt+1,1−
pt,1(1+ r). Plugging this in the equilibrium price, I obtain the return for asset u1 and asset
u2 at time t+1
Rt+1,1 =
µα1[ρt+1− (1+ r)ρt ]
1+ r
− α1µρ
∗
1+ r
+2γ(k+σ21 )+θ1 (3.22)
Rt+1,2 =
µα2[ρt+1− (1+ r)ρt ]
1+ r
− α2µρ
∗
1+ r
+2γ(k+σ22 )+θ2 (3.23)
where θ1(θ2) are functions of εt,1 and εt+1,1 (εt,2 and εt+1,2). Hence, the return difference
between the two risky assets is
Rt+1,1−Rt+1,2 = (α1−α2)[µ[ρt+1− (1+ r)ρt ]1+ r −
µρ∗
1+ r
]+2γ(σ21 −σ22 )+θ1−θ2 (3.24)
The equilibrium returns can also be expressed as functions of the deviation of current
sentiment from its long-run mean, denoted as ηt (ηt = ρt−ρ∗).
Rt+1,1 =
µα1[ηt+1− (1+ r)ηt ]
1+ r
−α1µρ∗+2γ(k+σ21 )+θ1 (3.25)
Rt+1,2 =
µα2[ηt+1− (1+ r)ηt ]
1+ r
−α2µρ∗+2γ(k+σ22 )+θ2 (3.26)
Hence, the return difference between asset u1 and asset u2 at time t+1 can be written as
Rt+1,1−Rt+1,2 = (α1−α2)[µ[ηt+1− (1+ r)ηt ]1+ r −µρ
∗]+2γ(σ21 −σ22 )+θ1−θ2 (3.27)
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Take the unconditional expectations of Equation (3.27), I obtain:
E(Rt+1,1−Rt+1,2) = (α1−α2)[−µρ∗]+2γ(σ21 −σ22 ) (3.28)
I consider the average of the overall market misperception ρ∗ as the long-run sentiment
component, and the incremental sentiment change as the short-run sentiment component.
The latter is measured by either sentiment increment, ρt − (1+ r)ρt−1, or the changes of
sentiment’s derivation from its long-run mean, ηt+1− (1+ r)ηt .
Equations (3.22) and (3.23) show that the short-run sentiment is positively related to
the returns of both risky assets. The effect is stronger for u1 than u2 because α1 > α2 (see
Equation (3.27)). As a result, I have the following hypothesis on the pricing effect of the
short-run component of investor sentiment:
Hypothesis 1. The short-run sentiment component is positively related to the contempo-
raneous difference in returns of more sentiment-prone and less sentiment-prone assets.
Inspection of Equations (3.22) and (3.23) also reveals that returns of a risky asset depend
on the exposure of the misperception about its price to the overall market misperception.
High long-run sentiment implies lower equilibrium returns for both risky assets (α1 and α2
are positive), and the returns of u1 are more adversely affected by the long-run sentiment than
u2 (α1 > α2). This leads to my hypothesis on the pricing effect of the long-run component of
investor sentiment.
Hypothesis 2. The long-run sentiment component predicts lower returns for more
sentiment-prone assets than less sentiment-prone assets.
If I relax the assumption that α1 > α2 > 0 by allowing α2 < 0 while keeping α1 > 0, the
effect of long- and short-run investor sentiment are inversed for the risky asset u2. In this
case, when the average market sentiment becomes more bullish, it exerts an adverse effect on
contemporaneous returns due to the short-run sentiment effect, and a positive effect on future
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returns due to the long-run sentiment effect. The opposite is true in case of the risky asset u1,
as it still has a positive exposure to market sentiment. Hence, the returns of the two risky
assets move in the opposite directions, and the effect of long- and short-run sentiment will be
muted at the aggregate market level. Baker and Wurgler (2007) make a similar argument that
if the price of a low sentiment-prone stock is inversely related to sentiment, due to reasons
such as "flight to quality”, then the effect of sentiment on aggregate market returns is unlikely
to be significant. This implication may also explain the inconclusive evidence on the impact
of investor sentiment on aggregate market returns (Baker and Wurgler, 2007; Baker et al.,
2012; Brown and Cliff, 2004; Elton et al., 1998). However, for a given positive α1 when
α1 > α2, a negative (instead of positive) α2 makes the cross-sectional returns difference
between u1 and u24 more dispersed. Hence, it is not surprising that several empirical studies
find that market sentiment affects asset returns in the cross-section (Baker and Wurgler, 2007;
Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006, among others).
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Portfolio Construction
To substantiate my theory, I follow Baker and Wurgler (2006) to construct long-short portfo-
lios to obtain the relative returns of more sentiment-prone stocks over less sentiment-prone
stocks. Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that firms that are small, young, volatile, non-
dividend-paying/non-profitable, informationally opaque, financially distressed and with more
growth opportunities are more prone to sentiment. Similar to Baker and Wurgler (2006),
I construct sixteen long-short portfolios based on 10 characteristics. These characteristics
include market capitalization (ME), firm age (Age), total risk (Sigma), earnings-book ratio
for profitable firms (E/BE), dividend-book ratio for dividend payers (D/BE), fixed assets ratio
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(PPE/A), research and development ratio (RD/A), book-to-market ratio (BE/ME), external
finance over assets (EF/A) and sales growth ratio (GS).7 The ten firm characteristics are
winsorized at 99.5 and 0.5% annually. The breakpoints for deciles are defined by only using
NYSE firms. The top three, middle four, and bottom three decile portfolios are noted as H,
M, and L respectively.
The firm-level accounting data are from Compustat and the firm-level stock monthly
returns are from CRSP. I adopt the Fama and French (1992) approach and match the year-end
accounting data of year t-1 to monthly returns from July t to June t+1. The stock market data
include all common stocks (share codes 10 and 11) on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ (with
stock exchange codes 1, 2, and 3) between January 1962 and Sep 2015. My final sample
consists of 18175 firms. I only consider the RD/A from 1972 because the RD/A data are
not available until 1971. I follow Baker and Wurgler (2006) to construct the portfolio when
possible.8
To facilitate the interpretation of my results, I use the returns of more sentiment-prone
stocks minus the returns of less sentiment-prone stocks to calculate the returns of the long-
short portfolios. For example, the returns of the long-short portfolio based on BE/ME (L-M)
represents the return difference between the bottom three deciles and the middle four deciles
when using BE/ME as the sorting characteristic. All the portfolio returns are equal-weighted.9
The sixteen long-short portfolios can be categorised into six groups. The first group is
named ’Size, Age, and Risk’. Small, young, and volatile firms are more sentiment-prone;
hence, the long-short portfolios associated with these variables are constructed and noted as
ME(L-H), Age(L-H) and Sigma(H-L). The second group is referred to as ’Profitability and
7Definitions of these characteristics variables are provided in the Appendix B.
8I use the same variable definition of Baker and Wurgler (2006) except for RD/A, which I do not replace
any missing value with zero. Replacing R&D missing values with zeros will cause some problem after mid
2000 where almost half of the observations are zero. I focus on the stocks that have non-missing R&D values.
Monthly returns are adjusted for delisting.
9I also conduct all the tests in this chapter with value-weighted returns and find similar results.
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Dividend Policy’. In this group, non-profitable stocks or stocks with low dividend payments
are considered to be more prone to sentiment. The third group is labelled ’Tangibility’ and
contains portfolios constructed by PPE/A and RD/A. Stocks with less tangible asset or more
intangible asset are considered to be more informational opaque and therefore more prone
to sentiment. The last three groups are called ’Growth Opportunity and Distress’, ’Growth
Opportunity’ and ’Distress’ respectively, which are constructed according to BE/ME, EF/A
and GS.
The reason for constructing nine long-short portfolios in the last three groups based on
the three characteristics (BE/ME, EF/A, and GS) is that those three characteristics have a
multidimensional nature. Stocks at the top and the bottom deciles sorted on BE/ME, EF/A
or GS represent either extreme growth or extreme value stocks, while firms in the middle
deciles are more stable and safe. In the meantime, those three characteristics could be used
as a generic pricing factor. Take BE/ME as an example. High BE/ME implies that a firm is
in distress, while the low BE/ME indicates extreme growth potential. On one hand, since
financially distressed stocks are highly appealing to the speculative demand of irrational
investors, firms with high BE/ME, low EF/A, and low GS are likely to be more prone to
sentiment. On the other hand, as high growth firms are hard to value, the returns of firms
with low BE/ME, high EF/A, and high GS are likely to be affected more by shifts in investor
sentiment.
Panel A in Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics for the long-short portfolio returns
during the sample period. Generally, most of the long-short portfolios have positive average
returns. The negative average portfolio returns of EF/A(H-L) and GS(H-L) are not surprising
because EF/A and GS measures the growth opportunity and financial stress in an opposing
way from BE/ME.10 The returns of those sixteen long-short portfolios are all positively
10One may find it more appropriate to construct long-short portfolios as EF/A(L-H) and GS(L-H). However,
due to the multidimensional nature of EF/A and GS, I would not expect decomposed investor sentiment to
perform well in predicting the long-short portfolios constructed with top and bottom deciles of EF/A or GS,
whatever the long-legs or short-legs are. Accordingly, I use EF/A(H-L) and GS(H-L) to be consistent with
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skewed. The last two columns of Panel A report the first-order autoregression coefficients
(AR(1)) and the correlation between the variable and one-month lagged Baker Wurgler
sentiment (Corr), respectively. Although the portfolio returns of ME(L-H) and BE/ME (H-L)
have little autocorrelations, the returns of all other long-short portfolios are significantly
autocorrelated. Furthermore, except for BE/ME(L-H), GS(H-L) and BE/ME(H-M), Baker
Wurgler sentiment negatively predicts future returns with strong statistical significance. The
negative correlation coefficients between the long-short portfolio returns and one-month
lagged investor sentiment are in line with previous studies showing that investor sentiment is
a good contrarian predictor of future cross-sectional returns.
Baker and Wurgler(2006).
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3.3.2 Decomposition of Investor Sentiment
To test my theoretical predictions on the cross-sectional effect of the long- and short-run
sentiment, I empirically decompose the overall market sentiment, as measured by the original
monthly sentiment index constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2006), into long- and short-run
sentiment components.
One innovation in my empirical tests is allowing long-run investor sentiment to vary
over time. In the DSSW model, both the constant level of long-run investor sentiment and
the fluctuation of short-run investor sentiment affect the asset price. However, the long-
run sentiment is included in their model as a constant and has a time invariant impact on
returns of the risky asset in the equilibrium. Empirical tests of investor sentiment typically
examine how the short-run lagged level of investor sentiment affects the cross-section of
returns, while long-run sentiment is usually ignored. Omitting long-run sentiment from the
empirical tests probably reflects the lack of a theory that allows long-run sentiment to vary
over time, implying that regressions of returns on constant long-run sentiment will make its
coefficients unidentifiable from the intercept. For this end, I modify the empirical tests by
assuming that the long-run sentiment component is a time-varying first-order autoregressive
progress. In this way, the empirical tests show that the time-varying long-run investor
sentiment is a contrarian predictor of the returns of the long-short portfolio that buys the
more sentiment-prone risky assets and sells the less sentiment-prone risky assets.
In my baseline regressions, I choose Baker-Wurgler Sentiment indicator as the investor
sentiment measure, because it is extensively accepted in the empirical studies. Choosing
Baker-Wurgler Sentiment also enables me to compare my results with Baker and Wurgler
(2006) to see whether my decomposed sentiment performs better at explaining the cross-
sectional return. Baker and Wurgler (2006) use the principal component analysis method to
extract the common component of five sentiment proxies, including closed-end fund discount
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(CEFD), the number and the first-day returns of IPOs (NIPO, RIPO), the equity share in total
new issues (S), and the dividend premium (DP).11 The Baker-Wurgler index, Sent_BW, is
orthogonalized to macroeconomic variables, including the growth in industrial production,
the growth in durable, nondurable, and services consumption, the growth in employment and
a NBER dummy variable for recessions. The sample period is from July 1965 to September
2015.12
I implement two approaches to decompose the original investor sentiment index. The
first one uses a moving average of the original sentiment index as a crude yet intuitive
measure for the long-run sentiment component. More specifically, at each time t, the long-
run sentiment component ρLR,t is the moving average of the original sentiment index over a
two-year period between [t−25, t−2]. While the choice of a 24-month window is admittedly
somewhat arbitrary, it is partially motivated by the observation that periods of high/low
sentiment often persist for around two years. For example, the US stock market experienced
a "new-issue mania" between 1961 and 1962, high investor sentiment for firms with strong
growth potential between 1967 and 1968, and a bubble in gambling issues in 1977 and 1978.
Concerning the bubbles and crashes, it also usually takes around two years for stock price to
come back to earth in the anecdotal history. For instance, following the high-tech bubble in
early 1980s, investors’ demand shifted to dividend paying stocks between 1987 and 1988.
For robustness purposes, I also consider alternative windows of the moving average for long-
run sentiment, including 12-month, 36-month and 48-month,with my primary conclusions
remaining unchanged.
When the long-run sentiment component is measured crudely by smoothing average,
there are two ways to construct the corresponding short-run sentiment component. One
measure for the short-run component (ρt −ρt−1)⊥ is the change in the current sentiment
11Jeffery Wurgler provide these data on his personal website http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/.
12I choose the Baker-Wurgler index as my baseline sentiment measure to make it easier to compare my
regression results with the findings in Baker and Wurgler (2006). I also use other sentiment measures to obtain
their long-run and short-run components and find similar results.
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from its previous level, which is also orthogonalized to the long-run sentiment component.
ρt−ρt−1 is orthogonalized from the long-run sentiment component to obtain a measure of
the short-run sentiment fluctuation that is uncorrelated with the long-run sentiment. Another
measure for short-run sentiment ηt−ηt−1 is the change in the deviation of current sentiment
from its corresponding long-run sentiment (ρt−ρLR,t)− (ρt−1−ρLR,t−1).13
Our second approach to decompose sentiment is from Beveridge and Nelson (1981).14
The Beveridge-Nelson decomposition is an approach to decompose the Autoregressive
Integrated Moving Average ARIMA(p,1,q) process into two components: a permanent com-
ponent that is a random walk with drift and a transitory component that is a stationary process
with a mean of zero. I consider the permanent component of the decomposed sentiment index
as the long-run sentiment (BN_LR), and the transitory component of decomposed sentiment
index as the short-run sentiment (BN_SR).
Figure 3.1 depicts the time series of decomposed long- and short-run sentiment and the
original Baker-Wurgler index when using a moving average to obtain long-run sentiment.
The long-run sentiment is ρLR and the short-run sentiment is ηt −ηt−1. The graph shows
that the long-run sentiment is strongly correlated with the original Baker-Wurgler sentiment
index, albeit with some lags. The long-run sentiment is smoother than the original Baker-
Wurgler index, while the short-run sentiment is relatively small and fluctuates around zero.
The short-run sentiment component is generally smaller in magnitudes than the long-run
sentiment component.
13 Based on my model, the short-run sentiment should be (ρt − (1+ r)ρt−1)⊥ . I nevertheless follow the
previous literature and ignore the effect of risky-free rate to obtain a short-run sentiment proxy, (ρt −ρt−1)⊥. I
also use (ρt − (1+ r)ρt−1)⊥ to run the tests and the regression results are strongly consistent with the results of
using (ρt −ρt−1)⊥. The monthly risky-free rate is small and does not affect my main results.
14I thank Dominique Ladiray for providing the algorithm codes.
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Moving Average Based Decomposition of BW Sentiment Index, 1965:07-2015:09.
The long-dashed blue line depicts the original Baker-Wurgler sentiment index during July
1965 and September 2015. The solid red line depicts the long-run component of Baker-
Wurgler sentiment index, which is measured by the moving average of previous 24-month
sentiment. The green short-dashed line depicts the short-run component ηt−ηt−1, which is
the change in the deviation of current sentiment from its corresponding long-run sentiment.
Fig. 3.1 Moving Average Based Decomposition of BW Sentiment Index
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Beveridge-Nelson Decomposition of BW Sentiment Index, 1965:07-2015:09.
The short-dashed blue line depicts the original Baker-Wurgler sentiment index. The red
solid line depicts the long-run component of Baker-Wurgler sentiment index decomposed
by Beveridge and Nelson (1981) method. The long-dashed green line depicts the short-run
component of Baker-Wurgler sentiment index decomposed by Beveridge and Nelson (1981)
method.
Fig. 3.2 Beveridge-Nelson Decomposition of BW Sentiment Index
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Figure 3.2 plots Beveridge-Nelson decomposed sentiment and the original Baker-Wurgler
index. It shows that BN_LR is highly correlated with the original Baker-Wurgler sentiment.
Comparing Figure 3.2 with Figure 3.1, the long-run sentiment is no longer a lagged version
of original sentiment. The correlation coefficient between the long-run sentiment and the
original sentiment is higher when I use BN_LR as the long-run sentiment indicator. Figure
3.2 also shows that BN_SR has a broader range than other short-run sentiment measures,
such as ηt−ηt−1 and (ρt−ρt−1)⊥.
Panel B of Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the decomposed investor sentiment
during the sample period from July 1965 to September 2015. Regarding the magnitudes
of decomposed sentiment components, the long-run sentiment is generally much bigger
than the short-run sentiment. The standard deviations of the long-run sentiment ρLR and
BN_LR are 0.91 and 1.06, respectively. The standard deviations of the two short-run
sentiment components,ηt −ηt−1 and (ρt −ρt−1)⊥, are both 0.02. The Beveridge-Nelson
decomposition generates a short-run sentiment with a relatively larger scale than ηt−ηt−1
and (ρt−ρt−1)⊥. The short-run sentiment component BN_SR has a standard deviation of
0.22.
Panel B also shows that the long-run sentiment measures, namely ρLR and BN_LR, have
a significant first-order autocorrelation coefficient with a value of 0.99. Short-run sentiment
measure (ρt−ρt−1)⊥ does not have significant correlation with its own lagged term, as it has
been orthogonalized to the strongly persistent long-run sentiment component. The short-run
sentiment BN_SR is still significantly auto-correlated, with a first-order autocorrelation
coefficient of 0.91. The last column of Panel B presents the correlation between each
decomposed sentiment and the one-term lagged Baker-Wurgler sentiment. Apart from
(ρt−ρt−1)⊥, the long- and short-run sentiment measures are significantly associated with
the original sentiment, although the correlation coefficients for the short-run sentiment are
relatively small in term of magnitude. With the exception of (ρt −ρt−1)⊥, the short-run
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sentiment measures are negatively associated with the one-period lagged original Baker and
Wurgler sentiment.
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 Decomposed Sentiment and Cross-Sectional Returns
Our theoretical model predicts that both the long- and short-run sentiment components affect
cross-sectional stock returns. To examine this prediction, I run the following regression:
Rt,1−Rt,2 = α+β1ρLR,t+β2∆ρs,t+ γX+ εt (3.29)
where Rt,1−Rt,2 represents the relative returns of a more sentiment-prone portfolio over a
less sentiment-prone portfolio, ρLR,t refers to the long-run sentiment component at time t,
∆ρs,t represents the short-run sentiment increments, and X is a vector of control variables.
The control variables include Fama-French (2015) five factors (RMRF, SMB, HML, RMW,
CMA) and the Carhart (1997) momentum factor (UMD).15 Specifically, RMRF is the market
return premium over risk-free rate; SMB is the average return on the three small portfolios
minus the average return on the three big portfolios; HML is the average return on the two
value portfolios minus the average return on the two growth portfolios; RMW is the average
return on the two robust operating profitability portfolios minus the average return on the two
weak operating profitability portfolios; CMA is the average return on the two conservative
investment portfolios minus the average return on the two aggressive investment portfolios;
UMD is the average return of high prior return portfolio over low prior return portfolio.
The control variable SMB (HML) is excluded when the long-short portfolio is constructed
with ME (BE/ME). The control variable RMW is excluded when the long-short portfolio is
15The data are available on http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
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constructed with E/BE or D/BE.
The strong persistence of the long-run sentiment measure may raise the concern of
spurious regressions. Stambaugh (1999) points out that the coefficient estimates of predictive
regression with a small sample can be biased and distort the t-statistics when the predictor
is highly persistent. Stambaugh bias exists if the autoregressive disturbance of a lagged
stochastic regressor correlates with the regression error term. Under this circumstance,
OLS regression results will lead to an erroneous conclusion that the lagged regressors
have predictive power while in fact they do not. Thus, it is paramount that I account for
Stambaugh bias in my predictive regressions. To this end, I adopt the multi-predictor
augmented regression method of Amihud et al. (2009) to adjust for the Stambaugh bias in the
estimated coefficients and report the t-statistics of coefficients estimated from a wild bootstrap
procedure. The detailed methodology of this wild bootstrap procedure is in Appendix C.
I also calculate Newey-West standard errors (Newey and West, 1987) that are robust to
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, and I choose a maximum lag of 12 throughout the
regressions.
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Table 3.2 Regressions of Monthly Cross-Sectional Returns on Decomposed Sentiment
This table reports the regressions of long-short portfolio returns on both the long-run and short-run sentiment.
Rt,1−Rt,2 = α+β1ρLR,t +β2∆ρs,t + γX+ εt ,
Rt,1−Rt,2 represents the return disparity of more sentiment-prone portfolio over the less sentiment-prone
portfolio. The control variables (X) include the Fama-French Five factors (RMRF, HML, SMB, RMW, CMA),
and the momentum factor (UMD). SMB (HML) will not be included in regression when return premium
is constructed by ME (BE/ME). The first two columns show how the portfolio is constructed. H, M, L
represents the top three, middle four and bottom three decile portfolios respectively. The long-run sentiment
component ρLR,t in Panel A and Panel B is the standardised smoothing average of prior [−25,−2] monthly
investor sentiment. Short-run component in Panel A and Panel B are respectively the standardised incremental
change of sentiment deviation from long-run sentiment average ηt −ηt−1 and the standardised incremental
sentiment orthogonalized to long-run sentiment (ρt −ρt−1)⊥. The long- and short-run sentiment in Panel C
are decomposed with Beveridge and Nelson (1981) method and noted as BN_LR and BN_SR respectively.
All coefficients are adjusted for Stambaugh-bias. The p-values reported in parentheses are obtained from wild
bootstrap procedures in which all stimulation uses Newey West robust t-statistics. See Appendix C for details
of the bootstrap simulation. ∗∗∗p< 0.01,∗∗ p< 0.05,∗p< 0.1.
Panel A Panel B Panel C
ρLR,t ηt −ηt−1 ρLR,t (ρt −ρt−1)⊥ BN_LR BN_SR
ME L-H
-0.262*** 0.332*** -0.323*** 0.312*** -0.236*** 0.135***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age L-H -0.017 0.187*** -0.051*** 0.175*** -0.091*** 0.109***(0.126) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sigma H-L -0.195*** 0.147*** -0.222*** 0.138*** -0.242*** -0.001(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.273)
E/BE <0->0 -0.335*** 0.180*** -0.368*** 0.170*** -0.453*** 0.039***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
D/BE =0->0 -0.305*** 0.059*** -0.316*** 0.056*** -0.359*** -0.101***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PPE/A L-H 0.060*** 0.014 0.058*** 0.013 0.062*** 0.164***(0.000) (0.377) (0.000) (0.310) (0.000) (0.000)
RD/A H-L -0.032*** 0.010** -0.033*** 0.009** -0.007*** -0.119***(0.002) (0.038) (0.000) (0.040) (0.000) (0.000)
BE/ME H-L -0.084*** 0.116*** -0.105*** 0.109*** -0.104*** -0.004(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.188)
EF/A H-L 0.002*** -0.003 0.003** -0.003** 0.007*** -0.031***(0.002) (0.136) (0.011) (0.035) (0.002) (0.000)
GS H-L -0.052*** -0.127*** -0.029*** -0.119*** 0.020*** -0.092***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BE/ME L-M -0.004*** -0.060*** 0.007*** -0.057*** -0.016*** -0.002(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.114)
EF/A H-M -0.103*** 0.008 -0.105*** 0.008 -0.102*** -0.024***(0.000) (0.335) (0.000) (0.195) (0.000) (0.000)
GS H-M -0.114*** 0.020*** -0.118*** 0.019*** -0.093*** -0.029***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BE/ME H-M -0.088*** 0.056*** -0.098*** 0.052*** -0.120*** -0.006(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.419)
EF/A L-M -0.105*** 0.010*** -0.107*** 0.010*** -0.109*** 0.008***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GS L-M -0.062*** 0.147*** -0.089*** 0.138*** -0.112*** 0.063***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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Table 3.2 shows the estimation coefficients of the standardised long- and short-run
sentiment components of the Baker-Wurgler’s (2006) sentiment indicator. All independent
variables (including the long- and short-run sentiment measures) are standardised before
running the regression to facilitate comparisons of coefficients. The short-run sentiment
in Panel A ηt−ηt−1 is measured by changes in the sentiment deviation from the long-run
sentiment. The short-run sentiment in Panel B, (ρt−ρt−1)⊥, is measured by the sentiment
increment orthogonalized to the long-run sentiment component. The long-run sentiment
component ρLR,t in both Panels A and B is the moving average of prior [−25,−2] monthly
investor sentiment. The long- and short-run sentiment components in Panel C are Beveridge-
Nelson decomposed long- and short-run sentiment, BN_LR and BN_SR, respectively. I
report the Stambaugh-bias adjusted coefficients with bootstrapped p-values in parentheses.
Panel A in Table 3.2 shows that the long-run sentiment component ρLR,t is a significant
contrarian predictor for 13 out of 16 long-short portfolio returns, consistent with my theory.
Furthermore, the short-run sentiment component ηt −ηt−1 is significantly and positively
associated with 11 out of sixteen long-short portfolio returns, which is consistent with existing
evidence that contemporaneous excess returns are positively related to shifts in sentiment
(Ben-Rephael et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2002).
In general, the empirical results in Panel A provide strong support for my two main
hypotheses. The signs of coefficients of both the long- and short-run sentiment components
in 11 out of 16 regressions are consistent with the predictions of my theory. However,
the coefficients of the long-run sentiment are significantly positive for the regressions in-
volving PPE/A(L-H) and EF/A(H-L), while the coefficients of the short-run sentiment are
significantly negative in the case of GS(H-L) and BE/ME(L-H). The portfolios with the
unexpected coefficient signs are portfolios in the ’Tangibility’ and in ’Growth Opportunity
and Distress’ group. Baker and Wurgler (2006) also find that investor sentiment is not a good
predictor of the future returns of the portfolios in the ’Tangibility’ group and argue that the
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multidimensional nature of BE/ME, EF/A, and GS makes the results unclear in the ’Growth
Opportunity and Distress’ group.
Panel B of Table 3.2 reports the estimation results of the long-run sentiment ρLR,t and
the short-run sentiment (ρt−ρt−1)⊥. The coefficients of the long-run sentiment component
are significantly negative in 13 out of the 16 regressions. The coefficients of the short-run
sentiment component are significantly positive in 11 out of 16 regressions, consistent with
the results in Panel A. The coefficients of the short-run sentiment are significantly positive
in 5 out of 16 regressions. The dependent variables in those regressions with unexpected
coefficients of the long- and short-run sentiment belong to the ’Tangibility’ and the ’Growth
Opportunity and Distress’ group. The magnitude of the coefficients of the long- and short-run
sentiment measures in Panel B is in most cases comparable to their counterparts in Panel A.
Panel C in Table 3.2 presents the estimation results of the Beveridge-Nelson decomposed
long- and short-run sentiment. The coefficients of the long-run sentiment BN_LR are almost
all significantly negative, while those on the short-run sentiment BN_SR are significantly
positive in 6 out of the 16 regressions. Under the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition, the
long-run sentiment no longer exhibits a pattern lagged to original sentiment (recall that in
Figure 3.2), and yet is still negatively associated with the subsequent long-short portfolio
returns. Despite some differences in the magnitude, the coefficients of the long- and short-run
sentiment components in Panel C have the same signs as their counterparts in Panel A.
Regressions with the long-short portfolio returns as the dependent variables may obscure
the effects of the two sentiment components on individual decile portfolios. To obtain further
insight into this issue, I run regressions of decile portfolio returns on both the long- and
short-run sentiment variables and control variables:
Rt,i, j = α+β1,i, jρLR,t+β2,i, j(ηt−ηt−1)+ γX+ εt (3.30)
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Rt,i, j represents the return of the ith decile portfolio sorted by variable j, where i represents
the decile portfolio rank and takes values from 1 to 10 and j is one of the ten firm characteristic
variables used to construct the decile portfolios. The control variables (X) include the Fama-
French five factors (RMRF, HML, SMB, RMW, CMA), and the Carhart (1997) momentum
factor (UMD).
Table 3.3 reports the coefficients of the long- and short-run sentiment components. Panel
A documents a large variation in the coefficients of the long-run sentiment component across
the decile portfolios. The observed patterns are consistent with predictions of my theoretical
model. Specifically, I find decile portfolios that are more prone to market-wide sentiment
are usually more affected by the long-run sentiment. More specifically, for Size and Age
sorted portfolios, the coefficients of the long-run sentiment increase from Decile 1 to Decile
10 most of the time, indicating that the reversal effect of long-run sentiment effect on decile
returns is more salient on small and young stocks than large and old stocks. The coefficients
of the long-run sentiment for Sigma sorted decile portfolios decrease almost monotonically
with the decile rank, implying that high long-run sentiment leads to lower returns on more
volatile decile portfolios than less volatile portfolios. For the two variables in the ’Tangibility’
group, PPE/A and RD/A, there is no salient pattern in the long-run sentiment coefficients
across different deciles. This finding is in line with the results in Table 3.2 and is consistent
with the findings in Baker and Wurgler (2006).
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For firm characteristics with the multidimensional nature, namely BE/ME, EF/A, and GS,
I find that the coefficients of the long-run sentiment across deciles have an inverse U-shape,
indicating that the middle deciles are less prone to overall market, while distressed stocks
and stocks with strong growth potential are more prone to overall market. When sorted
on ME, Sigma, and D/BE, the less sentiment-prone deciles and the more sentiment-prone
deciles show opposite exposure to the long-run sentiment. For example, for deciles sorted on
Sigma, the coefficients of long-run sentiment in the top two are negative, while those of the
bottom two deciles are significantly positive. This indicates that the "bond-like" stocks with
low return volatility have negative exposure to the long-run overall market sentiment. One
plausible explanation proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2007) is "flights to quality". When
overall market is pessimistic, bond-like stocks are more appealing to not only sophisticated
investors but also noise traders, leading to rising prices of those stocks during low market
sentiment periods. The reverse pattern I found in "bond-like" stocks helps explain the weak
relationship between investor sentiment and aggregate market return documented in the
literature. Indeed, I check the effects of decomposed sentiment on aggregate market returns,
and find the coefficients of the long- and short-run sentiment are insignificant.
Panel B of Table 3.3 reports the coefficients of the short-run sentiment component. The
coefficient of the short-run sentiment is positive and significant for almost all more sentiment-
prone decile portfolios. There is a decreasing (increasing) pattern in the coefficients of the
short-run sentiment across the deciles sorted by ME, Age, E/BE and D/BE (Sigma). However,
the coefficients of the short-run sentiment follow a U-shaped pattern across the deciles sorted
by BE/ME, EF/A, and GS and exhibit no clear pattern in the deciles sorted by PPE/A and
RD/A. I also find significantly negative coefficients of the short-run sentiment in most of
the less sentiment-prone deciles. In general, the results in Panel B confirm the conclusions
drawn from Panel A that the effect of short-run sentiment on returns varies across deciles
and the bond-like stocks have negative exposure to overall market sentiment.
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3.4.2 Robustness Checks
This chapter presents a behavioural explanation to the variations in the cross-sectional stock
returns. However, it is possible that variation in investor sentiment reflects changes in
systematic risk and my results may not be entirely consistent with the behavioural story. For
example, changes in my decomposed sentiment measures may coincide with time variation
in the market beta. If that is the case, the cross-sectional patterns conditional on certain
characteristics is the rational compensation for systematic risk. I examine this possibility
with a time-varying CAPM beta model.
Rt,1−Rt,2 = α+β1ρLR,t+β2∆ρs,t+(b+ γ1ρLR,t+ γ2∆ρs,t)RMRFt+υt , (3.31)
where Rt,1−Rt,2 represents the portfolio returns that long the more sentiment-prone portfolios
and short the less sentiment-prone portfolios, ρLR,t refers to the long-run sentiment component
at time t, ∆ρs represents the short-run sentiment increments, and RMRFt is the market return
premium. If the negative (positive) effect of long-run (short-run) sentiment on the cross-
sectional return is driven by its negative (positive) effect on the beta loading of market return
premium, the coefficients for the interaction terms will be significantly different from zero,
and the sign of γi will be the same as the sign of βi in Table 3.2; otherwise, the behavioural
story holds. That is to say, γ1 should be significantly negative and γ2 should be significantly
positive if the rational explanation holds.
Table 3.4 shows the sign and magnitude of the coefficients of both the long- and short-run
sentiment components remain consistent with their counterparts in Table 3.2 even after
including the interaction terms in the regressions. This evidence proves that the long-
and short-run sentiment components do indeed affect the cross-sectional stock returns. I
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also consider another potential systematic risk explanation, which suggests that even when
the market beta loadings are constant, the decomposed investor sentiment may reflect the
variations in the market return premium. If this story holds, the decomposed investor
sentiment should perform well in predicting the market return premium. However, in an
regression of market return premium on decomposed investor sentiment, I find little evidence
that decomposed investor sentiment components affect the aggregate market returns.
I also conduct a battery of other robustness checks (the results are reported in Appendix
E.1). First, I re-run my regressions with decomposed sentiment indicators from other widely
accepted investor sentiment proxies, such as the Conference Board Consumer Confidence
Index (CCI) from Bloomberg, Consumer Confidence Index by Michigan (ICS), the closed-
end fund discount (CEFD) and the aligned sentiment indicator (Sent_PLS) from Huang et al.
(2015). See Table E.1. I find similar results when the decomposition of sentiment is based on
CCI, CEFD and Sent_PLS, especially for the coefficients of long-run sentiment. The results
from ICS are slightly mixed.
Second, I construct different measures of sentiment components by taking the moving
average of the original Baker and Wurgler sentiment index over different horizons as the
measure of the long-run sentiment. I consider both 12-month and 36-month horizon and my
conclusions remain unchanged. See Table E.2.
Third, I divide the samples into high and low sentiment periods, where a low (high)
sentiment period is defined as the period when the current sentiment is lower (higher) than
the previous two-year smoothing average sentiment. See Table E.3. I find that the long-
and short-run sentiment components perform better in explaining the cross-sectional returns
during periods of high sentiment. This evidence may be explained by more binding short-
selling constraints during high sentiment periods (Nagel, 2005; Stambaugh et al., 2012; Yu
and Yuan, 2011).
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Fourth, I test whether the stocks that I argued as sentiment-immune ones are immune
because they receive very little investor attention. Investor sentiment indicates the direction of
the price movement: optimistic investor sentiment leads to price overpricing and pessimistic
investor sentiment results in underpricing of an asset. Investor attention, on the other hand,
indicates how effective investor attention could be. The effect of investor sentiment is stronger
when investor pays more attention and is weaker when investor seldom cares. I employ the
two investor attention measures proposed by Barber and Odean (2008), namely the abnormal
trading volume index and the abnormal return index. I first calculate the monthly abnormal
trading volume and abnormal return index for each firm and then I calculate the averaged
investor attention of all portfolios. The abnormal trading volume (abnormal return index)
is calculated as the ratio of the stock’s trading volume (return) of that month to its average
trading volume (return) over the prior one-year. I add the cross-sectional investor sentiment
disparity measure as a control variable into the regressions. For every regression, I construct
the attention disparity in the same way I calculate the return disparity of the sentiment-prone
portfolio over the sentiment-immune portfolio. Take ME sorted long-short portfolio as an
example, the dependent variable is the difference of bottom three-decile portfolio averaged
return over the top three-decile averaged return, and the attention disparity control variable is
the difference of bottom three-decile averaged attention over the top three-decile averaged
attention, noted as At,1)−At,2. The regression results are shown in Table E.4. After taking
the effect of investor attention into account, the effect of decomposed sentiment components
on returns remain strong.
Finally, to isolate the size effect on the portfolio returns, I re-run my tests using value-
weighted portfolio returns. The results are report on Table E.5. My conclusion does not alter
when using value-weighted portfolio returns.
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3.5 Conclusion
Chapter 3 fills a theoretical gap by showing that investor sentiment disproportionally affects
the returns of different assets. I extend De Long et al. (1990a) model into a noise trader risk
model with multiple risky assets. In my model, I allow the risky assets to have different
exposure to overall market investor sentiment and provide theoretical predictions consistent
with the empirical evidence on the effect of investor sentiment on the cross-sectional stock
returns.
Motivated by the model, I also decompose investor sentiment into long- and short-run
components. Consistent with the theory, I find that the long-run sentiment component is
a contrarian predictor of future long-short portfolio returns and the short-run sentiment is
positively correlated with contemporaneous long-short portfolio returns, where the long-short
portfolios long the sentiment-prone stocks and short the sentiment-immune stocks.
Furthermore, I check whether the effect of the sentiment components can be attributed to
the time-varying beta loading of the market premium (or other risk factors). My empirical
findings show that the impact of sentiment components on the cross-sectional return is
not related to systematic risk. Accordingly, the behavioural story holds. Further analysis
suggests that my results are robust to alternative sentiment measures, different sample periods,
additional control variables, and the use of value-weighted returns.
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Chapter 4
Technical Analysis as a Sentiment
Barometer and the Cross-Section of
Stock Returns
4.1 Introduction
Technical analysis (hereafter TA) is one of the most debated issues between financial aca-
demics and investment practitioners. The traditional academic wisdom posits that publicly
available information, such as past prices and trading volume, which serve as the basis of TA,
is already incorporated into asset prices. Accordingly, any attempt to predict future returns
using TA must "share a pedestal with alchemy" (Malkiel, 1999). However, TA continues to be
popular among experienced traders and top fund managers.1 For example, Sushil Wadhwani
has stated that overcoming the prejudice against TA was the most important lesson he had to
1 Taylor and Allen (1992) document that at least 90% of experienced traders place some weight on technical
analysis. Schwager (2012) and Lo and Hasanhodzic (2010) report that many of the top traders and fund
managers they interviewed believe that technical analysis works.
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learn when moving from academia to the fund management industry.2 This disparity between
theory and practice raises important questions, such as the underlying reasons for traders’
adoption of TA, and investors’ reasons for paying them to do so.
This study aims to reconcile these conflicting views by proposing a new channel through
which TA can add value. Explicitly, I argue that TA has the potential to serve as a barometer
for investor sentiment. My view is based on the theoretical model of Brown and Jennings
(1989), which considers TA as a vital tool for extracting information from current and past
prices. Several models also acknowledge that asset prices can carry information about investor
sentiment (e.g., De Long et al., 1990a). If investor sentiment is not directly observable (as is
usually the case in reality) and if prices are noisy predictors of sentiment,3 investors may
find combining current and past prices helpful in drawing inferences about sentiment signals.
Despite the absence of empirical literature in this direction, the role of TA as a barometer
of investor sentiment has been prevailingly recognised among practitioners and in the media.
For example, some analysts argue that the term "technical analysis" is a misnomer and should
be replaced by "investor sentiment analysis".4 In one of the most popular books on TA, Pring
(1991, pp. 2-3) states that:
". . . Since the technical approach is based on the theory that the price is a
reflection of mass psychology (’the crowd’) in action, it attempts to forecast
future price movements on the assumption that crowd psychology moves between
panic, fear, and pessimism on one hand and confidence, excessive optimism, and
greed on the other."
In the same vein, an article in Forbes magazine5 states that:
2See "Technical analysis pulled out of the bin", October 17, 2010, Financial Times.
3In De Long et al. (1990a), the spot price reveals contemporaneous sentiment fully and leaves no room for
past prices (hence TA) to improve inference of sentiment. Such an implication does not hold when there is a
random supply shock and current prices are a noisy predictor of sentiment.
4See http://www.centimetrics.com/explanation/
5See "Why Technical Analysis Matters", April 16, 2010, Forbes Magazine, by Michael Kahn
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"Technical analysis also attempts to measure the collective investor psyche,
calling heavily on the psychology of crowds and the cycle of greed and fear."
This chapter provides the first empirical evidence on the link between TA and investor
sentiment. To this end, I build a daily market sentiment indicator (hereafter TA sentiment)
based on the average of trading signals generated from applying 2,127 technical trading
strategies to benchmark stock market indices such as the S&P 500 index and DJIA. By
averaging the trading signals across different trading rules helping remove the idiosyncratic
noise contained in signals from individual trading rules, a buying (selling) signal indicates
a sentiment increase (decline). I use the same universe of trading strategies as Qi and Wu
(2006), which nests nearly all the technical trading rules studied in the top three finance
journals. I show that the level and the change of TA sentiment are significantly correlated
with the level and the change of both market- and survey-based sentiment indicators, such as
the CBOE Volatility Indicator (VIX), the CBOE Options Total Put-Call ratio, the detrended
trading volume of S&P 500 (VOL), and the Bull-Bear spread from surveys of retail investors
and institutional investors. These correlations are not driven by persistence in TA and other
sentiment indicators because I also observe strong contemporaneous positive associations
between innovations in TA sentiment and innovations in other sentiment indicators. This
evidence is consistent with some practitioners’ view that TA reflects investor sentiment.
After demonstrating that TA reflects investor sentiment, I examine whether TA sentiment
affects the cross-section of stock returns. I build my analysis on the delayed arbitrage
models in Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002, 2003). In these models, a single arbitrageur
cannot move the market and mispricing correction happens only when a sufficient mass
of arbitrageurs arbitrage in coordination. If an arbitrageur attacks mispricing too early,
she may find herself sailing against the wind and suffering substantial losses. Due to this
synchronisation risk, rational arbitrageurs may be unwilling to correct mispricing when they
are uncertain whether others are aware of the mispricing or hold similar opinions. Instead,
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rational arbitrageurs, who detect investor sentiment through TA, may delay arbitrage and
ride mispricing. Thus, based on the delayed arbitrage models, I expect high TA sentiment
to be contemporaneously accompanied with higher returns for sentiment-prone stocks than
for sentiment-immune stocks. I also expect sentiment-prone stocks to continue to earn
higher returns than sentiment-immune stocks following an increase in TA sentiment,6 as
rational arbitrageurs ride mispricing.7 Such a cross-sectional predictive pattern will reverse
when sentiment decays away and rational arbitrageurs manage to coordinate their attack
on mispricing. A coordinated attack of rational arbitrageurs on overpricing also implies a
sharper decline in the returns of more overpriced stocks. Therefore, a high TA sentiment
predicts a higher subsequent crash risk among the sentiment-prone and difficult-to-arbitrage
stocks.
To test the empirical implications of the delayed arbitrage models of Abreu and Brunner-
meier (2002, 2003), I follow Baker and Wurgler (2006) to compute the returns of long-short
portfolios that long the sentiment-prone and difficult-to-arbitrage stocks (e.g., small, young,
and high volatility stocks) and short the sentiment-immune and easy-to-arbitrage stocks (e.g.,
big, old, and low volatility stocks). Consistent with the delayed arbitrage models, I find that
the change in TA sentiment positively correlates with the contemporaneous returns of the
long-short portfolios. I also find that a rise in TA sentiment predicts an increase in the next-
day returns but a decline in the subsequent returns of the long-short portfolios. Controlling
for the commonly used risk factors, such as the Fama-French five factors and liquidity risk,
and time-varying factor loadings does not alter my results. Further tests also show that when
6While most previous studies consider that investor sentiment predicts future return reversal, several recent
studies demonstrate that investor sentiment also predicts short-term momentum (see, e.g., Chou et al., 2016;
Han and Li, 2017; Tu et al., 2016). Another strand of studies demonstrate the profitability of trading strategies
that benefit from the return momentum induced by the news-based sentiment (Huynh and Smith, 2017; Sun
et al., 2016; Uhl, 2017).
7Several studies also show that sophisticated investors ride mispricing (see, e.g., Bhojraj et al., 2009;
Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004; Griffin et al., 2011; Temin and Voth, 2004). Others also show that trend
following is a predominant strategy of hedge funds (e.g., Hurst et al., 2013; Schauten et al., 2015) and
commodity traders (Billingsley and Chance, 1996).
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beginning-of- period TA sentiment is low, sentiment-prone stocks have higher crash risk than
sentiment-immune stocks. Finally, consistent with the view that sophisticated investors earn
higher returns by riding mispricing, I show that a simple ’trend chasing’ trading strategy that
buys portfolios of the sentiment-prone stocks after a TA sentiment increase and sells them
following a TA sentiment decrease generates an average abnormal return of 12% per annum.
The returns of out TA trading strategies remain sizable and saliently positive after controlling
for the traditional risk factors and transactions costs.
Our study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, I provide a new
explanation for how TA can create value. Several studies suggest that past prices (or volumes)
are useful for inferring information that is not fully impounded into the current price (Brown
and Jennings, 1989; Hellwig, 1982; Treynor and Ferguson, 1985). TA also arises naturally
when traders learn about the quality of signals they receive from analyzing the sequences
of price and volume (Blume et al., 1994), or inferring information about the market depth
from limit order book (Kavajecz and Odders-White, 2004). Furthermore, TA improves asset
allocation when returns are predictable and there exists uncertainty about their predictability
(Zhu and Zhou, 2009). I contribute to this strand of research by demonstrating that TA
reflects investor sentiment and assists sophisticated investors to time the market.8
Second, I test the profitability of TA strategies from a sentiment perspective. Most of
the existing studies apply TA to a single asset or a market index to show that TA strategies
generate prominent returns (e.g., Allen and Taylor, 1990; Brock et al., 1992; Lui and Mole,
1998; Neely and Weller, 2003; Osler, 2003; Taylor and Allen, 1992). To the best of my
knowledge, this is the first attempt to apply TA to market indexes in order to construct
a market-wide sentiment indicator, which is then used to devise trading strategies using
portfolios of stocks with different exposures to investor sentiment. My new trading strategies
are motivated by the cross-sectional effect of market sentiment, and generates substantial
8In line with my results, Smith et al. (2016) find that hedge funds that use TA perform better than non-users,
although they do not consider TA as a measure of investor sentiment.
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profitability in the cross-section. While Han et al. (2013) also report notable cross-sectional
profitability from applying the Moving Average rules to individual portfolios constructed
with proxies of information uncertainty, I consider a much broader spectrum of trading rules
and apply TA to market indexes rather than individual stocks.
Finally, I introduce a novel, easy-to-construct, and real-time sentiment measure that is
available at daily frequency. Since the only data required for constructing a TA sentiment
indicator is historical prices, my approach can be useful when alternative sentiment indicators
are difficult to convey due to data availability. Furthermore, although I restrict the analysis in
this chapter to the stock market, my approach can be used to build sentiment indicators for
other asset classes.
The rest of Chapter 4 is organized as follows. Section 4.2 explains my data and the
construction of a TA sentiment index and various portfolios. Section 4.3 provides empirical
evidence of the predictive power of TA sentiment on cross-sectional return premium and
crash risk. Section 4.4 examines the profitability of timing strategies using TA sentiment.
Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Data and Sample Construction
4.2.1 TA Sentiment Indicator
To build a sentiment indicator from the trading signals generated by TA, I need to decide on
the number of trading rules I should use. Such a decision is difficult, as relying on a single
technical trading rule may fail to capture the overall market sentiment, whereas considering
all trading rules is inviable. As a balance, I employ the widely-acknowledged technical
trading rules mentioned in top journals, including Filter Rules, Moving Average, Support
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and Resistance, and Channel Breakout Rules.9 This universe of trading strategies is the same
as the one documented in Qi and Wu (2006) and covers nearly all the trading rules studied in
the top three finance journals.
To build a market-wide sentiment indicator, I apply the 2,127 technical trading rules to
benchmark market indexes, including S&P 500 index and DJIA. Each trading rule generates
a buy/sell/neutral recommendation for the next day at the end of each day. I assign value
1, 0, and -1 to each buy, neutral, and sell signal, respectively. Each day, I compute the
equal-weighted average10 of trading signals across all 2,127 strategies to obtain a time series,
which I then use as my TA sentiment index. For example, if at a given day, 1,800 strategies
recommend a buy, 127 strategies recommend a sell, and the remaining strategies are neutral,
TA sentiment on that day would be (1800-127)/2127 or 0.78. I argue that my TA sentiment is
a measure of the overall market sentiment (i.e., a high value of TA sentiment indicates a high
overall market sentiment). Averaging trading signals across trading rules helps remove the
idiosyncratic noise associated with individual trading rules.
I restrict ourselves to market-wide TA sentiment because validating TA sentiment at
the individual stock level by investigating the correlations between TA sentiment and other
sentiment indicators is constrained by the availability of other individual stock level daily
sentiment indicators with sufficiently long history. I also focus on testing effect of TA
sentiment on the cross-sectional stock returns because theory suggests that market-wide
investor sentiment can have different (and even opposite) effects on individual stocks (Baker
and Wurgler, 2007).
Our baseline TA sentiment is constructed by applying the technical trading rules on
S&P 500 index. Since S&P 500 members are mainly large cap stocks that are less prone
9The definitions of these trading strategies are the same as used by Qi and Wu (2006), and standard in the
literature, with the parameters used to define these technical trading strategies documented in Appendix D.
10I also calculate a performance-weighted TA sentiment index, which is the average of the trading signals of
2,127 technical trading rules weighted by their returns in the past year. The use of performance-weighted TA
sentiment index does not alter my conclusions.
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to sentiment and are easier to arbitrage, a TA sentiment that is based on S&P 500 does not
capture as much sentiment as that constructed from the small-cap stock index. However,
although my baseline TA sentiment index is likely to be biased against my findings, I choose
to focus on S&P 500 because of its popularity as the most closely monitored benchmark in
the US stock market.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 provide a simple eyeball check for the TA sentiment. Since the
daily TA sentiment is highly volatile and difficult to visualize over 50 years, I compute and
plot its monthly averages in Figure 4.1. The plotting of TA sentiment index roughly lines
up with anecdotal accounts of market sentiment fluctuations. It drops sharply during the
recession periods defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and is
visibly consistent with historical bubbles and crashes. In addition, TA sentiment is largely
positive in the high sentiment years as measured by the positive value of Baker and Wurgler’s
(2006) sentiment index.11
11Baker and Wurgler sentiment index is positive for 1968-1970, 1972, 1979-1987, 1994, 1996-1997, and
1999-2001.
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Monthly Averaged TA Sentiment and NBER Recession, 1964:01-2008:12. This figure
shows the monthly average TA sentiment from 1964 to 2008. The grey vertical bars represents
NBER-dated recession periods.
Fig. 4.1 TA Sentiment Index and NBER-Dated Recession
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Weekly Averaged TA Sentiment and Bull-Bear Spread, 1990:01-1995:01. This figure
compares weekly averaged TA sentiment index with weekly Bull-Bear Spread of individual
investors from a randomly selected sub-sample period (from 1990 to 1995). The solid line is
the averaged TA sentiment index. The dashed line is the Bull-Bear Spread.
Fig. 4.2 TA Sentiment Index and Bull-Bear Spread
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I also calculate a weekly average of TA sentiment to facilitate its comparison with the
weekly Bull-Bear spread from surveys of individual investors. Figure 4.2 plots weekly
average of TA sentiment and the weekly Bull-Bear spread for a randomly selected subsample
period (from 1990 to 1995)12. The observed comovement between these two variables
provides a first indication that my TA index tracks market sentiment.
To further validate my TA sentiment index as a sentiment measure, I examine its pair-
wise correlations with other commonly used sentiment indicators, such as the daily CBOE
Volatility Index (VIX), CBOE Options Total Put-Call ratio, the detrended trading volume of
S&P500 (VOL), and the weekly individual Bull-Bear spread based on surveys of individual
investors and institutional investors. VIX measures the market expectations of the volatility
conveyed by the S&P500 stock index option prices over the next 30-day period. VOL is the
detrended daily trading volume of the 500 stocks included in the S&P500 index. I detrend
the trading volume by subtracting a one-year backward moving average from the log trading
volume series. Higher trading volume means the market is more optimistic. The Put-Call
ratio is a ratio of put volume to call volume13, a contrarian indicator of market sentiment. The
Bull-Bear spread is the percentage of investors who are bullish, minus the percentage of those
who are bearish about the stock market performance over the next six months. I construct
the Bull-Bear spread for individual investors using data from weekly surveys of members
of American Associate of Individual Investors14 and the Bull-Bear spread for institutional
investors from the opinion polls of institutional investors available from Bloomberg.
12The reason I show a randomly selected sample period instead of the whole sample is that the two indicators
prominently correlate with each other and they are also both very volatile during the sample period. As I have
weekly data over a very long sample period, if I choose the whole sample it would be hard to distinguish the
two lines and see the correlation pattern.
13The Put-Call ratio is downloaded from https://www.cboe.com/data/putcallratio.aspx.
14Bull-Bear spread is available from http://www.aaii.com/sentimentsurvey.
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics of the Sentiment Indicators
The table summarises the Pearson correlations of TA sentiment and other sentiment indicators and the descriptive statistics for each indicator. Panel A reports the
results for sentiment level, while Panel B focuses on the change in sentiment. The descriptive statistics include the number of observations (Obs), mean (Mean),
standard deviation (Std. Dev), minimum value (Min), maximum value (Max) and skewness (Skew).
Panel A Summary of the level of sentiment indicators
Correlations Descriptive statistics
correlation p-value Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Skew
VIX -0.63 0.000 4788 19.70 7.88 9.31 80.86 2.28
VOL 0.22 0.000 11329 0.08 0.23 -3.29 1.25 -0.42
Put-Call ratio -0.24 0.000 3336 0.78 0.20 0.30 1.70 0.60
Individual Bull-Bear Spread 0.46 0.000 5399 9.39 18.93 -54.00 62.86 -0.10
Institutional Bull-Bear Spread 0.29 0.000 3474 10.01 13.65 -29.30 40.90 -0.67
TA 11329 0.20 0.39 -0.74 0.80 -0.53
Panel B Summary of the change in sentiment indicators
Correlations Descriptive statistics
correlation p-value Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Skew
VIX -0.39 0.000 4784 0.01 1.45 -17.36 16.54 0.43
VOL 0.05 0.000 11328 0.00 0.20 -3.23 3.33 -0.07
Put-Call Ratio -0.19 0.000 3331 0.00 0.15 -0.70 0.70 -0.08
Individual Bull-Bear Spread 0.32 0.000 1110 -0.07 15.15 -56.97 51.00 -0.14
Institutional Bull-Bear Spread 0.41 0.000 713 0.00 4.88 -20.50 22.30 0.17
TA 11328 0 0.03 -0.15 0.13 -0.11
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Table 4.1 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients and p-values from testing the null
hypothesis that two sentiment indicators are uncorrelated. Panel A shows the results of
correlations between the level of the TA sentiment and the level of other sentiment measures.
All five sentiment indicators significantly correlate with TA sentiment. The correlation
between TA sentiment and VIX is -0.63 with a corresponding p-value smaller than 1%. The
negative correlation is expected since high VIX proxies for low investor sentiment, whereas
high TA sentiment indicates high investor sentiment. The correlation of daily VOL and TA
sentiment is both positive (which means it has the right sign) and statistically significant.
As expected, the Put-Call ratio varies negatively with TA sentiment, with a statistically
significant correlation coefficient of -0.24. The Bull-Bear spread data for both individual
and institutional investors are strongly and positively correlated with my TA sentiment.
Panel B reports the correlation between the change in TA sentiment and the change in other
sentiment measures. All the signs of the correlations remain the same as in Panel A. While
the magnitude of the correlations are smaller than those in Panel A, they are all statistically
significant, and three out of five correlation coefficients have a correlation coefficient greater
than 0.3. This suggests that TA sentiment strongly correlates with other sentiment indicators
both in levels and in changes.
When measuring investor sentiment with trading volume or turnover, most literature
measures detrend trading volume/turnover by substracting a one-year/five-year backward
moving average of log series (eg: Campell, Grossman and Wang, 1993; Baker and Wurgler,
2006; Huang et al, 2015). I employed this detrending approach in this section to measure
detrended trading volume. VOL is highly correlated with TA sentiment and other sentiment
indicators.
One can plausibly argue that TA may generate rather than monitor investor sentiment
because of positive feedback trading. To address this issue, I do some more tests on the
correlations. If TA creates sentiment, I would expect current innovation in TA sentiment to be
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positively associated with next period’s innovations in other sentiment indicators. However,
if TA reflects sentiment, I would expect a contemporaneous positive correlation between
innovations in TA sentiment and innovations in other sentiment indicators. To check these
predictions, I remove the persistency in each sentiment indicator by regressing that indicator
on its past 10 lags and define the regression’s residual as innovation. The number of lags
is not strictly selected by information criteria, but is preferably chosen to ensure that the
residuals are not significantly autocorrelated. Table 4.2 reports the correlations between the
AR(1) residuals of TA index and the AR(1) residuals of other sentiment indicators.
The first two columns in Table 4.2 report the contemporaneous correlations between the
innovation in the TA sentiment index and innovations in other sentiment indicators. I find
strong contemporaneous correlations, implying that TA index tracks investor sentiment. The
last two columns in Table 4.2 report the correlations between the lagged innovation in the
TA index and the current innovations in other sentiment indicators. The lagged innovation
in TA index is significantly correlated with the current innovations in all other sentiment
indicators, except VIX. This suggests that TA sentiment has dual roles: monitoring investor
sentiment and generating future sentiment. While the role of TA as sentiment generator has
been repeatedly discussed in the literature, its role as a sentiment barometer has been largely
ignored.
Table 4.2 Correlations of Innovations in Sentiment Indicators
This table reports the correlation between innovations in TA sentiment and innovations in other sentiment
indices. I use the residuals from AR(10) regression as the innovations in sentiment indicators.
Correlations with in-
novations in TA
Correlations with
lagged innovations
in TA
correlation p-value correlation p-value
VIX -0.55 0.000 -0.01 0.652
VOL 0.11 0.000 0.11 0.000
Put-Call Ratio -0.36 0.000 -0.13 0.000
Individual Bull-Bear Spread 0.23 0.000 0.33 0.000
Institutional Bull-Bear Spread 0.23 0.000 0.29 0.000
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4.2.2 Portfolio Construction
To substantiate whether TA sentiment affects asset prices, I follow Baker and Wurgler (2006)
to construct portfolios based on ten firm characteristics that reflect the extent to which a stock
is prone to investor sentiment. These characteristics include firm size (ME), firm age (Age),
total risk (Sigma), earnings-book ratio (E/BE), dividend-book ratio (D/BE), fixed assets ratio
(PPE/A), research and development ratio (RD/A), book-to-market ratio (BE/ME), external
finance over assets (EF/A) and sales growth ratio (GS).
To construct my portfolios, I collect stock market data from CRSP for all common stocks
(share codes 10 and 11) on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ over the period from January 1962
to December 2008. Firm-level accounting data is obtained from Compustat. The year-end
accounting data of year t-1 is matched to daily returns from July of year t to June of year
t+1. The ten firm characteristics are used to sort stocks into deciles. All firm characteristics
are winsorized at 99.5 percent and 0.5 percent annually. For the reason of consistency,
breakpoints for the deciles are defined using NYSE firms only. The portfolios are rebalanced
every year to allow stocks to shift from one portfolio to another. The High (H), Medium (M),
and Low (L) portfolios are defined as the top three, middle four, and bottom three deciles,
respectively. My long-short portfolios are constructed by longing sentiment-prone deciles
and shorting sentiment-immune deciles. Detailed definitions of the firm characteristics and
the long-short portfolios are provided below.
I first consider ME, Age, Sigma characteristics. ME is the price times shares outstanding
in June every year. If there is more than one permanent code for a company, I sum up all the
ME for the same company. Small stocks are disproportionally held by retail investors and
are more difficult to value, indicating that small-cap firms are more prone to sentiment. In
this context, I make the returns of ME-based long-short portfolio equal to the average return
of Low (L) portfolio over High (H) portfolio. I denote this long-short portfolio as ME(L-H)
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hereinafter. Age is the number of months between a firm’s first appearance on CRSP to the
nearest month. Young firms have a short history and are typically more difficult to value
and arbitrage. Therefore, I long the young stock portfolio and short the old stock portfolio,
denoted as Age(L-H). Sigma is the annual standard deviation in monthly returns for the 12
months ending in June every year, and there should be no less than nine monthly returns
available to estimate it. Since highly volatile stocks are more difficult to arbitrage, I construct
the volatility-based long-short portfolio (or Sigma(H-L)) by longing more volatile stocks and
shorting less volatile stocks.
I then consider profitability and dividend policy characteristics. E/BE is the earnings
scaled by book equity. E is the income before extraordinary items (Item 18 in Compustat)
add income statement deferred taxes (Item 50) less preferred dividends (Item 19). D/BE
is the fiscal year-end dividends per share at the ex-date (Item 26) times shares outstanding
(Item 25) scaled by book equity. BE is the shareholders’ equity (Item 60) plus balance
sheet deferred taxes (Item 35). Paying dividend enhances arbitrage profits and reduces
holding costs (Pontiff, 1996). Following Baker and Wurgler (2006), the decile portfolios are
constructed with both E/BE and D/BE. The E/BE long-short portfolio returns used in my
regressions are the average return of non-profitable firms (E<0) minus that of profitable firms
(E>0). I denote this portfolio as E/BE(<0->0). The D/BE long-short portfolio returns used
in regressions are the average returns of non-dividend-paying firms (D=0) minus those of
dividend-paying firms (D>0). I refer to this portfolio as D/BE(=0->0).
PPE/A and RD/A are related to the asset tangibility of a firm. PPE/A is Plant, property,
and equipment (Item 7) divided by gross total assets (Item 6). RD/A is Research and
development (Item 46) divided by gross total assets (Item 6). The coverage of R&D is sparse
prior to 1972 because the disclosure of R&D was voluntary until 1974 under the Financial
Accounting Standards Board. As firms with more intangible assets are more difficult to value
and arbitrage, the long-short portfolios are constructed by longing firms with less tangible
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assets and shorting firms with more tangible assets. I denote these long-short portfolios as
PPE/A(L-H) and RD/A(H-L).
The remaining three characteristics, namely BE/ME, EF/A, and GS, are defined as
follows. BE/ME is the log of the ratio of book equity to market equity. EF/A is the external
finance scaled by gross total assets. EF is the change in gross total assets (Item 6) minus the
change in retained earnings (Item 36). When the change in retained earnings is not available,
I use net income (Item 172) minus common dividends (Item 21) instead. Sales growth (GS)
is the percentage change in net sales (Item 12). I first calculate the original sales growth ratio
and then use GS to denote its decile. Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that BE/ME, EF/A, and
GS can be related to both growth and distress. The firms in the middle deciles (M) are usually
stable, while the high (H) and low (L) deciles contain firms with strong growth opportunity or
with severe financial distress. High BE/ME implies that the firm is in financial distress, while
low BE/ME indicates the presence of strong growth opportunity. High values of EF/A or GS
mean firms in distress, while low values indicate that firms have strong growth potential. To
capture the multidimensional nature of these variables, I construct three long-short portfolios
for each variable: when the three variables are considered as a generic pricing factor, the
portfolios are denoted as BE/ME(H-L), EF/A(H-L), and GS(H-L); when the three variables
represent firm growth opportunities, the portfolios are denoted as BE/ME(L-M), EF/A(H-M),
and GS(H-M); when the three variables represent the level of financial distress, the long-short
portfolios are denoted as BE/ME(H-M), EF/A(L-M), and GS(L-M) respectively.
All decile portfolios have a sample period from January 01, 1964 to December 31, 2008,
except for the RD/A portfolio, in which the R&D data is generally available after 1972. In
total, I obtain 9,466 daily returns of RD/A-based long-short portfolios. For all other decile
portfolios and long-short portfolios, I obtain 11,329 daily observations.
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4.3 Empirical Tests
In this section, I examine the pricing effect of my TA sentiment on the cross-sectional stock
returns. I start with the contemporaneous regressions of cross-sectional stock returns on the
change in the TA sentiment.
Rt = α+β1∆TAt+ γCVt+ εt , (4.1)
where Rt is the return on a given long-short portfolio at time t, ∆TAt is the change in TA
sentiment from time t−1 to time t, and CVt is a vector of control variables, including the
Fama and French’s (2015) five factors and Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor.15
The Fama-French five factors include RMRF, SMB, HML RMW, and CMA. RMRF is the
market return premium over the risk-free rate. SMB is the average return on the three small
capitalization portfolios minus the average return on the three big capitalization portfolios,
HML is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the average return on the
two growth portfolios, RMW is the average return on the two robust operating profitability
portfolios minus the average return on the two weak operating profitability portfolios, and
CMA is the average return on the two conservative investment portfolios minus the average
return on the two aggressive investment portfolios. The momentum factor (UMD) is the
average return of the high prior return portfolio over the low prior return portfolio.
Any control factor analogy to the dependent variable in Equation (4.1) will be excluded
from the list of control variables. To be specific, the SMB factor is excluded when the
dependent variable is the returns of long-short portfolio ME(L-H). HML factor is removed
15The data are available on http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
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when the dependent variable is the returns of any one of the three long-short portfolios
constructed with BE/ME. RMW factor is omitted if the dependent variable is the return of
long-short portfolio E/BE(L-H) or D/BE(L-H). I report Newey-West standard errors (Newey
and West, 1987) that are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
Table 4.3 reports the results of contemporaneous regressions for the sixteen long-short
portfolios. The coefficients of the change in TA sentiment are positive and statistically
significant (at the 10% level or better) for 9 out of 16 long-short portfolios. For the remaining
7 long-short portfolios, the coefficients of the change in TA sentiment are insignificant, and 6
of them are positive. These results suggest that when TA sentiment increases, the sentiment-
prone and difficult to arbitrage stocks tend to earn higher returns than the sentiment-immune
and easy to arbitrage stocks, consistent with the view that TA sentiment is a sentiment
indicator. However, this finding should be taken with caution, due to endogeneity concerns.
The FF five factors and the momentum factor all have strong explanatory power on
contemporaneous returns conditional on the effect of investor sentiment. The abnormal
alphas are much smaller than the corresponding dependent variables but the alphas are still
significant after controlling for the commonly-used pricing factors and my TA sentiment.
To alleviate endogeneity concerns, I use the following predictive regressions of daily
returns from the long-short portfolios on TA sentiment and other control variables:
Rt = α+∑βiTAt−i+ γCVt+ εt , (4.2)
The key variables of my interest are TAt−i, i.e., the lagged TA sentiment indicators.
According to the lack of synchronization among arbitragers, sophisticated investors may
delay arbitrage and ride the mispricing. Thus, I expect the long-short portfolio returns to
increase in the short term and reverse later. Since the exact time at which sophisticated
investors can coordinate their attack on mispricing is not known with uncertainty, how long
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does it take for the returns of a long-short portfolio to revert back is an open empirical
question. One way to decide the number of lags (i) of the TA sentiment indicators is to
run the Likelihood Ratio test to compare the model fitness. At the significance level of 5%,
11 out of 16 portfolios have better model fitness with only two lagged TA sentiment. For
robustness purposes, I also consider alternative values for i in my regressions.
Table 4.4 shows the regression results. Panel A reports the results of the models with only
one TA sentiment lag (i= 1) with or without control variables. Although I do not know how
long the short-term momentum would persist, I expect to observe the momentum effect one
day following a TA sentiment increase. Panel A shows that 12 out of 16 of the coefficients
of TAt−1 are positive and significant at 10% level or better. The magnitudes of the TAt−1
coefficients decrease in most cases after controlling for the Fama-French five factors and
the momentum factor, but 11 out of 16 of the coefficients remain positive and significant.
The coefficients of TAt−1 in the PPE/A and RD/A portfolio regressions become insignificant
after controlling for Fama-French five factors and the momentum factor. This finding is
consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2006), who also show that sentiment does not predict the
future returns of PPE/A and RD/A long-short portfolios. Also similar to Baker and Wurgler
(2006), I find inconclusive results for the regressions involving BE/ME(H-L), EF/A(H-L)
and GS(H-L) long-short portfolios.
Panel B in Table 4.4 reports the results of models with two TA sentiment lags. The second
lag would allow me to examine whether the momentum effect continues or the returns reverse
two days after a TA sentiment increase. I find that consistent with Panel A, the first-order TA
lag positively predicts returns of the majority of long-short portfolios, indicating a short-term
momentum effect. The coefficients of TAt−2 are basically negative, suggesting the returns on
sentiment-prone stocks begin to drop on the second day following sentiment increase. Similar
to Panel A, Panel B also provides inconclusive evidence on the ability of TA sentiment to
explain the future returns of BE/ME(H-L), BE/ME(H-M), EF/A(H-L), and
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Table 4.4 Predictive Regressions of Portfolio Returns
This table reports the coefficients for lagged TA sentiment of regressions of long-short portfolio returns on
lagged TA sentiment and a vector of control variables.
Rt,1−Rt,2 = α+∑βiTAt−i+ γCVt + εt .
Rt is the daily return of the long-short portfolios constructed from the sentiment-prone variables. H, M,
and L are respectively the top three, middle four, and bottom three deciles. CVt is a vector of control
variables, which includes the Fama and French five factors and the momentum factor (UMD). A factor
is excluded from the list of control variables when it is the dependent variable in the regressions. Panel
A reports the results of the regressions with the previous period TA as the only independent variables,
i.e., i= 1. Panel B reports results of regressions with two TA lags as the independent variables, i.e.,
i = 2. The Newey and West (1987) robust t-statistics are in brackets. The sample period is from
1964/01/01 to 2008/12/31. The asterisks ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicates the statistical significance at 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A Panel B
No Control
Variables
With Control
Variables
No Control Vari-
ables
With Control Vari-
ables
β1 β1 β1 β2 β1 β2
ME L-H
0.15*** 0.15*** 2.48*** -2.34*** 2.84*** -2.70***
(8.77) (8.23) (13.87) (-12.98) (15.62) (-14.85)
Age L-H
0.14*** 0.076*** 2.42*** -2.29*** 0.85*** -0.77***
(8.23) (6.92) (15.11) (-14.13) (7.83) (-7.09)
Sigma H-L
0.11*** 0.037*** 3.01*** -2.90*** 0.51*** -0.47***
(4.92) (3.19) (15.58) (-14.95) (3.93) (-3.66)
E/BE <0->0
0.14*** 0.11*** 1.50*** -1.36*** 0.48*** -0.38**
(7.63) (6.19) (8.32) (-7.45) (2.72) (-2.13)
D/BE =0->0
0.13*** 0.081*** 1.98*** -1.86*** 0.50*** -0.42***
(6.83) (5.72) (11.98) (-11.11) (3.25) (-2.75)
PPE/A L-H
0.039*** 0.011 1.48*** -1.45*** 0.59*** -0.58***
(2.71) (0.92) (12.11) (-11.77) (5.16) (-5.09)
RD/A H-L
0.0093 -0.0027 0.84*** -0.84*** 0.20** -0.20**
(0.73) (-0.32) (7.11) (-7.02) (2.32) (-2.37)
BE/ME H-L
0.032* 0.054*** -0.64*** 0.67*** 0.42*** -0.37***
(1.96) (4.81) (-4.48) (4.67) (3.98) (-3.49)
EF/A H-L
-0.0068 -0.019*** 0.61*** -0.62*** 0.044 -0.063
(-0.78) (-3.82) (7.63) (-7.66) (0.72) (-1.03)
GS H-L
-0.022** -0.031*** 0.60*** -0.62*** 0.051 -0.082
(-2.52) (-5.45) (6.89) (-7.13) (0.82) (-1.33)
BE/ME L-M
0.011 -0.0058 0.85*** -0.84*** 0.14* -0.15*
(0.90) (-0.69) (8.22) (-8.04) (1.65) (-1.73)
EF/A H-M
0.042*** 0.021*** 1.00*** -0.96*** 0.29*** -0.27***
(4.47) (3.87) (12.42) (-11.77) (4.37) (-4.06)
GS H-M
0.038*** 0.012** 1.07*** -1.03*** 0.15** -0.13**
(3.54) (2.14) (11.76) (-11.26) (2.16) (-2.00)
BE/ME H-M
0.043*** 0.049*** 0.21** -0.17* 0.57*** -0.52***
(5.66) (6.80) (2.44) (-1.95) (7.25) (-6.71)
EF/A L-M
0.049*** 0.040*** 0.38*** -0.33*** 0.24*** -0.20***
(9.08) (7.92) (6.29) (-5.46) (4.13) (-3.46)
GS L-M
0.061*** 0.043*** 0.47*** -0.41*** 0.096 -0.053
(7.88) (6.76) (6.02) (-5.22) (1.41) (-0.77)
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GS(H-L). With the exception of these four portfolios and GS(L-M), including control
variables does not alter the sign or significance of β1 and β2. When BE/ME, EF/A, and GS
are used to capture growth and distress, β1 and β2 are statistically significant as hypothesized
in most cases.
I consider three lags of TA sentiment and find that the coefficients of the first-order TA
lag are in general positive, while the coefficients of the second and the third lags are in
general negative. Alternatively, in Table E.7 I include the first lag of TA sentiment, and the
average TA sentiment between t−2 and t−26. While the coefficients of the first-order TA
lag remain positive, the coefficients of the average of the past TA sentiment are negative.
These results suggest that, on average, an increase in TA sentiment predicts a momentum on
the following day and a reversal afterwards. The finding that TA is a contrarian predictor
for future cross-sectional returns suggests that my TA sentiment index is indeed a sentiment
indicator.
I conduct several additional tests to examine the robustness of my results. The results of
these tests are reported in Appendix E.2.
The first set of tests examine whether the observed return patterns reflect changes in
firms’ fundamentals. I do this by including macroeconomic variables in the set of the control
variables in Equations (4.1) and (4.2). Since I consider daily momentums and reversals, I
include the following macroeconomic control variables with available data at daily frequency:
default spread, TED spread, macroeconomic activities index (ADS), and economic policy
uncertainty (EPU). Default spread is the difference between Moody’s AAA and Baa bond
yields and TED spread is the difference between the yield on 3-month LIBOR and the yield
on 3-month US Treasury bills. When examining the effect of sentiment on returns, Da et al.
(2014) employ two macroeconomics variables ADS and EPU as control variables. ADS is
constructed by Aruoba et al. (2009) with a battery of seasonally adjusted macroeconomic
variables of mixed frequencies to measure daily macroeconomic activities. Baker et al.
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(2016) construct EPU by counting the number of US newspaper articles with terms related to
economic policies. As reported in Table E.8, the sign and significance of coefficients of TA
sentiment do not alter after including the macroeconomic variables as additional controls in
Equations (4.1) and (4.2).
To rule out the rational explanation for the predictability of TA sentiment, I also follow
Baker and Wurgler (2006) and add sentiment into a conditional CAPM model:
Rt = α+∑βiTAt−i+(d+∑λiTAt−i)RMRFt+ εt , (4.3)
where Rt is the portfolio return premium at time t, and RMRFt is the market return premium.
If the rational story holds, TA sentiment index would vary with systematic risks (beta
loadings) of the sentiment-based portfolio return premium. If the effect of TA lags on return
arises from the time-varying beta-loadings of market return premium, the sign of λi would
be the same as the sign of βi in Table 4.4 and remain significant; otherwise, the behavioural
story holds.
Table 4.5 presents the results of conditional CAPM model regressions. Check the results
against the two latent systematic risk explanations respectively. One explanation is that the
predictive pattern between TA sentiment and cross-sectional return is due to the effect of
TA sentiment on the beta loading of market return premium. If the rational story holds,
TA sentiment index will vary with systematic risks (beta loadings) of the sentiment-based
portfolio return premium, and the sign of λi is the same as the sign of βi in Regression (4.2);
otherwise, the behavioural story holds.
Panel A of Table 4.5 shows that the coefficients λ1 are significant for ten out of sixteen
regressions, but in most cases, the signs of coefficients λ1 do not match the signs of the
respective β1 in Table 4.4. Because the dependent variables for each regression in Table 4.5
are the return premium of sentiment-prone stocks over sentiment-immune stocks, I expect
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Table 4.5 Conditional Market Beta Loadings
This table reports the coefficients for lagged TA sentiment and the coefficients of interaction terms of TA
sentiment and market return premium (RMRF). The regressions are noted as
Rt = α+∑βiTAt−i+(d+∑λiTAt−i)RMRFt + εt .
Panel A reports results of model with only one-term lagged TA sentiment, where i = 1. Panel B
reports the results of model with two TA sentiment lags, where i= 2. The first two column indicates
how dependent variable Rt is formed. A superscript ’a’ (’b’) indicates that a statistical significant
coefficient of the interaction term of TA sentiment and RMRF matches (does not match) the sign of
return predictability of TA sentiment from Table 4.4. The Newey and West robust t-statistics are in
brackets. ***, ** and * indicates the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A Panel B
b β1 λ1 b β1 β2 λ1 λ2
ME L-H
-0.26*** 0.16*** -0.012 -0.27*** 3.06*** -2.91*** -0.75 0.73
(-24.15) (8.86) (-0.39) (-31.41) (16.52) (-15.71) (-1.44) (1.39)
Age L-H
-0.067*** 0.14*** -0.067*b -0.076*** 2.60*** -2.47*** -0.37 0.29
(-5.56) (8.18) (-1.93) (-6.82) (16.54) (-15.53) (-0.52) (0.42)
Sigma H-L
0.34*** 0.11*** -0.058*b 0.33*** 2.35*** -2.25*** -0.48 0.41
(36.42) (5.92) (-1.88) (36.61) (14.23) (-13.53) (-0.92) (0.80)
E/BE <0->0
0.021*** 0.14*** -0.033 0.014* 1.49*** -1.35*** -0.45 0.42
(2.65) (7.70) (-1.11) (1.82) (8.46) (-7.58) (-1.11) (1.02)
D/BE =0->0
0.11*** 0.12*** -0.024 0.10*** 1.79*** -1.67*** -0.46 0.43
(11.36) (7.12) (-0.64) (10.62) (10.94) (-10.11) (-0.87) (0.81)
PPE/A L-H
0.085*** 0.036*** 0.062 0.079*** 1.32*** -1.29*** -0.24 0.30
(11.46) (2.60) (1.36) (10.06) (11.54) (-11.17) (-0.91) (1.16)
RD/A H-L
0.18*** 0.0066 0.064***a 0.18*** 0.55*** -0.54*** -0.13 0.19
(37.37) (0.60) (2.59) (34.71) (5.30) (-5.25) (-0.84) (1.26)
BE/ME H-L
-0.31*** 0.038*** 0.092***a -0.31*** -0.020 0.058 0.042 0.050
(-36.75) (2.99) (3.27) (-43.01) (-0.17) (0.50) (0.10) (0.12)
EF/A H-L
0.14*** -0.010 -0.025 0.14*** 0.33*** -0.34*** -0.17*b 0.14
(41.77) (-1.42) (-1.55) (39.97) (4.71) (-4.83) (-1.65) (1.38)
GS H-L
0.15*** -0.026*** -0.024 0.15*** 0.30*** -0.33*** -0.12 0.096
(38.03) (-3.45) (-1.31) (41.32) (4.22) (-4.59) (-0.80) (0.63)
BE/ME L-M
0.19*** 0.0072 -0.050**b 0.18*** 0.48*** -0.47*** -0.094 0.043
(27.17) (0.70) (-1.99) (31.38) (4.98) (-4.89) (-0.27) (0.12)
EF/A H-M
0.10*** 0.040*** -0.058***b 0.10*** 0.81*** -0.77*** -0.29*b 0.23
(25.01) (5.11) (-3.75) (25.00) (10.60) (-10.00) (-1.65) (1.31)
GS H-M
0.14*** 0.035*** -0.053***b 0.14*** 0.80*** -0.76*** -0.25 0.20
(31.70) (4.07) (-2.62) (33.79) (9.55) (-9.11) (-1.08) (0.84)
BE/ME H-M
-0.12*** 0.046*** 0.042***a -0.12*** 0.46*** -0.42*** -0.051 0.092
(-36.76) (6.50) (4.27) (-41.50) (6.15) (-5.58) (-0.50) (0.90)
EF/A L-M
-0.040*** 0.050*** -0.033***b -0.042*** 0.48*** -0.43*** -0.12 0.087
(-11.84) (9.18) (-4.18) (-17.95) (8.16) (-7.27) (-1.01) (0.72)
GS L-M
-0.0086** 0.061*** -0.029***b -0.011*** 0.50*** -0.44*** -0.13 0.10
(-2.38) (7.97) (-2.65) (-2.84) (6.58) (-5.75) (-0.97) (0.73)
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positive coefficients of the first-order TA sentiment lag. The signs of β1 are generally positive
as hypothesized. In Panel A the signs of coefficients λ1 matches the signs of β1 in Table 4.4
only for three out of sixteen regressions; the coefficient λ1 is statistically positive for the
RD/A(H-L), BE/ME(H-L) and BE/ME(H-M) portfolios. My findings of significant positive
λ1 for BE/ME(H-M) is consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2006), who also find significant
coefficient of interactions terms for BE/ME(H-M). The signs of β1 are still notably positive
as expected for all the portfolios that show strong sentiment conditional effect in the previous
regressions.
Look into Panel B of Table 4.5. The signs of λ1 and λ2 are no longer significant in
most cases except for the EF/A(H-L) portfolio and EF/A(H-M) portfolio, while in those
two regressions the sign of statistically significant λ1 does not match the sign of β1 in Table
4.4. Both the sign and magnitude of the coefficients of TA lags are strongly consistent with
that in Table 4.3. The predictive ability of TA sentiment does not change after allowing for
time-variation in the conditional market betas. Generally speaking, the first systematic risk
explanation does not hold and does not undermine the explanatory power of behavioural story.
In Table 4.5, the sign of significant λ1 matches the sign of the coefficients of the first-order
TA lag in Table 4.4 in only in 3 out of the 16 regressions, suggesting that the behavioural story
holds for 13 out of the 16 regressions. I also find that the sign and significance of coefficients
of TA lags, βi, are consistent with those in Table 4.4, implying that the predictive ability of
TA sentiment does not change after allowing for time-variation in conditional market betas.
Another systematic risk explanation considers the market beta loadings fixed but argues
the market return premium varies with TA sentiment, and therefore the cross-sectional return
changes in proportion. If this story holds, then the coefficient for market return premium
should be consistent for all the sixteen portfolios constructed similarly based on variables
representing the sentiment-prone level of a stock. However, the coefficients of market return
premium in Table 4.3 vary in signs across the regressions for the sixteen portfolios. In the
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CAMP model, the coefficients d in Regression Equation (4.3) for market return premium
vary in signs for the sixteen portfolios as well. In addition, I run some simple tests and find
out that TA sentiment does not perform well in predicting the overall market returns. The
correlation of market return premium and TA sentiment lag is insignificant. With or without
control variables, the coefficient of TA sentiment is not significant when regressed on overall
market returns. To sum, neither systematic risk explanations hold for the predictive power of
TA sentiment index. The bulk of the results show that the predictability of TA sentiment on
future returns is not a reflection of systematic risk compensation.
The second set of tests investigate the sensitivity of my results to the way in which TA
sentiment is constructed. The regression results are tabulated in Appendix E2.3. I construct
a TA sentiment with historical data of Dow Jones Industrial Average Index and produce
similar results in Table E.12. Furthermore, instead of using an equal-weighted average of the
technical analysis forecasts, I compute a performance-weighted average of the 2,127 technical
forecasts as TA sentiment index, for which performance of each trading rule is measured
by its returns in the past year, and obtain consistent results. The performance-weighted TA
sentiment captures the idea that better performing strategies are more likely to be used. The
regression results using performance-weighted TA sentiment are reported in Table E.14.
The third set of tests investigate the robustness of my findings to alternative long-short
portfolio return calculations and to addressing the Stambaugh bias and multi-collinearity
issues in the regressions. Explicitly, I construct the long-short portfolios by longing the
most sentiment-prone decile portfolio and shorting the least sentiment-prone decile portfolio
and find that my results still hold. I also calculate the value-weighted return premium to
isolate the size effect on the portfolio return premium and show that the predictive power of
TA sentiment does not change, as shown in TableE.16. Finally, I address a potential multi-
collinearity issue (due to the high persistency of TA similar to other sentiment indicators) by
orthogonalizing TAt−2 to TAt−1 when both TAt−1 and TAt−2 are included in the regressions.
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I replace TAt−2 with recursive residuals of a rolling regression to avoid the look-ahead
bias. The results show that one-day lagged TA sentiment predicts higher returns while the
orthogonalized second lag of TA sentiment has a significant negative link with future returns,
consistent with the results in Table E.11.
Furthermore, I investigate whether the observed momentum-reversal pattern in the cross-
sectional returns following a TA sentiment increase reflects liquidity by adding a market-wide
liquidity measure, the detrended daily trading volume of S&P 500 index (VOL), into the
control variables. I find that the sign and the significance of the lagged TA coefficients remain
similar, inconsistent with the liquidity explanation. Similar results are obtained when the
average bid-ask spread of a sentiment-prone portfolio minus that of a sentiment-immune
portfolio, instead of the detrended VOL, is used a liquidity measure. The results after
controlling for liquidity effect are reported in Table E.9 of Appendix E2.2.
I also examine whether TA sentiment has incremental value beyond the alternative
sentiment indicators, such as VIX. I find that the effect of my sentiment measure remains
significant after including VIX as a control variable in my regressions. See Table E.10in
Appendix E2.2.
The final set of tests is to add macroeconomic variables into the control variables. Given
that the near term momentums and reversals occur within a few days when macroeconomic
conditions are similar, macroeconomic conditions are unlikely to drive my results,. Yet, I
still add four daily-frequency macroeconomic control variables, namely default spread, TED
spread, macroeconomic activities index (ADS) and economic policy uncertainty (EPU)16,
into the regressions. Default spread and TED spread are commonly accepted macroeconomic
variables. I borrow ADS and EPU from Da et al. (2014), who uses them as control variables
16Default spread and TED spread are from Bloomberg. Default spread is the differential between Moody’s
AAA and Baa yield, starting from 1986/01/02. TED spread is the difference between the interest rates on
interbank loans and on short-term U.S. government T-bills, starting from 1984/12/06. ADS is available at
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/business-conditions-index, starting from
1960/03/01. EPU is available at http://www.policyuncertainty.com/us_daily.html, starting from 1985/01/01.
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when trying to validate the daily search volume of negative words as a sentiment indicator.
ADS is constructed in Aruoba et al. (2009) with a battery of seasonally adjusted macroe-
conomic variables of mixed frequencies, including weekly initial jobless claims, monthly
payroll employment, monthly industrial production, monthly personal income less transfer
payments, manufacturing and trade sales, and quarterly real GDP. High ADS means good
macroeconomic conditions. Baker et al. (2016) construct EPU by counting the number of
US newspaper articles with at least one term from each of the three categories of terms 1)
economic or economy 2) uncertain or uncertainty 3) deficit, regulation, legislation, congress,
Federal Reserve or White House. EPU is a crucial control variable, as some argue that official
intervention might be a reason for the profitability of technical analysis. In an unreported
table, both the sign and magnitude of the coefficients for TA sentiment terms are strongly
consistent after accounting for the four macroeconomic variables based on the results in
Table E.8.
Apart from the tests on the relationship between TA indicator and cross-sectional stock
returns, I propose another way to validate TA indicator as an investor sentiment measure. I
show the predictability of TA indicator on sentiment-induced future crash risk to prove TA in-
dicator captures investor sentiment in Appendix E2.1. Because of the lack of synchronisation
among arbitragers, the sentiment-induced mispricing persists in the asset price. When the
bubbles are big enough and finally collapse, the coordinated arbitrage actions will trigger a
sharp deceleration in the asset price. Therefore, a good investor sentiment indicator would not
only predict the return momentum but also perform well in forecasting the future crash risk.
I expect my TA sentiment to predict future crash risk in the cross-section. More specifically,
I expect more sentiment-prone stocks to have higher crash risk than less sentiment-prone
stocks following a TA sentiment increase. The documented evidence suggests that arbitragers
who ride mispricing encounter a big chance of dramatic drops in their portfolio returns if
they are unable to "beat the gun" (i.e., before the joint attack on mispricing is triggered).
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4.4 Simple TA Trading Strategies
This new TA sentiment index can be used to design trend-following trading strategies and
quantify the effect of sentiment on return. In this section, I will first employ TA sentiment
index to time the sixteen long-short portfolios and test the profitability and marketing power
of my TA trading strategies. Then I check the profit of applying TA timing rule on decile
portfolios constructed with the ten characteristics, to have a better understanding of the
sources of profitability. I also calculate the break-even transaction costs to demonstrate my
TA trading strategies are practical and tradable.
4.4.1 Implementation on Cross-sectional Long-short Portfolios
One critical assumption behind the delayed arbitrage of sophisticated investors is that riding
mispricing is on average profitable. While I do not know exactly which trading strategies
are used by arbitrageurs, I trade on signals inferred from my TA sentiment indicator. I
then apply my TA timing rule to the sixteen long-short portfolios, which long the most
sentiment-prone deciles and short the least sentiment-prone deciles. In what follows, I refer
to these long-short portfolios as the original long-short portfolios to distinguish them from
the portfolios generated from the implementation of the TA timing rule.
The TA timing rule is straightforward: a ’buy’ (’sell’) signal is generated when a TA
sentiment at the end of the current trading day is higher (lower) than the moving average of
TA sentiment over previous five days.17 When I apply the timing rule to the sixteen original
long-short portfolios, I long or continue to hold the original long-short portfolio the next day
when a ’buy’ signal is generated today, and short the original long-short portfolio the next day
when a ’sell’ signal is generated. In this way, I get sixteen TA trading strategies. For example,
the TA trading strategy for the Age-sorted portfolio is to buy young and sell old firms when
17I also use moving average over alternative window period in my robustness checks.
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the TA sentiment gives a ’buy’ signal, and to buy old and sell young firms when the TA
sentiment generates a ’sell’ signal. Essentially, my TA time strategies are trend-following
strategies designed to take advantage of delayed arbitrage. I do not consider a contrarian
strategy to exploit return reversals, as the inability to observe coordinated events makes it
difficult to time reversals.
Panel A in Table 4.6 reports the average returns and risk-adjusted returns (Sharpe ratio
and the Alphas from regressions with the Fama-French five factors and the momentum factor)
of original long-short portfolios. Most of these portfolios have significantly positive average
returns and risk-adjusted returns. Approximate one-third of these TA-sentiment-timing
strategies have significantly negative average returns and risk-adjusted returns. Unlike the
results in Panel A, both average returns and risk-adjusted returns of my TA trading strategies
in Panel B are positive and salient for almost all portfolios. The only exceptions are GS(10-1),
which has significant albeit small negative average returns and BE/ME(10-1) and GS(10-1),
which have insignificant alphas. The average performances range from -1.74% to 36.42%
and the Sharpe ratios range from -0.25 to 2.76. Adjusting for the Fama-French five factors
and the momentum factor affects average returns only marginally. The low profitability of
BE/ME(10-1), EF/A(10-1), and GS(10-1) is not surprising because both the long leg and the
short leg of the three portfolios are sentiment-prone.
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Table 4.6 Profitability of TA Trading Strategies
This table reports the summary statistics of the original long-short portfolio returns, the TA timing returns, and the TAP returns. The original
portfolios are constructed by longing the most sentiment-prone deciles and shorting the least sentiment-prone deciles. TA timing rule represents
holding the original portfolio when current TA sentiment is no less than the average TA sentiment over prior five trading days and shorting the
original portfolio otherwise. TAP is the abnormal returns on the sentiment timing strategy over original portfolio returns. AvgRet is the average
return. SRatio is the Sharpe ratio. Alpha is the abnormal return of the portfolio after adjusting for Fama and French five factors and the momentum
factor. BETC in Panel B is the break-even transaction costs of TA trading strategies. Success in Panel C is the percentage of non-negative TAP
returns. All the returns are annualised and in percentages. The sample period is between 01/1964 and 12/2008. The asterisks ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗ and ∗
indicates the t-test significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A Original Portfolio Panel B TA Trading Strategy Panel C TAP
Avg Ret SRatio Alpha Avg Ret SRatio Alpha BETC Avg Ret Alpha Success
ME 1-10 18.7*** 1.4 21.5*** 36.42*** 2.76 35.6*** 61.15 17.72*** 14.1*** 0.78
Age 1-10 7.19*** 0.73 10.9*** 24.69*** 2.52 24.7*** 41.45 17.5*** 13.7*** 0.78
Sigma 10-1 12.83*** 0.97 13.1*** 28.57*** 2.18 31.5*** 47.96 15.74*** 18.4*** 0.77
E/BE 1-10 9.71*** 1.37 9.40*** 9.51*** 1.34 8.93*** 15.96 -0.21 -0.45 0.77
D/BE 1-10 9.08*** 1.08 10.6*** 19.13*** 2.3 20.1*** 32.12 10.05*** 9.52*** 0.78
PPE/A 1-10 -2.43** -0.3 -0.90 8.18*** 1.01 8.44*** 13.74 10.61*** 9.36*** 0.79
RD/A 10-1 5.35*** 0.49 10.3*** 8.32*** 0.76 9.32*** 13.97 2.96 -0.98 0.8
BE/ME 10-1 17.1*** 1.68 14.8*** 2.85* 0.28 2.06 4.79 -14.24*** -12.7*** 0.75
EF/A 10-1 -12.65*** -1.72 -9.39*** 3.16*** 0.43 3.64*** 5.31 15.81*** 13.0*** 0.79
GS 10-1 -10.9*** -1.59 -9.60*** -1.74* -0.25 -0.95 -2.92 9.17*** 8.62*** 0.78
BE/ME 1-5 -2.41** -0.31 2.03** 4.89*** 0.63 5.45*** 8.22 7.31*** 3.42** 0.77
EF/A 10-5 -4.35*** -0.59 -1.08 12.28*** 1.68 13.0*** 20.62 16.63*** 14.1*** 0.79
GS 10-5 -3.83*** -0.49 -0.77 9.28*** 1.2 10.2*** 15.58 13.11*** 10.9*** 0.78
BE/ME 10-5 14.68*** 2.26 14.5*** 7.75*** 1.19 7.59*** 13.01 -6.94*** -6.92*** 0.75
EF/A 1-5 8.3*** 1.56 8.32*** 9.12*** 1.71 9.36*** 15.31 0.82 1.06 0.77
GS 1-5 7.08*** 1.08 8.82*** 11.02*** 1.69 11.1*** 18.49 3.94*** 2.33 0.77
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One critical issue is whether my TA trading strategies can survive the transaction costs. I
calculate break-even trading costs (BETC) that make the average returns of my TA timing
portfolio zero. BETC depends on both the profitability and the trading frequency of a strategy.
High BETC arises from high profitability or low trading frequency of a strategy. The higher
the BETC is, the more likely a trading strategy will survive the transaction costs. The last
column of Panel B shows that 4 out of the 16 TA timing portfolios have BETCs higher
than the benchmark transaction cost of 25 basis points (see, Lynch and Balduzzi, 2000).
The highest BETC of 61.15 basis points is observed in the case of ME (1-10) portfolio.
Note that sophisticated investors, such as hedge funds, usually have lower transaction costs.
Furthermore, using a longer moving average window to generate trading signals will reduce
the trading frequency and transaction costs. Indeed, 9 (12) out of the 16 TA timing portfolios
have BETC above 25 basis points when a 30 (60) day moving average window is used to
generate trading signals. While I acknowledge that determining an appropriate transaction
cost is not an easy issue, my results show that transaction costs reduce but do not eliminate
the profitability of my trading strategies.18
To demonstrate the incremental value of applying my trading strategy, I also compute
TAPt , the return difference between each TA trading strategy and its corresponding original
portfolio. Panel C in Table 4.6 shows applying TA trading strategy generates significantly
positive returns over the original long-short portfolios in 11 out of the 16 cases. The size
of TAPt is remarkable, averaging 12% per annum. TAP is particularly large for ME(1-10),
AGE(1-10), Sigma(10-1), EF/A(10-1) and EF/A(10-5), with values exceeding 15% per
annum. Adjusting TAP for risk factors yields significantly positive alphas in 11 out of the 16
TA timing portfolios, with an average alpha of 6.1% after accounting for the Fama-French
five factors and the momentum factor. I also report the success rate of a TA trading strategy,
18I can also apply my timing rule on individual decile portfolios as in Han et al. (2013). Returns (BETC)
on the TA trading strategies are much higher (higher) for the most sentiment-prone deciles than that of the
long-short portfolio constructed with the same firm characteristic.
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defined as the percentage of trading days with non-negative TAPs. I find that the success rate
ranges from 75% to 80%, indicating that the TA trading strategies perform well most of the
time.
What happens if after applying the TA trading strategy to the original long-short portfolios
based on one-day prior TA sentiment index level at date t, I continue to hold the same TA
timing portfolio for the following 24 days? That is, I long the original portfolio for the next
25 days if current TA trading signal is positive, and short the original portfolio for the next
25 days if current TA trading is negative. Hence I ignore the trading signals from TA trading
strategy between day 2 and day 25. In untabulated results, I show that this new strategy
generates substantial positive returns on day one and these returns decline afterwards and
fluctuate randomly around a certain level (mainly around zero or below the average returns
of the original long-short portfolios). Such a pattern echoes the reversal effect found in
my predictive regression analysis in Table 4.4. These findings also corroborate with results
from Vector Autoregression models (VAR) of TA sentiment and the returns of the original
long-short portfolios. The simple impulse response functions from VAR analysis show that
after a positive sentiment shock, the returns on the original portfolios increase sharply on the
first day and then declines gradually in the following days. This suggests that the increase in
portfolio returns following shocks in the TA sentiment tends to die out gradually.
I also show that the profitability of my TA trading strategy is robust to using performance-
weighted TA sentiment index, constructing TA sentiment by applying technical analysis to
the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index, and applying TA timing rule on value-weighted
returns of the original portfolios. The results are documented in Appendix E2.3.
Since my TA sentiment is constructed from applying TA to a market index, the TA trading
strategy is a market timing strategy and a stock-picking strategy that it selects stocks on the
basis of their exposure to investor sentiment. To see whether my TA sentiment index has any
ability to time the market, I follow Han et al. (2013) and estimate the following regression
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models:
TAPt = α+βmRMRFt+βm2RMRF
2
t + εt (4.4)
TAPT = α+βmRMRFt+ γmRMRFtDrmr f + εt (4.5)
where Drmr f = 1 when the market return premium is above 0 and Drmr f = 0 otherwise and
the remaining variables are as defined above.
The regression Equation (4.4) is based on the methodology in Treynor and Mazuy (1966),
and the regression Equation (4.5) employs the market timing test in Henriksson and Merton
(1981). A significantly positive βm2 in Equation (4.4) or γm in Equation (4.5) indicates
successful market timing ability, and the regression alphas represent the abnormal returns
after controlling for market timing ability of TA sentiment.
Table 4.7 shows that βm2 (Panel A) and γm (Panel B) are significantly positive for most
of TAPs, suggesting that my timing strategy generally helps time the market. However, it
is important to emphasise that my trading strategy exploits the cross-sectional profitability
after timing the market and it perhaps, for this reason, I observe a very small R-square in the
market timing regressions as above. The significantly positive abnormal alpha in Panel A
implies that the market timing explanation could only partially explain the profitability of
TA Trading Strategy. Market timing explanation does not fully eliminate the abnormal alpha
returns of TA trading strategy.
To further understand the plausible sources of the profitability of my trading strategies, I
also explore the decile portfolios for each strategy. I expect the profits of my strategies to be
stronger among the sentiment-prone stocks than the sentiment-immune stocks.
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Table 4.7 Market Timing Tests for TA Trading Strategy Profit
This table reports results of market timing regressions of the long-short portfolio TAPs . Panel A
shows the results of Treynor and Mazuy (1966) quadratic regressions
TAPt = α+βmRMRFt +βm2RMRF2t + εt ,
Panel B presents the results of Henriksson and Merton (1981) regressions
TAPT = α+βmRMRFt + γmRMRFtDrmr f + εt .
The alphas are annualised and in percentages. The asterisks ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicates significance at
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The Newey and West robust t-statistics are in parenthesis. The
sample period is from 1964/01/01 to 2008/12/31.
Panel A. TM Regression Panel B. HM Regression
α βm βm2 R2 α βm γm R2
ME 1-10
5.07 -0.24*** 5.82*** 8.74 -22.63*** -0.52*** 0.50*** 6.86
(1.27) (-11.47) (5.30) (-2.86) (-7.00) (5.32)
Age 1-10
10.97*** -0.17*** 3.08*** 6.03 -4.09 -0.31*** 0.27*** 5.08
(3.27) (-9.97) (3.25) (-0.72) (-6.12) (3.93)
Sigma 10-1
12.42*** -0.21*** 1.79** 3.11 -2.56 -0.33*** 0.23*** 3.18
(3.12) (-10.04) (2.48) (-0.40) (-6.13) (3.21)
E/BE 1-10
-0.36 -0.04*** 0.13 0.34 -4.47* -0.06** 0.05 0.43
(-0.19) (-2.76) (0.39) (-1.65) (-2.54) (1.64)
D/BE 1-10
5.93** -0.14*** 2.02*** 5.06 -5.61 -0.25*** 0.20*** 4.68
(2.21) (-10.92) (2.89) (-1.25) (-6.33) (3.68)
PPE/A 1-10
9.92*** -0.06*** 0.41 0.83 7.77* -0.09** 0.04 0.81
(4.00) (-5.90) (0.53) (1.82) (-2.51) (0.70)
RD/A 10-1
0.75 -0.09*** 1.00** 1.07 -2.57 -0.13*** 0.07 0.93
(0.22) (-5.51) (2.19) (-0.48) (-3.41) (1.25)
BE/ME 10-1
-14.54*** 0.03 0.07 0.06 -16.31*** 0.02 0.02 0.07
(-5.52) (1.64) (0.14) (-3.97) (0.50) (0.53)
EF/A 10-1
14.56*** -0.06*** 0.65 1.01 12.23*** -0.09*** 0.05 0.91
(7.53) (-6.46) (1.23) (3.38) (-2.93) (1.08)
GS 10-1
8.41*** -0.03*** 0.38 0.25 8.43** -0.04 0.01 0.19
(4.46) (-3.05) (0.64) (2.33) (-1.13) (0.24)
BE/ME 1-5
7.37*** -0.06*** 0.09 0.65 3.95 -0.08*** 0.04 0.69
(3.62) (-5.55) (0.39) (1.38) (-4.26) (1.50)
EF/A 10-5
14.75*** -0.09*** 0.97*** 2.22 7.65** -0.15*** 0.11*** 2.21
(7.25) (-9.02) (3.29) (2.54) (-6.61) (3.58)
GS 10-5
10.99*** -0.09*** 1.06*** 1.93 4.35 -0.15*** 0.11*** 1.85
(5.10) (-9.47) (2.84) (1.22) (-5.59) (2.83)
BE/ME 10-5
-7.18*** -0.03** 0.16 0.34 -12.36*** -0.07** 0.07** 0.50
(-4.09) (-2.35) (0.35) (-4.53) (-2.33) (2.05)
EF/A 1-5
0.19 -0.03*** 0.32 0.50 -4.58** -0.06*** 0.07*** 0.68
(0.14) (-3.88) (1.08) (-2.19) (-4.02) (2.89)
GS 1-5
2.59 -0.06*** 0.69** 1.43 -4.08* -0.11*** 0.10*** 1.57
(1.40) (-5.16) (2.55) (-1.82) (-5.98) (4.43)
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Consistent with my conjecture, I find that the TA trading strategies built on sentiment-prone
decile portfolios notably outperform their benchmark portfolios. Compare the TAPs in Panel
A and B. Both the average returns and risk-adjusted returns of TAPs in Panel A are higher
than the data presented in Panel B.
I compare my timing strategies with the momentum strategy. Both the momentum
strategy and my trading strategies are trend-following strategies. The momentum strategy
has an annualised return of 12%, which is substantially lower than the returns generated by
my TA trading strategies. In the regressions of TA trading profits from decile portfolios, the
alphas are prominently positive, and the coefficients of the momentum factor are all negative,
implying that my timing strategies and momentum capture different aspects of the market.
I also calculate the annual returns of TA trading strategy and momentum trading strategy
(S&P 500 Index Return) and compare them in Figure E.1 (Figure E.2) in Appendix E2.4.
Recall that Table 4.4 shows that conditional on the effect of TAt−1, two-term lagged TA
indicator is negatively associated with future returns. To better illustrate the reversal effect of
investor sentiment, I also look into the profitability of holding the same portfolio on a trading
signal over the future 25 days with Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3 compares the overtime return of holding the portfolio with the benchmark
when I do not time the market, which is the average returns of the original portfolio. If
current sentiment is high, then I expect the following short-run return high and I expect the
return of holding this portfolio shall reverse after an uncertain period.19 On the starting day I
apply TA timing rule based on one-day prior TA sentiment index level, and then I ignore the
following trading signals continue holding the same TA timing portfolio for the next 24 days.
Put differently: the strategy is to long the original portfolio for the next 25 days if current TA
trading signal is positive, and to short the original portfolio for the next 25 days if current
19 I could not determine when the reversal effect starts to come into effect, so I just let the data talk. It is
not possible to show the timing of reversal. Otherwise, the backward induction will lead to a dilemma that
mispricing could be corrected if everyone could time the market correctly.
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TA trading is negative. I choose 25-day window period to observe whether the impact of a
trading signal for the following one month.
In Figure 4.3, generally speaking, the return for holding the sentiment timing portfolio is
the highest on day one, and then the daily return for holding the portfolio reduces sharply for
at least the first five days, and afterwards the return fluctuates around a certain level. Such
a pattern of TA sentiment timing strategies return coming off first-day highs indicates that
the reversal effect of high TA sentiment takes longer time to offset the momentum effect of
high TA sentiment. Consider the first four graphs. After a sentiment shock, for example,
following the high sentiment day, my trading strategies outperform by riding the bubble.
Then the return falls and continues to drop below the average level, the below average level
indicates that the reversal is not purely due to the mean-reverting pattern of sentiment, but at
least partially caused by the overreaction in the price.
It is also noteworthy that applying TA sentiment timing on BE/ME(H-L), BE/ME(H-M)
and EF/A(L-M) portfolio does not generate better return compared with the benchmark
return. This is consistent the negative or insignificant alpha for those portfolios in Table
10. TA sentiment timing strategy does not perform well on BE/ME(H-L) due to the cross-
sectional U-shape pattern of decile returns of BE/ME sorted portfolios. Except for those
three portfolios, the first-day returns of TA sentiment timing strategies are all greater than
corresponding benchmark returns, which again confirms that trading signals based on TA
sentiment help predict future return.
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(a) ME(L-H) (b) Age(L-H) (c) Sigma(H-L) (d) E/BE(L-H)
(e) D/BE(L-H) (f) PPE/A(L-H) (g) RD/A(H-L) (h) BE/ME(H-L)
(i) EF/A(H-L) (j) GS(H-L) (k) BE/ME(L-M) (l) EF/A(H-M)
(m) GS(H-M) (n) BE/ME(H-M) (o) EF/A(L-M) (p) GS(L-M)
Profit of holding a portfolio based on current TA trading signal over 25 following days The solid line is the return for holding a portfolio based on TA
trading signal. The dashed line is the original portfolio averaged returns, which serves as a benchmark for the profitability of TA trading strategies. The sample
period is from 1964 to 2008.
Fig. 4.3 TA Trading Strategy Profit over Time
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(a) ME(L-H) (b) Age(L-H) (c) Sigma(H-L) (d) E/BE(L-H)
(e) D/BE(L-H) (f) PPE/A(L-H) (g) RD/A(H-L) (h) BE/ME(H-L)
(i) EF/A(H-L) (j) GS(H-L) (k) BE/ME(L-M) (l) EF/A(H-M)
(m) GS(H-M) (n) BE/ME(H-M) (o) EF/A(L-M) (p) GS(L-M)
Impulse Response Graphs of Long-Short Portfolio Returns to TA Sentiment Shock Each impulse–response graph shows the effect of a one-standard-
deviation TA sentiment shock on the daily cross-sectional return premium over a 10-day period. The sample period is from 1964 to 2008. The cross-sectional
long-short portfolio returns in each panel are calculated as the return premium of sentiment-prone stocks over sentiment-immune stocks indicated by the panel
title. The grey area is the 95% confidence bands.
Fig. 4.4 Impulse Response of Long-Short Portfolio Returns to TA Sentiment
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I also run the Vector Autoregression model (VAR) to investigate the simple impulse
response functions (IRF) of the original portfolio returns to a positive sentiment shock. VAR
model is an approach to analyse the joint dynamics and causal relations among a set of
time-series variables. To be more specific, each variable is dependent on its own lags and the
lags of every other variables in the vector of variables included in a VAR model. The order
of variables affect the impulse response results. In this chapter, I have sixteen VAR models;
each model contains two variables, the TA sentiment and the cross-sectional portfolio return.
The ordering of variables in VAR model should be imposed based on the economic relations
of the variables. I follow the rule that each variable is contemporaneously uninfluenced
by the shock to the equation above it, and therefore the TA sentiment is placed at the first
order. TA sentiment is allowed to affect the cross-sectional return contemporaneously. I run
a battery of lag-order selection tests. The likelihood ratio test, the final prediction error and
Akaike’s information criterion all recommend four lags, and therefore I set the lag-order at
four for all sixteen VAR models. I also employ small-sample corrections to the large-sample
estimation statistics estimated in the VAR models. With the VAR model estimation, I build
the impulse response function to trace out the effect of shock in TA sentiment. Figure 4.4
reports the impulse response of one standard-deviation shock in TA sentiment on the original
portfolio returns for a 10-day period.
In Figure 4.4, the results show that the responses of the original portfolio returns to one
unit of TA sentiment shock. The grey area is the 95% confidence bands. The response is
generally significant if the upper and lower bounds of the grey area carry the same sign. For
most of the sixteen cases, when there is a positive sentiment shock, the original portfolio
returns experience a sharp increase on the first day and then keep declining gradually for the
following days remarkably for almost all cases except the RD/A and BE/ME(H-L) portfolio.
The positive increase of portfolio return caused by TA sentiment shock generally dies after
more than five days. This shows that the momentum effect of sentiment shock are stronger
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than the reversal effect at the beginning, and the reversal effect takes place over a longer
horizon. That also helps explain why I take advantage of the momentum effect to time the
market and make profits. I also obtain a similar conclusion in Figure 4.3.
I also look into the time-series variation of the profit of TA trading strategies. I calculate
the annual average returns of TA trading strategies RTAt and draw figures to show the trend of
the annual performances of applying TA timing rules on all the sixteen long-short portfolios
from 1964 to 2008. The profitability of TA trading strategies is generally higher after 1990. I
also regress RTAt on time t and notice a significant and dominant rising trend. Unlike the
declining size effect or the declining value effect, the performance of TA trading strategy is
weaker for the beginning period but stronger for the recent periods. I revisit the predictive
regressions of cross-sectional returns using different subsample periods. Intriguingly, I find
that TA sentiment has stronger predictive power on returns for the subsample period after
1990 than for the subsample period before 1990.
The enhancing predictive power of technical analysis over time is consistent with the
growing profitability of TA trading strategies over time. This finding seems to be inconsistent
with Qi and Wu (2006), who argue that the improved market efficiency and increased liquidity
make the profit of applying technical trading rules weaker during the recent periods. Such a
tendency that the effect of technical analysis is becoming stronger after 1980 could hardly
be explained by theoretical models on technical analysis such as informational diffusion
model and liquidity model. Those theories see technical analysis as a method of processing
fundamental information, and better computing skills and increased liquidity shorten the
process of pricing reaching to equilibrium. However, this thesis argues that technical
analysis is a method of processing the non-fundamental information, and arbitragers who
face synchronisation risk may choose to ride the bubble and drive the price further away
from the fundamental. My TA sentiment index captures the uninformed demand of biased
and irrational investors. With the development of technology, the transaction cost reduces,
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and the computing skills improvement, it is becoming easier for investors to apply technical
analysis to monitor sentiment and cheaper for them to ride the bubble. One could say that in
the context of synchronisation risk models the arbitrageurs can better apply technical analysis
to monitor sentiment and ride the bubble with the progressively cheaper computing power,
lower transaction costs and increased liquidity in the stock market for the past two decades.
4.4.2 Implementation on Decile Portfolios
To further understand the potential sources of the profitability of my trading strategies, I
also explore the decile portfolios for each strategy as well. The profitability of my strategies
relies on whether there are detectable trends in the cross-section of the stock market. If
TA sentiment is an adequate measure of sentiment, the profits of TA trading strategies tend
to show up more strongly for the sentiment-prone stocks than for the sentiment-immune
stocks. In this part, all the deciles are constructed with the ten characteristics that represent
sentiment-prone level as used in the cross-sectional portfolio. For each decile, the TA timing
rule is to long the decile portfolio during high TA period and to short this decile portfolio
during low TA period. Mathematically, the decile sentiment timing return is denoted as
RTAX , j,t = RX , j,tDt−1), where RX , j,t is the original return of the jth decile portfolio sorted
by X characteristics at time t, and j is the number of decile rank, and X is one of the ten firm
characteristics representing sentiment-prone level. Dt−1 has the same definition as in the
previous section. The difference between the TA timing return and the original buy-and-hold
decile return is denoted as TAPX , j,t = RTAX , j,t−RX , j,t .
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Decile Profitability and Abnormal Return of Sentiment Timing Portfolio, 1964-2008 When today’s sentiment are no less than average of the previous five
trading days’ sentiment I define it as a high sentiment day; otherwise define it as a low sentiment day. For each decile, the solid bars are the average returns of TA
trading strategies (RTA); the clear bars are average TAP returns. The solid line is the abnormal returns of TAP adjusted for FF five factors and momentum factor.
The dashed line is the Sharpe Ratio of TA trading strategy, and its corresponding y-axis is on the right side. All the returns are annualised equal-weighted average
and are in percentage. The y-axis on the left side is for the returns. The sample period is from 1964 to 2008.
Fig. 4.5 Statistics of Decile Portfolio Sentiment Timing Performance
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Figure 4.5 graphically displays all the essential statistics of TA trading strategies im-
plemented on decile portfolios. The solid bar is the annualised average of RX , j for each
decile portfolio; the clear bar is the TAPX , j,t ; the solid line is the abnormal return of RTAX , j,t
adjusted for FF Five factors and momentum factor; the dashed line is the Sharpe Ratio of
RTAX , j,t , and its corresponding y-axis is on the right side.
Figure 4.5 shows that the TA timing returns show a monotonic decreasing pattern across
ME or Age deciles and a monotonic increasing pattern across Sigma deciles. The graphs in
Figure 4.5 show that Sharpe Ratios share the same pattern with the TA timing returns in the
cross-section. That is because the Sharpe Ratio are principally driven by the noticeable rise
in returns and the slightly increase in standard deviations of returns after employing the TA
timing rule. The cross-decile patterns of TA timing returns and Sharpe Ratios indicate that the
profitability of TA trading strategies monotonically increases with the decile sentiment-prone
level. Moreover, the abnormal returns, i.e. the alphas of regressing TAPs on FF five factors
and the momentum factor, are also increasing with the sentiment-prone level. Figure 4.5
roughly indicates that the most profitable trading strategy should be timing with the most
sentiment-prone deciles.
Table 4.8 provides the summary statistics of the 13 most sentiment-sensitive deciles in
Panel A and that of 10 least sentiment-sensitive deciles in Panel B. In Panel A of Table 4.8,
the TA timing returns of those sentiment-sensitive deciles are favourable and basically over
8% per annum. Generally speaking, the sentiment-prone decile portfolios in Panel A have
more notable positive TAPs than the sentiment-immune decile portfolios in Panel B. It shows
TA timing rule works better for sentiment-prone deciles. Take ME top decile as an example,
applying TA timing rule on large stock portfolio make the return worse off.
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Table 4.8 Summary Statistics of Timing Decile Portfolios
Table 4.8 reports summary statistics of the original return, TA timing return and return difference TAP for all the most sentiment-prone deciles in Panel A and
for all the most sentiment-immune deciles in Panel B. The first two column show the choice of decile portfolios as original portfolios. The first column shows the
characteristics used to form the decile portfolio. The second column reports the decile rank. TA sentiment timing rule is to hold the original portfolio when
current TA sentiment is no lesser than the average TA sentiment over prior five trading days and to short the original portfolio otherwise. TAP is the return
disparity of sentiment timing returns over original portfolio returns. Last column is the success ratio (Success), which is the percentage of non-negative TAP
returns. All the average return are annualised and in percentages. ** and * indicates the t-test significance at 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Original Portfolio Return Sentiment Timing Return TAP
SP Decile Avg Ret Std Dev Skew SRatio Avg Ret SD Skew SRatio Avg Ret SD Skew Success
Panel A
ME 1 29.26** 12.02 -0.8 1.97 38.75** 11.92 0.88 2.79 9.49** 18.69 1.82 0.75
Age 1 21.28** 13.83 -0.66 1.14 36.62** 13.7 0.63 2.27 15.34** 21.5 1.43 0.76
Sigma 10 28.04** 17.64 -0.51 1.28 41.56** 17.53 0.43 2.06 13.52** 27.5 1.04 0.75
E/BE 1 26.15** 14.52 -0.58 1.42 36.58** 14.43 0.56 2.15 10.43** 22.52 1.26 0.75
D/BE 1 23.87** 15 -0.59 1.22 34.79** 14.92 0.48 1.96 10.93** 23.52 1.16 0.75
PPE/A 1 19.74** 13.18 -0.54 1.08 29.05** 13.11 0.41 1.79 9.31** 20.63 1.03 0.75
RD/A 10 25.65** 19.46 -0.44 1.03 33.83** 19.41 0.33 1.46 8.18 29.99 0.87 0.79
BE/ME 1 33.16** 12.32 -0.74 2.24 33.91** 12.31 0.65 2.31 0.75 18.73 1.59 0.75
BE/ME 10 16.07** 17.22 -0.36 0.61 31.06** 17.14 0.26 1.49 14.99** 27.08 0.7 0.75
EF/A 1 28.16** 13.17 -0.75 1.72 33.12** 13.13 0.5 2.1 4.96 20.59 1.34 0.75
EF/A 10 15.51** 16.96 -0.44 0.59 36.28** 16.84 0.42 1.83 20.77** 26.58 0.97 0.76
GS 1 26.99** 13.99 -0.63 1.53 35.8** 13.91 0.54 2.18 8.81** 21.58 1.31 0.75
GS 10 16.08** 17 -0.46 0.62 34.06** 16.9 0.41 1.69 17.98** 26.68 0.97 0.76
Panel B
ME 10 10.56** 16.83 -0.32 0.3 2.33 16.84 0.21 -0.19 -8.23* 25.95 0.54 0.75
Age 10 14.09** 13.89 -0.87 0.62 11.93** 13.9 0.64 0.46 -2.16 21.57 1.6 0.75
Sigma 1 15.21** 7.23 -0.6 1.34 12.99** 7.25 0.3 1.03 -2.22 11.22 0.95 0.74
E/BE 10 16.44** 15.45 -0.58 0.71 27.07** 15.39 0.37 1.4 10.63** 24.37 1.01 0.76
D/BE 10 14.79** 12.07 -0.59 0.77 15.66** 12.06 0.45 0.84 0.87 18.71 1.12 0.75
PPE/A 10 22.17** 12.4 -0.58 1.34 20.87** 12.41 0.21 1.24 -1.3 19.26 0.83 0.75
RD/A 1 20.29** 12.31 -0.95 1.2 25.51** 12.27 0.54 1.63 5.21* 19.31 1.57 0.79
BE/ME 5 18.12** 13.37 -0.73 0.94 26.01** 13.31 0.45 1.54 7.89* 20.78 1.3 0.76
EF/A 5 19.65** 12.69 -0.74 1.11 23.22** 12.67 0.48 1.4 3.58 19.77 1.31 0.75
GS 5 19.95** 12.18 -0.69 1.18 24.84** 12.15 0.5 1.59 4.89* 18.9 1.31 0.75
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With regard to the standard deviation of returns, the standard deviation slightly reduces
when implementing TA timing rule on sentiment-prone deciles, but it barely changes when
applying TA timing rule on sentiment-immune deciles. The notable increase in return and
slightly decrease in standard deviation makes the Sharpe Ratio increase remarkably after
applying TA timing rule on sentiment-prone deciles. This magnitude of Sharpe Ratio is
comparable with Han et al. (2013), who employ Moving Average Timing Strategy on a
similar Sigma sorted decile portfolios. I also find that TA timing rule does not improve the
Sharpe Ratio for the sentiment-immune deciles. This cross-sectional pattern again shows that
it is a sentiment measure that contributes to the predictability of technical analysis forecasts.
I also conduct the robustness tests on the performance of TA timing rule applied on
decile stocks. I calculate the abnormal alphas for each decile controlled for market return
premium or controlled for FF Five factors and momentum factor. Table 4.9 reports the
risk-adjusted TAP returns for most sentiment-sensitive decile portfolios in Panel A and that
of least sentiment sensitive decile portfolios in Panel B.
Look into Table 4.9. Among the 13 sentiment-sensitive deciles, 10 of them have salient
and positive CAPM abnormal returns, ranging from 9.92% per annum to 22.06% per annum.
Similarly, those 10 sentiment-sensitive deciles also have significant and positive FF model
risk-adjusted returns, ranging from 10.28% per annum to 21.56% per annum. The TA timing
rule is not effective on the RD/A top decile, BE/ME top decile and EF/A bottom decile, which
is consistent with my findings in Section 4.3.1 and consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2006).
One plausible reason is that RD/A and PPE/A may not capture investor sentiment-prone level
in the cross-section very well. The statistical high and novel abnormal return shows that TA
sentiment performs well for those high sentiment-prone deciles.
Consider Panel B of Table 4.9, I find TA timing rule perform poorly for those sentiment-
immune deciles. It conjectures that the performance TA sentiment index relies not only
on itself but also on the sentiment-sensitivity level of the original portfolio. The statistical
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insignificance results in Panel B could help understanding why TA sentiment does not perform
so well for some of the previous sixteen portfolios that obtain cross-sectional premium.
For most deciles, the market betas have strongly negative coefficients. It is also intriguing
that the most potent risk factor in explaining TAP is RMW (Robust minus Weak) factor when
calculating the abnormal return in the FF model for all the deciles. The coefficients of RMW
are prominently negative for almost all the deciles. It indicates that my timing strategies
are effective in mitigating the risk measured by RMW. Another outstanding explanatory
factor for TAP is the momentum factor (UMD), but even so the coefficients of UMD are only
significant for the sentiment-prone deciles.
When runing the regressions to obtain alphas, the coefficient for momentum factor are all
remarkably negative, which indicates that my timing strategies and momentum capture the
different aspects of the market. My abnormal returns of sentiment-prone decile portfolios are
still significantly large controlling for the momentum factor. Such magnitude of abnormal
returns cannot be explained away by a known asset pricing model or the momentum factor. In
Figure E.1, I also compare my timing strategies with momentum anomaly. Both momentum
anomaly and my trading strategies are all results of trend-following. Momentum anomaly
gets an annualised return of 12%, which is substantially less than the returns of TA trading
strategies (RTA). The correlation of momentum return and decile TAPs are high.
I a
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Table 4.9 CAPM and Fama-French Alphas of Decile Portfolios
Table 4.9 reports the CAPM and Fama-French Five Factor adjusted alphas of the most sentiment-prone deciles in Panel A and that of the most sentiment-immune
deciles in Panel B. The first column shows the characteristics used to form the decile portfolio. The second column reports the decile rank. The alphas are
annualised and in percentages. ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1% and 5% level, respectively. The Newey-West robust t-statistics are reported in
parenthesis. The sample period is from 1964/01/01 to 2008/12/31.
Panel A Panel B
SP Decile
CAPM FF model
SP Decile
CAPM FF model
α βm R2 α βm R2 α βm R2 α βm R2
ME 1
10.75** -.286** 5.5 10.59** -.256** 6.02
ME 10
-8.19* -0.01 -0.01 -8.8** 0.023 0.38
(2.82) (-8.48) (2.65) (-6.02) (-2.43) (-.41) (-2.61) (0.81)
Age 1 16.54** -.27** 3.72 16.58** -.249** 4.78 Age 10 -1.77 -.087** 0.38 -1.2 -.081** 0.67(4.18) (-7.29) (4.24) (-6.1) (-.56) (-3.33) (-.36) (-2.65)
Sigma 10 14.9** -.314** 3.06 14.7** -.28** 3.96 Sigma 1 -1.79 -.097** 1.74 -0.82 -.114** 2.16(3.06) (-7.36) (3.05) (-5.96) (-.88) (-4.82) (-.39) (-4.65)
E/BE 1 11.6** -.267** 3.31 11.57** -.248** 4.19 E/BE 10 11.64** -.229** 2.08 11.03** -.182** 2.67(2.79) (-7.28) (2.83) (-6.08) (2.92) (-5.29) (2.67) (-4.03)
D/BE 1 12.1** -.266** 3.02 11.86** -.236** 3.8 D/BE 10 1.36 -.11** 0.81 1.3 -.096** 0.93(2.89) (-6.74) (2.84) (-5.45) (0.49) (-4.13) (0.45) (-3.37)
PPE/A 1 10.31** -.227** 2.85 11** -.218** 3.52 PPE/A 10 -0.6 -.16** 1.61 0.5 -.173** 1.99(2.81) (-6.15) (2.92) (-5.3) (-.2) (-5.26) (0.16) (-5.03)
RD/A 10 9.45 -.275** 2.19 8.54 -.222** 2.9 RD/A 1 6.05 -.181** 2.3 7.02 -.188** 2.84(1.69) (-5.52) (1.51) (-4.29) (1.67) (-4.96) (1.85) (-4.63)
BE/ME 1 16.14** -.261** 2.19 16.07** -.225** 2.86 BE/ME 5 8.77* -.199** 2.15 9.93** -.202** 2.7(3.67) (-6.39) (3.67) (-5.41) (2.51) (-4.88) (2.76) (-4.8)
BE/ME 10 1.78 -.233** 3.65 3.17 -.26** 4.55 EF/A 5 4.42 -.192** 2.22 5.33 -.185** 2.87(0.49) (-7.78) (0.89) (-7.94) (1.36) (-5.32) (1.58) (-4.75)
EF/A 1 5.96 -.226** 2.82 6.75 -.222** 3.69 GS 5 5.73 -.189** 2.36 6.66* -.188** 2.94(1.59) (-6.46) (1.81) (-5.75) (1.78) (-5.44) (1.99) (-4.78)
EF/A 10 22.06** -.291** 2.82 21.56** -.249** 3.61(4.88) (-6.68) (4.77) (-5.22)
GS 1 9.92* -.251** 3.18 10.28** -.24** 4.14(2.48) (-7.35) (2.62) (-6.44)
GS 10
19.22** -.281** 2.6 18.72** -.237** 3.37
(4.31) (-6.62) (4.17) (-5.04)
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4.4.3 Tradability of TA Trading Strategies
To address the tradability of TA trading strategies, I argue that the practitioners could apply
my TA timing rule on the ETF funds that traces the return of small-cap stocks and large-cap
stocks, so that the transaction cost would be much lower. When TA sentiment is high,
investors could long the small-cap ETFs and short the large-cap ETFs. One could even apply
the TA timing rule merely on the small-cap ETFs, which are more sensitive to sentiment;
that is to long the small-cap ETFs when TA sentiment is high and to short the small-cap ETF
when TA sentiment is low.
Applying TA timing rule on the cross-sectional return premium generate more conserva-
tive results on profitability relative to applying TA timing rule on decile portfolios. Recall
that in Figure 4.5 the decile return of sentiment-immune stocks are also high. The actual
transaction cost for applying TA timing rule on decile portfolios is lower than that for ap-
plying TA timing rule on long-short portfolios. Given that the short-selling is costlier than
merely opening and closing long positions, a more cost-effective investment strategy is to
avoid the short-selling transactions by investing money into the risk-free assets. Although
the absolute value of average return during low sentiment periods are generally a little higher
than the risk-free rate, considering the short selling constraints and the transaction cost, the
most practical strategy is to only take long position after a high-sentiment day and invest
money into the risk-free asset after a low-sentiment day.
I also follow Han et al. (2013) framework and use BETC to check whether my TA
sentiment timing strategy is practical without taking a stand of actual transaction costs.
Break-even trading cost is the trading cost that makes the average returns of my TA trading
strategies become zero. The higher BETC a trading strategy has, the more practical this
trading strategy is. Break-even trading cost depends on both the profitability and the trading
frequency of a strategy. Higher profitability and lower trading frequency will make the BETC
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higher.
To see whether my TA trading strategies can survive the transaction costs, I first check the
fraction of trading days, the average consecutive holding days, and the break-even transaction
costs. Since TA trading strategy is based on daily signals of TA sentiment index, it is essential
to see how often the transactions are required. The frequency of trading depends on how
frequent the trading signal Dt changes. Trading signal Dt is defined by comparing TAt
with its smoothing average of a specified prior period. If the signs of Dt does not change
frequently, that is to say, there is no need for frequent transactions. In this way, the trading
costs will be lower, and the investor only need to make transactions on the first and last day
for a continuous high/low sentiment period and hold the portfolio for the rest days. Therefore,
it is understandable that when the signal is determined using a smoothing average over a
longer horizon, the trading frequency will be smaller and the holding days extend. Take
1-day horizon as an example, the trading signal is actually obtained by comparing TAt with
TAt−1: one is supposed to buy if today TA is higher than yesterday and to sell if it is lower.
The smoothing average is more volatile when calculated over the 1-day horizon and therefore
the transactions will happen more often.
Table 4.10 Trading Frequency and Holding Time
This table reports the trading frequency and average holding days for TA trading strategies with different
signal-generating horizons. Horizon is the length of window period employed to calculate smoothing average,
which will serve as a benchmark for current TA index. The timing rule is to buy when current TA is higher than
this smoothing average and to sell when it is lower. The first column of each panel shows the total number of
days when transactions are required, the second column is the fraction of trading days, and the third column is
the average conservative holding days. The sample period starts from 1964/01/01 and ends at 2008/12/31.
Horizon Trading days Trading frequency Holding time
1-day smoothing average 3039 0.27 3.73
5-day smoothing average 1339 0.12 8.46
30-day smoothing average 617 0.05 18.36
60-day smoothing average 491 0.04 23.07
120-day smoothing average 429 0.04 26.41
250-day smoothing average 321 0.03 35.29
Table 4.10 reports the number of transactions, the fraction of trading days and the average
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holding days for TA signals based on different window periods. The number of trading days
decreases remarkably when the calculation horizon of the benchmark smoothing average
moves from one day to five days. Then the number of trading days decreases at a decreasing
speed when the smoothing average horizon increases. The trading frequency is calculated
using trading days divide the total number of observations over my 45-year sample period.
When TA trading signal is defined using the 5-day smoothing average, over the entire 11329-
day sample period I need to make 1339 transactions, which is less than half of the trading
days if trading signal D is defined using 1-day smoothing average. The trading frequency
drops from 27% to 4% when the horizon increases from 1-day to 60-day. The trading
frequency of my TA timing rule is similar to that of the MA trading strategies examined by
Han et al. (2013), which drop from around 20% for 10-day horizon MA strategy to 3% for
200-day horizon MA strategy.
I also investigate the sensitivity of my results to the choice of the length of the moving
average window used to generate my trading signals. I consider a buying signal if TA is
higher than the past average of 1, 5, 10, 30, 60, 120 and 250 days. I find substantial trading
profits remain in all cases, although profitability tends to decline with the increase in the
length of the moving average window.
Table 4.11 reports the profitability and the break-even transaction costs of applying TA
timing rule on the sixteen sentiment-based long-short portfolios with TA signals generated
with different TA sentiment and with different horizons. In addressing the robustness of
the superior performance of TA sentiment, I change the definition of high/low sentiment
period. I still obtain strong returns for TA timing rule when defining the dummy D by
comparing today’s sentiment level with smoothing average of different window periods. In
Panel A, the TA trading strategy returns of sixteen long-short portfolios are higher when the
trading signals are generated using 1-day or 5-day smoothing average as a benchmark. The
profitability of BE/ME(H-L), EF/A(H-L), and GS(H-L) are not strongly positive, and this is
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Table 4.11 Profits and BETCs with Alternative Horizons for TA Timing Signals
This table reports the profitability and the break-even transaction costs of applying TA timing rule on the sixteen sentiment-based long-short portfolios with
TA signals generated with different TA sentiment and with different horizons. Panel A reports the annualised profitability in percentage and Panel B reports
the BETC in basis points. BETC is the transaction costs that would make profit of TA trading strategies equal to zero. The second row denotes the horizon of
smoothing average used to calculate trading signals. Horizon is the length of window period employed to calculate smoothing average, which will serve as a
benchmark for current TA sentiment to generate trading signal. The sample period is from 1964/01/01 to 2008/12/31.
Panel A. Return of TA Trading Strategy Panel B. BETC of TA Trading Strategy
1-day 5-day 10-day 30-day 60-day 120-day 250-day 1-day 5-day 10-day 30-day 60-day 120-day 250-day
ME 1-10 33.46 36.42 33.94 27.93 27.72 27.77 25.08 24.75 61.15 78.81 101.76 126.9 145.53 175.64
Age 1-10 24.7 24.69 22.22 18.74 18.97 18.9 17.86 18.27 41.45 51.6 68.26 86.85 99.02 125.09
Sigma 10-1 34.04 28.57 22.24 17.01 19.37 19.26 20.15 25.18 47.96 51.65 61.99 88.67 100.92 141.13
E/BE 1-10 6.93 9.51 9.4 8.39 9.32 9.26 9.49 5.13 15.96 21.83 30.56 42.67 48.52 66.46
D/BE 1-10 21.93 19.13 15.84 13.17 14.33 15.46 15.86 16.22 32.11 36.77 47.98 65.62 80.98 111.09
PPE/A 1-10 10.71 8.18 5.51 6.08 5.58 4.39 4.85 7.92 13.73 12.79 22.17 25.57 23.02 33.94
RD/A 10-1 13.78 8.32 4.58 2.29 4.83 5.65 7.39 10.19 13.97 10.63 8.33 22.1 29.6 51.77
BE/ME 10-1 -2.79 2.85 4.97 5.84 5.49 5.73 3.82 NA 4.79 11.54 21.29 25.13 30.03 26.76
EF/A 10-1 6.21 3.16 0.23 0.36 -0.92 -0.76 -0.54 4.6 5.31 0.53 1.31 NA NA NA
GS 10-1 1.8 -1.74 -3.17 -2.97 -3.55 -2.85 -2.43 1.33 NA NA NA NA NA NA
BE/ME 1-5 8.19 4.89 2.13 1.33 2.56 2.72 4.91 6.06 8.21 4.96 4.84 11.71 14.27 34.36
EF/A 10-5 14.28 12.28 9.48 7.93 7.35 8.2 8.97 10.56 20.62 22.02 28.89 33.65 42.97 62.84
GS 10-5 12.51 9.28 6.85 5.32 5.84 6.7 8.04 9.25 15.58 15.9 19.39 26.72 35.11 56.28
BE/ME 10-5 5.4 7.75 7.11 7.17 8.05 8.45 8.73 3.99 13 16.5 26.13 36.84 44.3 61.12
EF/A 1-5 8.06 9.12 9.25 7.57 8.27 8.96 9.51 5.96 15.31 21.49 27.58 37.87 46.96 66.61
GS 1-5 10.71 11.02 10.02 8.3 9.39 9.55 10.46 7.92 18.49 23.27 30.22 42.97 50.03 73.28
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because those three portfolios are constructed using most sentiment-prone deciles instead of
longing sentiment-prone deciles and shorting sentiment-immune deciles. Apart from those
three portfolios, other portfolios all have sizable and positive returns when using the TA
timing.
The TA timing returns change slightly when using longer than 30 day window period. In
Table 4.11, Panel A shows that TA timing rule performs best with using the 5-day window
period to calculate moving average as benchmark TA. The 5-day window period is a better
choice, because going too far back into the historical TA sentiment may undervalue the trend
of current TA. Whereas choosing a much shorter period as the window period will lose the
information of TA sentiment level for prior period.
In general, the large scale of my TA timing returns (relative to the performance of other
trading strategies in the literature) and the modest amount of transactions indicate my TA
trading strategies are likely to survive the transaction costs. In Panel B, it is noteworthy that
an increase in the horizon length for calculating trading signals associates with a monotonic
increase in BETCs. This is principally because of the sharp decrease of trading frequency
when horizon increases. The BETCs for those portfolios with positive returns are reasonably
large due to the limited transactions one may need to execute. When using a smoothing
average of a longer horizon to determine trading signals, the trading frequency decline
sharply, and the break-even transaction costs increase notably. For example, the break-even
transaction costs of the ME long-short portfolio would be 49.5 basis points when using 1-day
horizon to get trading signal, and it would dramatically increase to 351.29 basis points when
using 250-day horizon to get the trading signals. The BETCs for 5-day horizon trading
signals are reasonably high, ranging from 9.58 to 122.3 basis points for portfolios with
positive TA timing returns. I conclude that my TA trading strategies would still be profitable
after accounting for the transaction cost.
With regard to the BETCs for the decile portfolios sorted by the ten firm characteristics
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that represent sentiment-prone level, the BETCs show the same pattern with that of decile TA
timing returns. Because the trading frequency for all deciles is the same, the pattern of BETCs
across deciles depends on the decile TA timing returns. In this case, the more sentiment-prone
deciles have higher BETCs and the sentiment-immune deciles have lower BETCs. For any
portfolio sorted by the ten characteristics, RTA returns for the most sentiment-prone decile
are higher than the RTA returns of the corresponding long-short portfolios constructed with
the same firm characteristic; therefore, the BETCs of the most sentiment-prone decile are
also much higher than that of the long-short portfolio built on the same characteristic.
I conduct a series of robustness checks for the profitability of my TA sentiment timing
strategies. See Appendix E2.4. See Table E.13. DJIA-based TA sentiment indicator performs
no worse in my TA trading strategy than the TA sentiment indicator derived from the trend of
S&P 500 index. Table E.15 show that returns of trading on signals generated by performance-
weighted TA sentiment are generally more significant but slightly less in terms of magnitude
than the returns of trading on equal-weighted TA sentiment. To mitigate the effect of size
on sentiment index, I also apply TA timing rule on value-weighted returns of the original
portfolios (descriptive summary statistics are reported in Table E.17). The profitability
of applying TA timing rule on value-weighted returns is strongly consistent with that on
equal-weighted returns (even slightly higher); using value-weighted return does not reduce
the profitability of TA trading strategies. I also use performance-weighted TA sentiment
index. My main conclusions remain the same.
I also examine the profitability and BETC of TA trading strategies with TA sentiment
index based on historical data of DJIA index rather than S&P 500 index. The results on
profitability of my sentiment-based trading strategies are highly robust. My conclusions do
not change.
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4.5 Conclusion
Chapter 4 attempts to bridge the long-standing gap between academic researchers and
financial market traders regarding the merits of TA. Like many practitioners, I argue that TA
is a barometer of investor sentiment. I apply a spectrum of technical analysis to a market
index (such as S&P 500) to build a novel market sentiment indicator. I show that this new
TA sentiment indicator correlates strongly with other commonly used sentiment indicators. I
also test the cross-sectional pricing effect of my TA sentiment.
Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that stocks differ in their exposure to market-wide
sentiment and hence sentiment affects the cross-section of stock returns. Furthermore, when
rational arbitrageurs have a synchronisation problem (Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2002; 2003),
they delay arbitrage and ride mispricing until the coordinated arbitrage is triggered. Therefore,
I expect that following a TA sentiment increase, the returns of more sentiment-prone stocks,
relative to those of sentiment-immune stocks: (a) are contemporaneously high due to limits
to arbitrage; (b) continue to be high in the near-term due to delayed arbitrage; (c) reverse
over the longer term when sentiment decays and coordinated arbitrage occurs; (d) have high
crash risk in subsequent periods due to coordinated attacks.
I provide empirical evidence consistent with all of these predictions based on U.S. data
for 1964 to 2008. Finally, I examine whether it is profitable to delay arbitrage by devising a
simple timing rule that captures the momentum effect of TA sentiment. I demonstrate that
riding the TA sentiment can result in substantial profits. Unlike previous literature that tests
the profitability of TA with single stocks or the overall market, I show that applying TA to a
market index while trading in the cross-section generates substantial profits.
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Chapter 5
Volatility Timing, Sentiment, and the
Short-term Profitability of VIX-Based
Cross-Sectional Trading Strategies
5.1 Introduction
The Chicago Board Options Exchange’s implied volatility index (VIX) is a measure of
market expectation of stock return volatility implied from the supply and demand of S&P
index options over the next 30 calendar days. Financial practitioners commonly use VIX-
based trading strategies for hedging, speculative, and market timing purposes (see, e.g.,
Nagel, 2012). VIX is also widely perceived as an "investor fear gauge" (Da et al., 2014;
Kaplanski and Levy, 2010; Whaley, 2000, 2009), with low VIX indicating high overall
market sentiment, and vice versa. Consistent with this view, VIX notably elevated in the
NBER recession and was considerably low during the anecdotal bubble period in US market.
Several studies view VIX as a measure of expected volatility in a mean-variance frame-
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work where investors are assumed to have constant risk aversion (e.g. Clements and Silven-
noinen, 2013; Fleming et al., 2003; Merton, 1980). They argue that because of the positive
mean-variance relationship, an increase in VIX should be associated with higher future return.
Other studies deem VIX as an ’investor fear gauge’ and use it to predict future returns. For
example, Giot (2005), Banerjee et al. (2007) and Bekaert and Hoerova (2014) document
strong negative associations between contemporaneous returns and incremental VIX and
between long-term future returns (e.g., 30-day/ 60-day/ monthly return) and the VIX level.
Similarly, Giot (2005) shows that during very high/low VIX period, VIX positively predicts
future 60-day returns on S&P 100. Banerjee et al. (2007) also present that VIX is positively
related to the next 30-day future returns in the cross-section of the stock market. This strand
of studies almost exclusively uses low-frequency return data to test whether VIX predicts the
long-run reversals arising from mispricing correction.
Unlike previous studies, which commonly focus on the in-sample ability of VIX to predict
the long-term (one month or longer) return reversals, this study investigates the profitability of
VIX-based strategies arising from the short-run (next day) momentum in the cross-section of
stock returns. Specifically, I test whether VIX can be used as a sentiment indicator to design
trading strategies that can exploit the short-term return momentum. My study is motivated by
Abreu and Brunnermeier’s (2002) theory of delayed arbitrage, in which rational arbitrageurs
are assumed to correct mispricing only when a significant mass of arbitrageurs come together
to trade against noise trader sentiment. However, since arbitrageurs may not know when their
peers recognise mispricing, they may choose to ride the sentiment until a synchronized attack
takes place. The delayed arbitrage leads to short-term momentum in stock returns after an
increase in sentiment. My empirical tests show a significant negative association between
lagged VIX and return is stronger during high sentiment periods and among sentiment-prone
stocks. Therefore, carefully designed trading strategies that use VIX as a sentiment proxy has
the potential to exploit the short-term return momentum caused by the delayed arbitrage. The
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choice of VIX as the sentiment indicator in my trading strategies is justified on two grounds.
First, VIX is obtained primarily from the trading activity of sophisticated investors on S&P
options. Its ability to reflect the sophisticated investors’ estimation of the overall market
sentiment, makes VIX an ideal candidate to test the delayed arbitrate theory. Second, VIX is
one of the most prevalently accepted daily sentiment indicators, allowing us to examine the
profitability of the sentiment-based trading strategies over short time intervals.
In this study, I design trading strategies that involve holding sentiment-prone stocks when
VIX is low and holding sentiment-immune stocks when VIX is substantially high; where
substantially high (low) VIX is defined as VIX increases of 10% or more (less than 10%)
relative to its moving average over the previous 25 days1. I use firm characteristics, namely
size, firm age, return volatility, earning-to-book ratio, dividend-to-book ratio, fixed asset
ratio, research and development ratio, book-to-market ratio, external finance over asset and
sales growth ratio, to determine the extent to which a stock is exposed to changes in investor
sentiment. Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that firms are more prone to sentiment when
they are small, young, volatile, non-profitable, non-dividend-paying, have high financial
distress and a great growth opportunity. In this study, I argue that when investor sentiment is
high (VIX is low), the contemporaneous returns of sentiment-prone stocks are also likely
to be high due to limits to arbitrage. If the theory of delayed arbitrage holds, the prices of
the already overpriced sentiment-prone stocks will increase further in the short term. Thus,
longing sentiment-prone stocks when sentiment is high reflects my attempt to exploit the
short-term cross-sectional momentum profits associated with these stocks.
I find that my VIX-based trading strategies generate considerable excess returns over
the unconditional long-short portfolio, which always longs sentiment-prone portfolios and
shorts sentiment-immune portfolios. Specifically, I find that the annualised returns of my
VIX trading strategies range from 22.05% to 42.38%, and the corresponding benchmark
1I also used 0%, 5%, 15% and 20% as the threshold, with my trading strategies still yielding strong and
significant profits.
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long-short portfolios have returns ranging from -3.15% to 28.01%. I also show that the
annualised excess returns of the VIX-based trading strategies over their corresponding
benchmark portfolios range from 11.66% to 25.55%. The most profitable trading strategy
involves shifting investments between the smallest and the largest stocks deciles, and the
least profitable trading strategy is the one that shifts investments between the bottom and the
middle book-to-market portfolios. Further analysis indicates that the Sharpe ratios increase
significantly after applying VIX-based trading strategies in 14 out of 16 cases. Shifting
investments based on size has the highest Sharpe ratio of 2.70, and shifting investments
between the bottom and the middle book-to-market portfolios has the lowest Sharpe ratio of
1.13.
Furthermore, I regress the excess returns of my trading strategies and those of the
benchmark portfolios on the well-known risk factors. I find that the risk-adjusted excess
returns (alphas) are slightly smaller than their unadjusted excess returns counterparts, whist
remaining remain positive and statistically significant. This finding shows that the common
risk factors cannot fully explain the abnormal profitability of my trading strategies. Additional
analysis presents that my trading strategy remains profitable after considering effects of
macroeconomic factors such as term spread, default spread, TED spread and the liquidity
factor.
Finally, I calculate the break-even transaction cost to see whether my trading strategy
could survive the transaction costs. The break-even transaction costs of my strategies are
roughly higher than 50 basis points. In literature, transaction costs are usually set lower
than 50 basis points. For example, Lynch and Balduzzi (2000) set the transaction costs at
25 basis points to calculate the profit. Frazzini et al. (2012) measure the real-world trading
costs for asset pricing anomalies such as size and value trading strategies, with the trading
costs calculated to be no higher than 25 basis points. My high break-even transaction costs
indicate that my trading strategies are still profitable after taking the transaction costs into
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account.
This study contributes to the literature by providing a new behavioural explanation that
influences the profitability of the volatility timing strategies in the cross-section of stock
returns. Prior studies use VIX as a proxy for expected volatility, market volatility, market
liquidity, or macroeconomic expectation. Most of these studies effectively explain the long-
term positive VIX-return relation, whilst rarely discussing the potentially negative association
between VIX and the next-day return. Unlike prior literature, I regard VIX as a market-wide
sentiment indicator and then design trading strategies to exploit its cross-sectional effect on
stock returns in the spirit of Baker and Wurgler (2006). This cross-sectional effect, combined
with Abreu and Brunnermeier’s (2003) delayed arbitrage theory, provides the rationale behind
the success of my VIX timing strategies.
The closest study to ours is that conducted by Copeland and Copeland (1999), who
also design trading strategies that involve shifting investments across stock portfolios based
on changes in VIX. This chapter is distinct from Copeland and Copeland (1999) in two
ways. First, I explain the profitability of the VIX-timing strategy using a sentiment story,
with my hypothesis derived from the theoretical work on the effect of sentiment on stock
returns and delayed arbitrage (Abreu and Brunnermier, 2002; Delong et al., 1990). Copeland
and Copeland (1999) view VIX as a proxy for future discount rate, i.e., higher VIX means
higher future discount rates and falling prices. However, this argument is not consistent
with the broadly documented reversal effect of VIX on stock return. My study uses the
investor sentiment channel to reconcile between the momentum and reversal effects of VIX.
Second, my study applies VIX-based strategies in a broader spectrum of cross-sectional
stock returns, showing that the VIX-based trading strategies are profitable. The finding
that VIX-based strategies can generate significant abnormal returns may help explain the
prevalent applications of such strategies in the financial industry.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 describes the data. Section 5.3
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reports the profitability of my VIX-based trading strategy. Section 5.4 concludes.
5.2 Related Literature
Existing empirical studies commonly show that investor sentiment and future returns are
inversely related. The contrarian predictive power of investor sentiment on future return are
usually tested with low frequency data, as most of the commonly used investor sentiment
measures, including mutual fund flow, consumer confidence index, closed-end fund discount,
Baker Wurgler index, are only available at monthly frequency (e.g., Baker and Wurgler,
2006, 2007; Lee et al., 1991; Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006; Neal and Wheatley, 1998).
Most prior studies investigate the extent to which these monthly sentiment indicators predict
the monthly, quarterly, or longer-term future returns. These studies often argue that bullish
investor sentiment pushes current price above fundamentals and the correction of mispricing
results in lower future returns.
However, the delayed arbitrage model of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002) implies that
the negative relation between investor sentiment and future return may not hold in the short
run. This is because in a market where arbitrageurs do not know their sequence in notifying
the mispricing, sophisticated investors choose to beat the gun and ride the trend. The lack of
coordination among arbitrageurs may, in turn, lead to a persistent mispricing particularly in
the short run. Ample empirical studies also indicate that sophisticated arbitrageurs actively
ride the bubbles and contribute to the bubble (e.g., Berger and Turtle, 2015; Brunnermeier
and Nagel, 2004; DeVault et al., 2014; Griffin et al., 2011; Xiong and Yu, 2011). Therefore,
I argue that investor sentiment may have a momentum effect on short-run future returns.
The momentum effect of investor sentiment on future returns does not conflicts with the
well-documented reversal effect of investor sentiment. To quote Yu (2011), who studies the
reversal effect of investor sentiment, “the synchronization problem among arbitrageurs may
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create limits to arbitrage or even amplify the mispricing”. In this case, the reversal effect
of investor sentiment could be more pronounced due to the delayed arbitrage. My study
compliments the previous literature by investigating at the momentum effect of sentiment on
the short-run future returns.
While several studies have already examined the predictive power of VIX on future
returns, these VIX studies usually view VIX as a proxy for expected future volatility or
liquidity rather than as a sentiment measure. For example, Banerjee et al. (2007) propose a
theory in which the positive association between VIX and stock return is attributed to the
possibility that VIX proxies for market volatility. Consistent with this view, Jackwerth and
Rubinstein (1996), Coval and Shumway (2001), and Bakshi and Kapadia (2003) show that
market volatility has a negative price and high levels of volatility translate to high price risk
premiums when investors are averse to volatility risk. Thus, high VIX indicates high market
volatility and therefore low current price and high future return. VIX is also often regarded
as a liquidity measure. In Nagel (2012), VIX is deemed as a liquidity measure that strongly
predicts the returns from liquidity evaporation. High VIX indicates low funding liquidity
and hence higher future returns. However, while the theories proposed by Banerjee et al.
(2007) and Nagel (2012) explain the positive long-term VIX-return relation, i.e., the reversal
effect, they do not work well in explaining the negative short-run VIX-return relation, i.e. the
return momentum. To reconcile the reversal with the momentum effects of VIX on return, I
consider VIX as a measure of investor sentiment.
In this study, I argue that VIX is not only an indicator of a limit of arbitrage but also
a measure of investor sentiment. Tu et al. (2016) argue that VIX can predict absolute
mispricing because of the limit to arbitrage. Specifically, they argue that high VIX implies
high expected volatility and therefore stronger limits to arbitrage, which in turn amplifies
mispricing. However, VIX can also be view as a sentiment measure. If limit to arbitrage is
assumed to be constant, VIX is expected to be negatively related to the contemporaneous
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mispricing, resulting in higher return momentum when arbitrage is delayed. Unlike Tu
et al. (2016), I use VIX-based strategies to exploit mispricing.Viewing VIX as a sentiment
indicator reconciles the long-term return reversals with the short-term return momentum
following increases in VIX.
Existing studies find that the long-term return reversals following sentiment increases is
controversial in the aggregate market level, but strong in the cross-section. Baker and Wurgler
(2007) argue that stocks that are more prone to speculative demand and more difficult to
arbitrage are more prone to sentiment. Some stocks, such as young and small stocks, are
more prone to sentiment while others are tend to be sentiment-immune. Hence, sentiment
may play a more prominent role in predicting the return disparity between sentiment-prone
stocks and sentiment immune stocks than predicting aggregate market returns. Stambaugh
et al. (2012) argue that stocks with more constraints to arbitrage are more sensitive to investor
sentiment. Ljungqvist and Qian (2016) argue that, because of the synchronization problem
(Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2002), sophisticated investors may deliberately target stocks with
sever short-sell constraints, limiting the scope of coordinated short-selling actions. Campbell
et al. (2011) also find that distressed stocks underperform more severely following increases
in VIX. This evidence suggests that the short-term return momentum caused by delayed
arbitrage may also be stronger in the cross-section. Specifically, I hypothesize that sentiment-
prone stocks will exhibit stronger momentum effect as they are more prone to sophisticated
arbitrageurs and more difficult to arbitrage during the bubble periods.
Several studies use VIX to time the market. Some of these studies apply the mean-
variance theory to design VIX-based volatility timing strategies (Clements and Silvennoinen,
2013; Fleming et al., 2001, 2003; Johannes et al., 2002). A strand of studies demonstrate
the profitability of trading strategies that benefit from the return momentum induced by the
news-based sentiment (Huynh and Smith, 2017; Sun et al., 2016; Uhl, 2017). Copeland and
Copeland (1999) propose to shift asset allocation in the cross-section based on VIX. Their
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motivation for this trading strategy is that VIX represent future discount rate and therefore
influence price in discount cash flow model; however, this explanation does not strongly
illustrate why VIX has asymmetric predictability on future return in the cross-section. I
see VIX as sentiment indicator and based on the asymmetric effect of investor sentiment in
the cross-section stock market, I design a wider spectrum of trading strategies by building
portfolios based on different sentiment sensitive level measures. To the best of my knowledge,
few paper view VIX as sentiment and test trading strategies that capture the VIX-induced
return momentum in the cross-section stock market, and this paper contributes to the existing
literature by filling this gap.
5.3 Research Design and Data Sources
I construct decile portfolios based on firm characteristics that relate to exposure to irrational
investors’ speculative demand and arbitrage constraints. Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue
that sentiment-prone firms tend to be small, young, volatile, non-dividend-paying, non-
profitable, informationally opaque, financially distressed, and have strong growth opportunity.
Therefore, the firm size (ME), age (Age), return volatility (Sigma), earning ratio (E/BE),
dividend ratio (D/BE), tangible and intangible asset ratio (PPE/A and RD/A), book-to-market
ratio (BE/ME), external finance ratio (EF/A), and sales growth (GS) are the ten characteristics
I employ to gauge the extent of stocks’ sensitivity to investor sentiment.2
Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that stocks that are prone to speculative demand are also
difficult to arbitrage. Take Age as an example. The lack of an earnings history combined
with the presence of apparently unlimited growth opportunities for young firms makes young
firms difficult to value. Unsophisticated investors consequently generate a wide range of
valuations for these firms depending on their sentiment. This lack of consensus among
2Details on these characteristics variables are provided in the Appendix B.
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unsophisticated investors increases the volatility of returns, which in turn deters rational
investors from trading fully against mispricing.
Similar to Baker and Wurgler (2006), I construct sixteen long-short portfolios. Each
of these long-short portfolios longs the most sentiment-prone decile portfolio and shorts
the most sentiment-immune decile portfolio. I consider the bottom (top) deciles of ME,
Age, E/BE, D/BE, and PPE/A as the most sentiment-prone (sentiment-immune) and the
top (bottom) deciles of Sigma and RD/A as the most sentiment-prone (sentiment-immune).
Three of the firm characteristics included in my analysis, namely BE/ME, EF/A, and GS
have a multi-dimensional nature, as they reflect both growth and distress. Take BE/ME as an
example. High book-to-market ratio represents severe distress, whereas a low value of the
same ratio indicates extreme growth potential. Stocks with either of these extreme BE/ME
ratios are more difficult for investors to price accurately. Stocks with financial distress are
highly appealing to speculative demand, so firms with high BE/ME, low EF/A, and low
GS are sentiment-prone. Firms with strong growth potential are also hard for investors to
value, so returns of firms with low BE/ME, high EF/A, and high GS are more prone to
investor sentiment. The middle deciles are considered most sentiment-immune for those
three characteristics. Hence, the long-short portfolio could be top-minus-middle and bottom-
minus-middle decile for BE/ME, EF/A, and GS. In addition, BE/ME (EF/A, GS) itself could
be seen as generic pricing factor, and therefore the top BE/ME (bottom EF/A, GS) decile is
expected to be more sensitive to VIX than the bottom BE/ME (top EF/A, GS) decile.
Firm-level accounting data is retrieved from Compustat. The monthly stock returns are
downloaded from CRSP. My sample includes all common stocks (share codes in 10 and 11)
between January 1988 and December 2016 on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ (with stock
exchange code in 1 2 3). All the firm characteristic variables are winsorized at 99.5 and
0.5% annually. The breakpoints for deciles are defined only using NYSE firms. I match the
year-end accounting data of year t-1 to monthly returns from July t to June t+1. I obtain
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VIX data over the period from 1990/01/01 to 2016/04/30 from WRDS. I also obtain the
historical data on the implied volatility conveyed from S&P 100 index, NASDAQ index,
and DJIA index. The momentum factor (UMD), defined the average return of high prior
return portfolio over low prior return portfolio, and the Fama-French five factors, i.e., the
market return premium over risk-free rate (RMRF), the average return on the three small-cap
portfolios minus the average return on the three big-cap portfolios (SMB), the average return
on the two value portfolios minus the average return on the two growth portfolios (HML), the
average return on the two robust operating profitability portfolios minus the average return
on the two weak operating profitability portfolios (RMW), and the average return on the two
conservative investment portfolios minus the average return on the two aggressive investment
portfolios (CMA), are downloaded from Kenneth French website3.
5.4 Empirical Results
In this section, I start with the in-sample predictive regressions of VIX on the next-day cross-
sectional returns. I then report the performances of the simple VIX-based trading strategies,
both raw and risk-adjusted, and compare them with those of the benchmark portfolios.
5.4.1 Predictive Regressions
To substantiate the predictive power of VIX on the next-day stock returns in the cross-section,
I regress portfolio returns on the one-day lagged VIX and other contemporaneous risk factors.
The regression is specified as follows:
RX ,t = α+β1VIXt−1+ γCVt+υt , (5.1)
3The data are available on http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. I
thank Kenneth R. French for providing the data.
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where RX ,t is the portfolio returns X at time t, and the portfolio X can be one of the following:
1) a long-short portfolio that longs sentiment-prone stocks and shorts sentiment-immune
decile portfolio (P-I); 2) a sentiment-prone decile portfolio (P); 3) a sentiment immune decile
portfolio (I). VIXt−1 is the standardised VIX level at time t−1, andCVt is a vector of control
variables, including the Fama-French (2015) five factors and the Carhart (1997) momentum
factor (UMD). A control factor is omitted from the regression when it is analogy to the
dependent variable. For example, SMB factor is ruled out if the dependent variable is the
daily returns of long-short portfolio ME(1-10). HML factor is excluded when the dependent
variable is the daily returns of the long-short portfolios constructed from BE/ME. RMV is
excluded the regression of E/BE and D/BE portfolios.
Table 5.1 reports the coefficients of the lagged VIX in the regressions with different data
samples and portfolio returns as dependent variable and the Newey-West standard errors
(Newey and West, 1987) that are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.4 Panel A
reports the regression results for the entire sample period, and Panel B and Panel C present
the results for the high sentiment period (i.e., standardised lagged VIX is lower than -0.5 and
low sentiment period (i.e., standardised lagged VIX is greater than 0.5), respectively. I divide
the sample into high and low sentiment periods to test whether the ability of VIX to predict
returns depends on investor sentiment. As previous studies show that the predictability of
VIX is strong when VIX is at the extreme (either substantially high or substantially low), I
set the threshold as 0.5.5
The coefficients of the one-day lagged VIX in Panel A of Table 5.1 are negative and
statistically significant (at the 10% or better) in 6 out of 16 long-short portfolios and insignif-
icant in the rest portfolios. This finding is consistent with the delayed arbitrage theory, which
4I set a maximum lag of 15 when calculating Newey-West robust standard errors for the coefficients.
5I choose 0.5 as the threshold to define extreme high/low VIX sub-samples because it results in a large
sample size in both sub-samples. This choice is likely to make my results more conservative. I also consider 1
as the threshold, and I find more dominant regression results. The trading rules is to hold sentiment-immune
stocks following a substantial rise in VIX. As a consequence of larger threshold, I make less transactions and
the break-even transaction costs is more striking.
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predicts high returns following a rise in sentiment, i.e., a negative relationship between the
relative returns of sentiment-prone stocks over sentiment-immune stocks and the one-day
lagged VIX. Columns (2) and (3) of Panel A present the results of regressing the returns
on sentiment-prone decile and sentiment-immune decile on lagged VIX, respectively. The
results suggest that lagged VIX has a much stronger predictive power on sentiment-prone
stocks than sentiment-immune stocks. In Column (3), apart from the top ME decile portfolio
regression, none of the sixteen regressions exhibits a significant correlation between lagged
VIX and future returns. For the top ME decile return regression, the coefficient of VIX is
even significantly positive. One plausible explanation for this positive coefficient is "flight-
to-quality" (see also Baker and Wurgler (2007)), i.e., investors seek safer portfolios in low
sentiment period.
Panel B of Table 5.1 presents the regression results for the high sentiment sub-sample.
I find that both the magnitude and the significance of the coefficients of the lagged VIX
increase during the high sentiment period. VIX is a significant negative predictor of the
one-day forward return for 11 out of the 16 long-short portfolios. Similarly, I find that the
ability of VIX to predict the returns of the sentiment-prone deciles also increases when
sentiment is high. Column (3) of Panel B shows that when sentiment is sufficiently high, even
the returns of some of the sentiment-immune deciles exhibit a significant negative association
with the lagged VIX.
Panel C of Table 5.1 shows that when sentiment is low, VIX has little predictability of
the next-day returns, regardless of whether the returns of the sentiment-prone deciles or
those of the sentiment-immune deciles are used as the dependent variables in the regression.
Specifically, I find the lagged VIX to be a significant return predictor for only 5 out of the 16
long-short portfolios. The reduced predictability of VIX in low sentiment period is consistent
with Stambaugh et al. (2012), who argue that investor sentiment is more likely to have a
more considerable influence on stock prices during periods of high sentiment, as short sale
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constraints are generally more binding during these periods.
Recall that Tu et al. (2016) explain the predictive power of VIX on returns through the
limit to arbitrage channel. They claim that VIX is a measure of expected volatility and high
VIX imposes stronger limits to arbitrage. Hence, mispricing may be amplified if sentiment
remains stable. On the other hand, high VIX means low sentiment, if limits arbitrage is
assumed constant, I expect VIX negatively relates with contemporaneous mispricing. This
chapter focuses on the sentiment channel though, not the limits to arbitrage channel. This
chapter extends this strand of literature by documenting a strong negative association between
VIX and the next day return. This finding is consistent with the delayed arbitrage argument,
whereas the mean-variance theory and the liquidity evaporation theory do not work well in
explaining this empirical finding.
To check the robustness of my results, I add more control variables into the regression.
First, even though the liquidity evaporation explanation explains the positive relationship
between VIX and return and I find the negative short-run relationship, I build a liquidity
measure and add it as a control variable in the robustness test. My liquidity control variable
is the difference of the average bid-ask spread between the corresponding long and short
portfolios used in each regression. I find that sentiment-prone decile portfolios have higher
bid-ask spread relative to sentiment-immune stocks. Table E.19 show that though the bid-ask
spread difference plays a significant role in return disparity, the coefficients of one-day lagged
VIX on returns remain significantly negative. By controlling for liquidity risk factor, I could
at least say that the liquidity evaporation does not fully explain or does not subsume the
momentum effect of VIX.
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Table 5.1 Regressions of Portfolio Returns on Lagged VIX
Table 5.1 reports the coefficients of lagged VIX in regressions of sentiment-based long-short portfolio returns on one-day lagged VIX and control variables in the
whole sample and sub-samples.
RX ,t = α+β1VIXt−1+ γCVt + εt .
Rt is the daily return of the portfolio X, where X could be a sentiment-prone decile (P), a sentiment-immune decile (I) or the long-short portfolio of
sentiment-prone decile over sentiment-immune decile (P-I). The control variables include the FF 5 factors and the momentum factor (UMD). Any control
factor will be excluded from the regression when it is the cross-sectional return premium being forecasted. The first two columns indicate the decile rank
of sentiment-prone and sentiment-immune portfolios. The first row indicates the selection criteria for choosing the data samples. The second row indicates
the choice of X. The Newey and West (1987) robust t-statistics are in brackets. ***, ** and * indicates the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively. The sample period is from 1990/01/01 to 2016/04/30.
Table 5.1 Regressions of Portfolio Returns on Lagged VIX
Panel A. All Samples Panel B VIX<-0.5 Panel C VIX>0.5
P I RP−I,t RP,t RI,t RP−I,t RP,t RI,t RP−I,t RP,t RI,t
ME 1 10 -0.045*** -0.037** 0.008** -0.181*** -0.158*** 0.023* -0.054 -0.046 0.008
(-2.688) (-2.406) (2.323) (-3.231) (-3.168) (1.684) (-1.547) (-1.489) (0.822)
Age 1 10 -0.007 -0.014 -0.007 -0.078* -0.090** -0.012 0.007 -0.014 -0.021
(-0.708) (-1.372) (-1.284) (-1.760) (-2.535) (-0.485) (0.361) (-0.641) (-1.508)
Sigma 10 1 -0.011 -0.015 -0.004 -0.162*** -0.133** 0.029 -0.004 -0.022 -0.018
(-0.899) (-1.173) (-0.805) (-2.850) (-2.570) (1.306) (-0.166) (-0.792) (-1.414)
E/BE 1 10 -0.016* -0.021* -0.005 -0.075* -0.145*** -0.070*** -0.024 -0.031 -0.007
(-1.769) (-1.821) (-0.875) (-1.881) (-3.604) (-2.673) (-1.410) (-1.330) (-0.492)
D/BE 1 10 -0.024*** -0.016* 0.008 -0.105*** -0.099*** 0.005 -0.029* -0.025 0.004
(-3.045) (-1.905) (0.887) (-2.875) (-3.221) (0.226) (-1.678) (-1.448) (0.170)
PPE/A 1 10 0.001 -0.009 -0.010 0.022 -0.031 -0.053 0.018 -0.001 -0.019
(0.050) (-1.347) (-0.906) (0.380) (-0.973) (-1.064) (0.805) (-0.059) (-0.776)
RD/A 10 1 0.014** 0.005 -0.009 -0.086* -0.120** -0.035* -0.007 -0.015 -0.007
(1.979) (0.522) (-1.452) (-1.875) (-2.483) (-1.721) (-0.498) (-0.676) (-0.533)
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Table 5.1 Regressions of Portfolio Returns on Lagged VIX (Continued)
Panel A. All Samples Panel B VIX<-0.5 Panel C VIX>0.5
P I RP−I,t RP,t RI,t RP−I,t RP,t RI,t RP−I,t RP,t RI,t
BE/ME 10 1 -0.037*** -0.033** 0.003 0.008 -0.098** -0.106*** -0.068** -0.055 0.013
(-2.745) (-2.001) (0.438) (0.186) (-2.147) (-2.943) (-2.450) (-1.620) (0.872)
EF/A 1 10 -0.011 -0.016* -0.005 -0.011 -0.098*** -0.086** -0.040*** -0.034* 0.006
(-1.601) (-1.791) (-0.482) (-0.348) (-2.858) (-2.314) (-3.071) (-1.789) (0.317)
GS 1 10 -0.009 -0.015 -0.006 -0.022 -0.109*** -0.087** -0.016 -0.023 -0.007
(-1.546) (-1.307) (-0.686) (-0.640) (-2.746) (-2.494) (-1.530) (-1.040) (-0.364)
BE/ME 1 5 0.005 0.003 -0.003 -0.097*** -0.106*** -0.019 0.018 0.013 -0.010
(0.739) (0.438) (-0.406) (-2.853) (-2.943) (-0.866) (1.445) (0.872) (-0.632)
EF/A 10 5 -0.005 -0.005 0.000 -0.070** -0.086** -0.033* 0.012 0.006 -0.011
(-0.574) (-0.482) (-0.073) (-1.971) (-2.314) (-1.662) (0.806) (0.317) (-0.840)
GS 10 5 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 -0.081** -0.087** -0.012 0.004 -0.007 -0.021
(-0.554) (-0.686) (-0.581) (-2.280) (-2.494) (-0.569) (0.304) (-0.364) (-1.415)
BE/ME 10 5 -0.032** -0.033** -0.003 -0.088** -0.098** -0.019 -0.050* -0.055 -0.010
(-2.193) (-2.001) (-0.406) (-2.081) (-2.147) (-0.866) (-1.688) (-1.620) (-0.632)
EF/A 1 5 -0.016** -0.016* 0.000 -0.081*** -0.098*** -0.033* -0.028** -0.034* -0.011
(-2.378) (-1.791) (-0.073) (-2.616) (-2.858) (-1.662) (-2.003) (-1.789) (-0.840)
GS 1 5 -0.013 -0.015 -0.004 -0.103*** -0.109*** -0.012 -0.012 -0.023 -0.021
(-1.399) (-1.307) (-0.581) (-2.739) (-2.746) (-0.569) (-0.724) (-1.040) (-1.415)
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5.4.2 Two-Way Sorts
I divide my sample into high and low VIX periods by the trading signals implied by the
historical and current levels of VIX. To gain an initial insight into the ability of VIX to predict
returns, I conduct two–way sorts of decile portfolio returns. First, I sort stock returns into ten
deciles based on a firm characteristic that is associated with the extent to which the stock is
prone to market-wide investor sentiment. Then, I sort the returns in each decile conditional
on whether the return is following a high sentiment day or a low sentiment day. In this case,
day t is classified as a low sentiment day; if VIX at time t−1 is at least 10% higher than
the average VIX between t−26 and t−2, otherwise day t is classified as a high or normal
sentiment day. Figure 1 shows the two-way sorts of returns for the period from Jan 1990 to
Dec 2016.
Generally, the results in Figure 5.1 suggest that low VIX predicts higher next-day returns
for sentiment-prone stock deciles and high VIX predicts higher next-day returns for sentiment-
immune stocks. Figure 5.1 indicates that when sentiment is high, sentiment-prone deciles,
such as young firms, are likely to have larger persistent overpricing due to delayed arbitrage.
Similarly, when sentiment is low, young firms tend to be more undervalued by irrational
investors, as it takes time for arbitrageurs to take synchronized actions to eliminate the
underpricing.
Figure 5.1 also shows that the return difference between the solid bar and the white bar is
lower for high ME, high Age, low Sigma, high E/BE, and high D/BE decile portfolios, in
line with the conjecture that these portfolios are less sensitive to sentiment. However, I do
not find any conclusive pattern in the return difference between the high sentiment period
and the low sentiment period in the cross-section of the PPE/A and RD/A deciles, implying
that the sentiment-prone level is not well reflected by PPE/A and RD/A. This evidence is
consistent with the findings of Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Chung et al. (2012).
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Two-way sorts one-day forward portfolio average returns, 1994:01-2016:12. I place the daily return observations into bins
according to the decile rank that a characteristic takes. The subtitles show the sentiment-sensitivity measure used to sort deciles. Then
I sort return by VIX level on the previous day. If current VIX is at least 10% higher than its prior 25-day average, I define it a high
VIX day. The solid bars are the annualised equal-weighted average returns following low VIX (high sentiment) days; the clear bars are
average returns following high VIX (low sentiment) days.
Fig. 5.1 Two-Way Sorts: One-Day Forward Returns Sorted on VIX Levels and Sentiment-Exposure
144
5.5 VIX-Based Trading Strategies 145
Furthermore, Figure 5.1 shows that sentiment-immune stocks outperform sentiment-
prone stocks after high VIX. For example, I find that the returns of ME decile increase almost
monotonically following high VIX. I also observe a general pattern of negative average return
following the high VIX period across all the sentiment-prone deciles, except for PPE/A and
RD/A. Figure 5.1 also shows that high VIX predicts future returns for sentiment-prone stocks.
In other words, sentiment-prone stocks tend to have negative returns following periods of
low sentiment. Finally, a closer look at the graphs of returns pertaining BE/ME, EF/A, and
GS. The white bars all show an inverted U-shape pattern. The lowest differences between
the solid bars and the white bars are in the middle BE/ME, middle EF/A, and middle GS
deciles. This finding confirms that firms in the middle deciles are less sensitive to sentiment
changes than those in the bottom and top deciles of BE/ME, EF/A, and GS, consistent with
the multi-dimensional nature of these three variables.
5.5 VIX-Based Trading Strategies
The rule of my trading strategies is to hold sentiment-immune stocks when VIX increases
by at least 10% more than the average of its prior 25-day historical level and to hold
sentiment-prone stocks otherwise.6 These VIX-based timing strategies aim at capturing
the momentum effect of sentiment on the cross-section of stock returns. I use the relative
returns of sentiment-prone decile portfolio over sentiment-immune decile portfolio (P-I) as
the benchmark portfolio returns. The excess return of my trading strategies over benchmark
portfolio is denoted as RVIX.
6Note that my trading strategy does not require short-selling. In addition, I argue that one could also apply
my VIX-based trading strategy on the ETF funds that traces the return of small-cap stocks and large-cap stocks,
so that the transaction cost would be much lower. To be specific, the trading strategy would be to hold the
small-cap ETF when VIX is low and to shift the asset allocation to large-cap ETF when VIX is substantially
high.
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Table 5.2 Summary Statistics of the Profitability of VIX-Based Trading Strategy
This table reports average returns (Avg Ret), the standard deviation (Std Dev), skewness (Skew) and the Sharpe ratio (SRatio) for benchmark portfolios, VIX
timing strategy, and the RVIX returns, where RVIX is the excess returns of VIX strategy return over the benchmark long-short portfolio return. The first number
in second column represents the rank of a sentiment-prone decile and the second number represents the rank of a sentiment-immune decile. The first three
columns indicate the construction of benchmark portfolio and the VIX Timing strategy. The benchmark portfolio is to long the sentiment-prone decile (P) and
short the sentiment-immune decile (I), and that the timing strategy is to hold the sentiment-prone decile after low VIX and hold the sentiment-immune decile after
high VIX. VIX-based trading strategy is to buy and hold the sentiment-immune decile following a high VIX trading day and to buy and hold the sentiment-prone
decile otherwise. A high VIX trading day is defined as current VIX is at least 10% higher than its prior 25-day average. Last column, the success ratio (Success),
is the percentage of non-negative RVIX return. All the average returns are annualised and are in percentages. ***and ** indicates the t-test significance at 1%
and 5% level, respectively. The sample period is from 1990/01/01 to 2016/04/30.
Panel A. Benchmark Portfolio Return Panel B. VIX Strategy Return Panel C. RVIX
P I Avg Ret Std Dev Skew SRatio Avg Ret Std Dev Skew SRatio Avg Ret Std Dev Skew Success
ME 1 10 23.11*** 13.95 -0.53 1.66 42.38*** 15.7 0.17 2.7 19.26*** 23.58 0.97 0.54
Age 1 10 10.90*** 11.21 -0.2 0.97 28.35*** 16.99 -0.27 1.67 17.42*** 17.75 0.27 0.55
Sigma 10 1 18.85*** 15.55 -0.2 1.21 38.25*** 18.2 -0.32 2.1 19.45*** 10.44 -0.1 0.58
E/BE 1 10 13.37*** 7.91 -0.03 1.69 33.41*** 17.9 -0.37 1.87 20.05*** 18.65 -0.18 0.57
D/BE 1 10 11.58*** 8.84 -0.26 1.31 30.83*** 16.95 -0.33 1.82 19.26*** 16.39 -0.04 0.56
PPE/A 1 10 -3.15 10.12 -0.12 -0.31 22.38*** 15.98 -0.2 1.4 25.55*** 19.91 -0.11 0.57
RD/A 10 1 9.23*** 12.58 -0.05 0.73 31.43*** 20.34 -0.34 1.54 22.20*** 15.74 -0.36 0.6
BE/ME 10 1 17.60*** 12.04 -0.24 1.46 40.49*** 17.59 -0.14 2.3 22.92*** 24.08 0.18 0.58
EF/A 1 10 11.84*** 8.55 -0.24 1.38 29.67*** 17.79 -0.4 1.67 17.82*** 22.49 -0.14 0.58
GS 1 10 12.39*** 7.56 -0.17 1.64 31.82*** 18.35 -0.37 1.73 19.45*** 22.09 -0.13 0.57
BE/ME 1 5 10.42*** 13.41 -0.02 0.78 22.05*** 19.51 -0.32 1.13 11.66*** 9.16 -0.29 0.58
EF/A 10 5 8.61*** 13.6 -0.24 0.63 23.02*** 18.82 -0.34 1.22 14.44*** 8.11 -0.28 0.58
GS 10 5 8.08*** 13.88 -0.22 0.58 22.73*** 18.8 -0.32 1.21 14.66*** 7.92 -0.14 0.59
BE/ME 10 5 28.01*** 9.2 0.2 3.04 41.31*** 16.15 -0.23 2.56 13.35*** 10.68 0.14 0.57
EF/A 1 5 20.46*** 9.24 -0.53 2.21 32.93*** 16.03 -0.42 2.05 12.49*** 8.4 -0.03 0.58
GS 1 5 20.47*** 10.81 -0.42 1.89 35.11*** 16.56 -0.39 2.12 14.66*** 8.41 0.12 0.59
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Table 5.2 summarises the buy-and-hold long-short portfolio returns (i.e., the return of
the benchmark portfolio), the returns of VIX-based trading strategy, the excess returns of
my trading strategy over benchmark long-short portfolio, and the success rate of my trading
strategy, defined as the percentage of trading days in RVIX is zero or higher. That is, when
my VIX timing strategy performs at least as good as the benchmark portfolio. Panels A
and B in Table 5.2 reports average returns, the standard deviation, the skewness, and the
Sharpe ratio of the sixteen original portfolio returns. The results suggest that my VIX-based
trading strategies generate higher average returns and Sharpe ratios than the benchmark
portfolios. The annualised returns of benchmark portfolios in Panel A range from -3.15%
(PPE/A long-short portfolio) to 23.11% (ME long-short portfolio), and the annualised returns
of VIX-based trading strategies range from 22.05% to 42.38%. Although the standard
deviations in Panel B is slightly higher than those standard deviation in Panel A, the Sharpe
ratios of the VIX-based strategies are higher than those of the benchmark portfolios. In Panel
B, the annualised returns of shifting investments between top and bottom ME-sorted deciles
and BE/ME-sorted deciles are 42.38% and 40.49%, respectively. The remarkable profitability
associated with shifting investments between size and value portfolios is consistent with the
findings of Copeland and Copeland (1999). With the exception of ME-sorted portfolios, the
skewness statistics of the long-short portfolio returns in Panel A are higher than those of the
VIX-based trading strategies in Panel B, suggesting that my trading strategies incur lower
crash risk than the benchmark strategy.
Panel C in Table 5.2 shows that the average returns of the VIX-based strategies are notably
higher than those of benchmark portfolios. Even the least profitable portfolio generates a
nontrivial excess return of 11.66% after adopting the VIX-based trading strategy. The
success rate of my VIX trading strategies ranges from 0.54 to 0.60 for the 16 cases, indicating
that more often than not the VIX-based trading strategies generate larger returns than the
benchmark portfolios.
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Table 5.3 Abnormal Alphas of RVIX
RVIX is the excess returns of the VIX-based trading strategy over the buy-and-hold long-short portfolio return.
In Panel A, I regress RVIX on the daily market excess return. Panel B reports the results of RVIX regressed
on FF3 factors and the momentum factor. Panel C reports the results of RVIX regressed on FF5 factors and
the momentum factor. Panel D reports the results of RVIX regressed on Stambaugh and Yuan (2017) four
mispricing factors. Any risk factor will be excluded from the regression when it is the portfolio being estimated.
The alphas are annualised and are in percentages. The Newey and West robust t-statistics are in parentheses.
*** and ** indicates significance at 1% and 5% level, respectively. The sample period is from 1990/01/01 to
2016/04/30.
Panel A CAPM Panel B FF3 Umd Panel C FF5 Umd Panel D Mispricing4
P I α R2 α R2 α R2 α R2
ME 1 10 10.03*** 85.35 10.07*** 85.35 10.35*** 87.04 10.89*** 85.56
(5.48) (5.48) (5.68) (5.50)
Age 1 10 11.11*** 70.30 10.07*** 74.07 5.88*** 81.62 6.40*** 74.66
(5.34) (5.59) (3.68) (3.07)
Sigma 10 1 17.49*** 19.53 16.65*** 24.79 14.55*** 30.44 13.86*** 29.73
(8.56) (8.51) (7.48) (6.88)
E/BE 1 10 12.94*** 80.75 11.90*** 85.95 12.97*** 86.46 11.59*** 85.13
(6.91) (8.19) (9.18) (7.35)
D/BE 1 10 13.45*** 69.98 11.92*** 76.28 11.90*** 77.71 10.13*** 76.06
(7.21) (7.23) (7.17) (5.55)
PPE/A 1 10 19.46*** 52.24 17.41*** 62.24 15.53*** 64.12 17.38*** 59.37
(6.34) (6.79) (5.78) (6.07)
RD/A 10 1 17.00*** 60.73 14.50*** 80.47 13.95*** 82.49 14.92*** 75.27
(7.81) (9.66) (9.62) (8.51)
BE/ME 10 1 14.26*** 72.15 12.99*** 81.24 18.42*** 85.22 17.68*** 83.73
(4.71) (5.49) (8.47) (7.30)
EF/A 1 10 9.98*** 67.64 9.14*** 81.01 14.11*** 84.54 14.18*** 83.25
(2.84) (3.59) (6.32) (5.71)
GS 1 10 11.43*** 73.47 10.47*** 85.31 14.54*** 87.98 14.79*** 87.27
(3.79) (4.95) (8.14) (7.44)
BE/ME 1 5 8.89*** 51.18 8.39*** 61.02 7.02*** 67.55 6.53*** 63.34
(7.43) (8.27) (7.01) (5.75)
EF/A 10 5 12.01*** 50.06 10.99*** 63.02 10.02*** 65.29 9.34*** 62.61
(10.19) (11.04) (10.19) (8.54)
GS 10 5 12.42*** 44.63 11.39*** 57.46 10.53*** 59.86 9.97*** 57.74
(10.44) (10.80) (10.48) (9.26)
BE/ME 10 5 9.59*** 69.11 9.04*** 77.72 8.46*** 78.83 8.01*** 76.89
(8.04) (8.60) (8.61) (7.45)
EF/A 1 5 9.49*** 71.05 8.69*** 82.02 8.47*** 82.58 8.15*** 80.59
(9.95) (12.63) (12.85) (10.86)
GS 1 5 11.86*** 61.85 10.96*** 71.28 10.35*** 73.41 10.30*** 70.05
(11.17) (12.02) (11.87) (10.69)
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The summary statistics suggest that my VIX-based trading strategies outperform their
benchmarks. However, it is not clear whether the excess returns of my VIX strategies
(RVIX) represent compensation for risk. Thus, I adjust RVIX for risk using four different
models. Table 5.3 reports the risk-adjusted RVIX (i.e., the alphas) and the adjusted R-square
associated with the four models. Panel A presents the results of the CAPM model, Panel
B reports the results from the FF three factors plus the momentum (SMB, HML, RMRF,
UMD), Panel C shows the results from the FF five factors plus momentum (SMB, HML,
RMRF, CMA, RMW, UMD), and Panel D shows the results of the four mispricing factors
model of Stambaugh and Yuan (2016) (RMRF, MSMB, MGMT, PERF).7 In Stambaugh
and Yuan (2017) mispricing model, MGMT is a composite factor constructed by combining
the rankings of six anomaly variables that represent quantities that firms’ management can
affect directly, PERF is a composite factor based on five anomaly variables that relate to
performance, but are less directly controlled by management, and MSMB is the return
between the small-cap and large-cap leg sorted on the two composite mispricing measures
used to construct MGMT and PERF.
The alphas in Table 5.3 are generally smaller than the excess returns in Table 5.2,
suggesting that the superior performance of my VIX trading strategies is at least partly driven
by risk. The salient coefficients of risk factors and high R-square also indicate that returns of
VIX-based trading strategy are associated with risk factors. However, all alphas in Table 5.3
are positive and highly significant (at 1% or better), implying that adjusting for risk mitigates
but does not fully eliminate the profitability of my VIX strategies. Can the profitability of
my VIX-based trading strategy be attributed to market timing? Following Han et al. (2013),
I use two approaches to test whether the superior performance of my VIX strategies stems
from their ability to detect periods of low market return premium. The first approach is the
7The Stambaugh and Yuan daily mispricing factors available on Prof. Yu Yuan’s personal website http:
//www.saif.sjtu.edu.cn/facultylist/yyuan/.
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quadratic regression of Treynor and Mazuy (1966)
RVIXt = α+βmRMRFt+βm2RMRFt
2+υt . (5.2)
A significantly positive coefficient βm2 would indicate successful market timing ability.
The second approach is the regression of Henriksson and Merton (1981)
RVIXt = α+βmRMRFt+ γmRMRFtDrmr f +υt , (5.3)
where Drmr f is a dummy variable with a value of unity when the market return premium is
positive, and zero otherwise. A significantly positive coefficient γm would indicate that the
profitability of my trading strategies is due to their ability to predict booming periods. The
alpha in each regression shows to the abnormal returns after controlling for market timing
ability of my VIX-based trading strategy.
Table 5.4 reports the market timing regression results. Panel A reports the results of the
quadratic regression (Equation 5.2). The coefficients of squared market return premium, βm2 ,
are not statistically significant, except for the ME sorted portfolio. The regression alphas are
largely significantly positive, except for the ME sorted portfolio. Panel B reports the results
of Equation 5.3. The coefficients γm are roughly insignificant, whereas the intercepts (α) are
positive and significant. For some regressions such as the PPE/A and RD/A sorted portfolio
regressions, the intercepts are even greater than the dependent variable, inconsistent with
the market timing explanation. The prominent positive γm and the salient negative alphas
are only observed in the case of ME-sorted portfolios, indicating that the market timing
explanation exclusively applies to these portfolios.
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Table 5.4 Market Timing Tests On VIX Based Trading Strategy
This table reports results of market timing regressions of RVIX, the excess returns of VIX-based trading
strategy over benchmark portfolio return. Panel A shows the results of Treynor and Mazuy (1966) quadratic
regressions, and Panel B show the results of Henriksson and Merton (1981) regressions. The alphas are
annualised and are in percentages. *** and ** indicates statistical significance at 1% and 5% level, respectively.
The Newey and West robust t-statistics are in parenthesis. The sample period is from 1990/01/01 to 2016/04/30.
Panel A. TM Regression Panel B. HM Regression
P I α βm βm2 R2 α βm γm R2
ME 1 10 1.60 1.22*** 2.62*** 85.86 -10.98*** 1.11*** 0.22*** 85.72
(0.66) (34.82) (3.63) (-2.66) (30.27) (4.63)
Age 1 10 9.92*** 0.83*** 0.37 70.32 10.98*** 0.83*** 0.00 70.3
(3.79) (25.20) (0.54) (2.68) (24.68) (0.03)
Sigma 10 1 17.13*** 0.26*** 0.11 19.52 18.06*** 0.26*** -0.01 19.52
(7.85) (10.10) (0.20) (4.97) (7.16) (-0.14)
E/BE 1 10 13.66*** 0.94*** -0.22 80.75 16.79*** 0.95*** -0.04 80.77
(7.04) (43.66) (-0.70) (6.23) (38.57) (-1.50)
D/BE 1 10 13.51*** 0.76*** -0.02 69.97 12.75*** 0.76*** 0.01 69.98
(7.33) (26.24) (-0.03) (3.97) (21.36) (0.19)
PPE/A 1 10 23.35*** 0.80*** -1.21 52.38 33.55*** 0.87*** -0.15*** 52.46
(5.56) (17.10) (-1.37) (7.37) (18.83) (-3.31)
RD/A 10 1 20.94*** 0.68*** -1.22** 60.97 28.80*** 0.74*** -0.12*** 60.99
(9.08) (19.11) (-2.39) (7.49) (18.36) (-2.88)
BE/ME 10 1 14.87*** 1.14*** -0.19 72.15 18.53*** 1.16*** -0.04 72.16
(4.42) (40.03) (-0.26) (3.73) (33.49) (-0.85)
EF/A 1 10 12.83*** 1.03*** -0.89 67.7 23.69*** 1.10*** -0.14*** 67.81
(3.04) (47.60) (-0.97) (4.51) (37.08) (-2.72)
GS 1 10 13.02*** 1.06*** -0.49 73.48 20.85*** 1.10*** -0.10** 73.55
(3.76) (61.26) (-0.75) (4.84) (51.84) (-2.42)
BE/ME 1 5 10.77*** 0.37*** -0.59 51.34 14.54*** 0.39*** -0.06** 51.35
(7.43) (19.06) (-1.59) (5.80) (19.74) (-2.15)
EF/A 10 5 13.28*** 0.32*** -0.40 50.15 15.28*** 0.34*** -0.03 50.12
(9.09) (20.19) (-1.01) (6.32) (18.12) (-1.24)
GS 10 5 14.13*** 0.29*** -0.53 44.8 16.57*** 0.32*** -0.04 44.75
(9.63) (18.20) (-1.35) (6.78) (16.27) (-1.56)
BE/ME 10 5 8.78*** 0.50*** 0.25 69.13 7.22*** 0.48*** 0.02 69.13
(7.53) (35.63) (1.25) (4.24) (29.78) (1.34)
EF/A 1 5 9.36*** 0.40*** 0.04 71.05 10.01*** 0.40*** -0.01 71.05
(8.77) (42.75) (0.17) (6.08) (31.70) (-0.31)
GS 1 5 11.51*** 0.37*** 0.11 61.86 11.25*** 0.37*** 0.01 61.85
(10.06) (25.69) (0.38) (6.16) (20.62) (0.31)
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5.5.1 Robustness Checks
I document a battery of additional tests to examine the robustness of my VIX-based cross-
sectional trading strategies in Appendix E.3. I first examine whether the profitability of
my VIX-based trading strategies is robust to alternative definitions of what a "substantially
high" VIX means. Recall that in the previous tables, VIX is defined as substantially high
when current VIX is 10% higher than its prior 25-day average, where the 25-day window
represents the number of trading days in a month there are 25 trading days in month. I also
consider alternative horizons of prior 1-day, 5-day, 10-day, 60-day, 120-day and 250-day
average. Panel A of Table 5 shows that the profitability of my VIX-based trading strategies
is not very sensitive to the choice of VIX definition horizon. The return differential between
any two different horizons is less than 5%, with the returns being higher for the 10-day and
25-day horizons and lower for either shorter or longer horizon. I also use 0%, 5%, 15% and
20% as alternative thresholds for my definition of substantially high VIX. Table E.24 shows
that the excess returns are positive and salient across all these thresholds.
I then test whether transaction costs can eliminate the profitability of my trading strategies
in Panel B of Table 5.5. Following Han et al. (2013), I calculate Break-even trading cost
(BETC) to check whether my VIX-based trading strategies survives the transaction costs
without taking a stand on actual transaction costs. Break-even trading cost is the trading cost
that makes the average actual returns of my VIX-based trading strategies become zero. The
higher BETC of a trading strategy, the more likely that this trading strategy is profitable after
the transaction costs. Panel B of Table 5 reveals that all estimated BETCs are larger than
50 basis points. This demonstrates that the transaction costs must be unrealistically high to
eliminate the profitability of my VIX-based trading strategies.
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Table 5.5 Returns and BETCs on Different VIX Trading Signal Horizons
This table reports the returns and break-even transaction costs of VIX-based trading strategies if I choose
alternative horizons to compare the VIX with its past average. For instance, I define a high VIX day if current
VIX is at least 10% higher than its prior 10-day average. In this table, I show the results when using 1-day,
5-day, 10-day, 25-day, 60-day, 120-day and 250-day horizons. Panel A reports the returns of my VIX-based
trading strategies when using different horizon average to define high VIX, and the returns are in percentages.
Panel B reports the corresponding break-even transaction costs and the costs are in basis points. The sample
period is from 1990/01/01 to 2016/04/30.
Panel A. Profitability on different trading signal horizons
P I 1-day 5-day 10-day 25-day 60-day 120-day 250-day
ME 1 10 38 41.81 42.51 43.21 42.44 40 37.91
Age 1 10 26.24 29.05 29.25 28.95 30.08 28.21 26.15
Sigma 10 1 36.34 38.43 38.67 38.13 39.34 37.44 35.62
E/BE 1 10 31.81 34.03 34.11 33.69 33.78 32.89 30.8
D/BE 1 10 29.38 31.04 30.91 31.34 31.76 30.46 29
PPE/A 1 10 22.93 23.26 23.08 22.51 22.64 23.56 23.61
RD/A 10 1 32.58 33.29 32.58 31.57 32.04 31.62 30.38
BE/ME 10 1 39.54 40.36 40.11 40.77 38.9 38.53 37.54
EF/A 1 10 30.97 29.52 29.66 29.81 28.68 28.84 29.1
GS 1 10 31.88 31.97 32.45 32.05 31.59 31.65 30.75
BE/ME 1 5 22.27 23.02 23.02 22.16 23.26 23.5 22.68
EF/A 10 5 21.32 22.99 23.37 23 23.96 23.3 22.55
GS 10 5 20.78 22.01 21.98 22.68 23.49 22.64 21.95
BE/ME 10 5 40.58 42.14 41.9 41.7 40.93 40.8 38.99
EF/A 1 5 32.53 32.74 33.27 33.05 32.88 32.37 31.88
GS 1 5 33.22 34.54 34.98 35.28 35.63 34.84 33.25
Panel B. BETC on different trading signal horizons
P I 1-day 5-day 10-day 25-day 60-day 120-day 250-day
ME 1 10 116.53 124.14 124.57 143.25 177.3 205.27 220.78
Age 1 10 80.47 86.25 85.72 95.97 125.67 144.78 152.31
Sigma 10 1 111.45 114.12 113.32 126.41 164.37 192.12 207.45
E/BE 1 10 97.56 101.04 99.97 111.69 141.15 168.77 179.38
D/BE 1 10 90.09 92.16 90.57 103.92 132.7 156.34 168.9
PPE/A 1 10 70.3 69.07 67.65 74.63 94.6 120.92 137.48
RD/A 10 1 99.92 98.87 95.49 104.67 133.86 162.29 176.92
BE/ME 10 1 121.26 119.84 117.56 135.18 162.53 197.72 218.62
EF/A 1 10 94.98 87.64 86.93 98.84 119.84 147.98 169.44
GS 1 10 97.77 94.94 95.11 106.26 131.98 162.43 179.06
BE/ME 1 5 68.29 68.34 67.45 73.47 97.18 120.62 132.07
EF/A 10 5 65.37 68.26 68.49 76.26 100.1 119.58 131.33
GS 10 5 63.73 65.37 64.41 75.2 98.13 116.2 127.83
BE/ME 10 5 124.43 125.13 122.78 138.26 171 209.37 227.04
EF/A 1 5 99.74 97.22 97.5 109.58 137.36 166.13 185.67
GS 1 5 101.86 102.56 102.53 116.98 148.85 178.82 193.64
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Some studies choose to set the transaction costs at a conservative rate of 25 basis points
(see, Lynch and Balduzzi, 2000) , other studies choose to calculate the realized transaction
costs (Frazzini et al., 2012). For instance, Frazzini et al. (2012) find the trading costs is 11.21
basis points for large-cap stocks and 21.27 basis points for small-cap stocks. In my case, the
lowest BETC for trading on size portfolio is 116.53 basis points calculated with 1-day VIX
benchmark, and even the lowest BETC for size portfolio is sufficiently higher than the 21.27
bps realistic transaction costs in Frazzini et al. (2012).
I also find that the BETCs increase almost monotonically with the length of the horizon
used in the definition of VIX strategies in Panel B of Table 5. When longer horizons are used
as benchmarks, the average VIX tend to be more stable and consequently the investor will
have consecutive high or low VIX days without trading. Take the 25-day window period
as an example, the BETCs range from 73.47 to 143.25 basis points, which is much larger
than 50 basis points. This is because BETCs depend on both the profitability and the trading
frequency. In other words, for any given profitability, a low trading frequency leads to a
high BETC. My trading strategies have such reasonably high BETCs which rely not only on
the high returns but also on the low transaction frequency. Take 25-day window period size
portfolio trading strategy as an example, the actual number of actual transactions is 1356 out
of 11329 trading days, which means in this sample period the average portfolio holding time
length is more than 8 trading days.
Furthermore, to understand whether macroeconomic factors and other risk factors explain
the superior performance of my VIX-based trading strategies, I also adjust the excess returns
for the daily difference between the yield on interbank loans and 3-month treasuries (TED
spread), and the difference between the yield on 10-year and 3-month treasuries (term spread,
or TS) in Table E.18. I find economically large and statistically significant alphas when these
factors are included in the regressions. I also calculate the bid-ask spread for all the sixteen
long-short portfolios, i.e., the average bid-ask spread of high sentiment-prone portfolio minus
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that of low sentiment-prone portfolio, and include it as a control variable into the respective
regression. Based on the results in Table E.19, the effect of TA sentiment on returns is
unaffected after controlling for cross-sectional variations in the bid-ask spread. Interestingly,
the difference between Moody’s AAA and Baa bond yields (Default Spread, or DS) could
explain the excess return very well. I find only 8 out of 16 trading strategies still have
significant and large positive abnormal return after controlling for Default Spread.
Moreover, I test the robustness of returns of each VIX-based trading strategies by chang-
ing the benchmark portfolio from its corresponding long-short portfolio to the overall market
index returns. I find that my trading strategies reasonably outperform the S&P 500 Index
Return. Figure E.3 examines the persistence of the performance of my VIX-based trading
strategies. Figure E.3 shows that the annual average returns of each trading strategy is
consistently higher than the S&P500 index return every calendar year in my sample. I
also investigate whether the profitability of my trading strategies is sensitive to choice of
alternative implied volatility indexes. I show that strategies that based on trading signal from
other indexes, such as the CBOE S&P 100 Volatility Index (VXO), the CBOE NASDAQ
Volatility Index (VXN), and the CBOE DJIA Volatility Index (VXD), generate significant
profits. The results are respectively shown in Table E.20, Table E.21 and Table E.22.
Additionally, I design two additional sets of VIX-based trading strategies. The trading
rule for the first set involves holding sentiment-prone stocks and shorting sentiment-immune
stocks when VIX is low and shorting sentiment-prone stocks and longing sentiment-immune
stocks when VIX is higher than its prior moving average. Table E.25 shows that this trading
rule generates significant positive excess returns and high Sharpe ratios, albeit the magnitudes
of the excess returns are smaller than those reported in my baseline results. The second set
of trading strategies is implemented on the decile portfolios. In this set, the trading rule
involves holding sentiment-prone decile when VIX is low and shorting the sentiment-prone
decile when VIX is substantially high. See Table E.26 for test results. I show that this trading
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rule also generates higher returns and higher Sharpe ratios than the benchmark strategy of
buy-and-hold sentiment-prone decile portfolios. Thus, the performance of both sets of trading
strategies indicate that VIX index has a value in timing the market. However, the baseline set
of trading strategies, which requires shifting asset allocations conditional on VIX, is more
practical than these two alternative sets of trading strategies. This is because these alternative
ones require short-selling, which can be costly and limited for some investors. For example,
mutual funds are typically prohibited from short-selling.
Finally, VIX is an index conveyed from S&P 500 stock index options, where S&P 500
index members are practically the largest stocks in US stock market. In this case, I argue
that VIX is a very conservative measure of the overall market sentiment. Also, due to the
fact that size-based portfolio returns are highly correlated with other characteristics based
portfolio returns, one may question the profitability of VIX on timing those portfolios are
mainly due to the size effect. To mitigate the effect of size, I also examine the profitability
of VIX-based timing strategy on value-weighted cross-sectional returns in Table E.23. It
turns out that when applying VIX timing rules on value-weighted returns, the profitability is
slightly smaller than applying it on equal-weighted returns. Still, the raw and risk-adjusted
returns of VIX-based trading strategy remain significantly positive in most cases.
5.6 Conclusion
Chapter 5 explores the cross-sectional profitability of VIX-based trading strategies. My
trading strategies involve holding sentiment-prone stocks when VIX is low and holding
sentiment-immune stocks when VIX is high. The motivation of my trading strategies is
the short-run negative VIX-return relation arises from the delayed arbitrage theory (Abreu
and Brunnermeier, 2002). In this chapter, VIX is deemed as a daily measure of investor
sentiment, and due to the lack of coordinated actions among arbitrageurs, the mispricing
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caused by investor sentiment may even amplify, which leads to a short-run negative VIX-
return relationship. Interpreting VIX-return relation from behavioural perspective enables
us to interpret the negative short-run relation as the return momentum caused by delayed
arbitrage and interpret the positive long-run relation as the correction of mispricing. Unlike
most existing literature that focus on interpreting the positive VIX-return relation, I argue
that delayed arbitrage leads to high returns for sentiment-prone stocks following a decline in
VIX (high sentiment), and that flight-to-quality leads to the better performance of sentiment-
immune stocks over sentiment-prone stocks following an increase in VIX (low sentiment).
Consistent with my explanation, I find that VIX strongly and negatively associates
with one-day forward stock return in the in-sample predictive regressions. This finding is
robust with or without controlling for other well-documented risk factors. I conduct various
robustness tests to further demonstrate that seeing VIX as investor sentiment could better
explain the return momentum and reversal. For instance, I find the effect of VIX is stronger
during the high sentiment period, which is consistent with the argument that sentiment plays
a less important role due to the short-sell constraints in low sentiment period.
Following on the short-run negative VIX-return pattern, I devise trading strategies to
capture the return momentum attributed by investor sentiment. I not only cover the value
and size rotation based on VIX, but also explore the profitability of VIX timing over a
large spectrum of cross-sectional portfolios based on the extent to which a stock is exposed
to market-wide investor sentiment. I find that my VIX-based trading strategies generate
significant excess returns and higher Sharpe ratios. The excess returns of my trading strategies
cannot be fully explained by Fama-French five factors, momentum factors, liquidity, and
other macroeconomic variables. In addition to their strong profitability, my trading strategies
do not require short-selling. The strong and consistent profitability of applying VIX-based
trading strategy on different cross-sectional sentiment-based portfolios also supports the
investor sentiment perspective explanation on VIX-return relation.
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To sum up, I contribute to existing literature by combine the delayed arbitrage theory
and flight-to-quality to explain the pattern between sentiment-based cross-sectional stock
returns and VIX. I show strong empirical evidence supporting the short-run return momentum
caused by VIX. From the behavioural finance point of view, I use the negative VIX-return
connection to design highly profitable and practical trading strategies which is to shift asset
allocation to sentiment-prone stocks when VIX is low and to sentiment-immune stocks when
VIX is high.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis focuses on the effect of investor sentiment on cross-sectional stock returns. It is
essential to study investor sentiment as it has been widely applied to examine a variety of
financial issues and anomalies. Yet, I find a few gaps in existing literature about investor
sentiment. This thesis mainly contributes to fill in two research gaps. The first gap is that no
theory has demonstrated the effect of investor sentiment in the cross-section, while empirical
tests mostly are on the cross-sectional level. The second gap is that most studies explore the
predictability of investor sentiment on return reversal while few examine the existence of
sentiment-induced momentum. Inspired by the delayed arbitrage theory, this thesis argues
that delayed arbitrage leads to the persistence of mispricing caused by investor sentiment,
and therefore one can test the momentum effect of investor sentiment in the short-run with
higher frequency data.
There is no consensus as to the effect of investor sentiment in literature. Previous
literature finds the effect of investor sentiment on the aggregate stock market controversial
but finds demonstrated evidence in the cross-sectional stock market. One explanation for
those two seemingly conflicting findings is that the sentiment-prone level of stocks varies
in the cross-section. The first essay theoretically demonstrates that the effect of investor
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sentiment is stronger on the cross-section than on the aggregate market because assets have
different levels of sentiment sensitivity.
The extended model inspires me to decompose investor sentiment into long- and short-
term components and test their effects in the empirical part of the first essay. In the empirical
parts, I sort the stocks based on the sentiment-prone level in the cross-section and regress
the cross-sectional return premium of sentiment-prone stocks over sentiment-immune stocks
on the decomposed short-run incremental sentiment and long-run previous sentiment level.
The empirical tests in Chapter 3 document a negative relationship between the long-run
sentiment component and subsequent stock returns and positive association between the
short-run sentiment component and contemporaneous stock returns. I further investigate the
explanatory power of decomposed investor sentiment for the cross-sectional decile portfolio
returns and further confirm the opposite effect of long-run and short-run investor sentiment.
By decomposing investor sentiment, I integrate the literature that only focuses on the positive
contemporaneous relationship between sentiment shock and stock returns with the studies
that find negative predictability of lagged sentiment on asset returns. The decomposition of
investor sentiment achieves substantial improvement in explaining stock returns both at the
cross-sectional level and at the portfolio level.
The multiple risky-assets noise trader risk model enables the future research to mathemat-
ically demonstrate how investors trade stocks during periods with varying sentiment level.
The theoretical derivation could also be extended to the research on the relationship between
investor sentiment and comovement in return (or comovement in liquidity).
The main contribution of the second essay is connecting technical analysis with investor
sentiment. I propose that technical analysis is a means of capturing investor sentiment. To
examine this argument, I construct a TA sentiment index from the forecasts of applying 2,127
technical trading on the overall market index S&P 500. I show that this TA index predicts
the momentum and reversal of the cross-sectional stock returns and future crash risk just as a
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sentiment indicator would do. A rise in the TA sentiment accompanies high contemporaneous
returns and predicts higher near-term returns, lower subsequent returns and higher crash risk
in the cross-section. These results are broadly consistent with the explanation that the lack of
synchronization induces rational arbitrageurs to ride the mispricing before it’s corrected. A
simple trading strategy based on TA sentiment index earns substantial risk-adjusted returns. I
find that both the predictability and the profitability of this TA index are stronger among the
widely-acknowledged sentiment-prone stocks than among the sentiment-immune stocks.
It is of essence to test the argument that connect technical analysis with investor sentiment.
This is the first attempt to explain the usefulness of technical analysis from a behavioral
finance perspective and design a series of empirical tests to formally examine this point
of view. Technical analysis is widely used in the industry, however, the logic beneath its
prevailing application does not gain enough attention in academia. With the development of
behavioral finance, it is of essence to help economists and investors to understand technical
analysis better from a new perspective. This research also has a practical value in terms of
the measurement of investor sentiment. The investor sentiment indicator at high frequency is
not easy to measure in the real market. By establishing the connection between technical
analysis and investor sentiment, this essay provides a new of measuring investor sentiment
for any asset market both at individual asset level and at the overall market level at different
frequency.
The future research in the direction is closely related to the challenges in the research
area about investor sentiment. One challenge in investigating investor sentiment is that it
is not directly observable. It is difficult to find a good test ground for identify the effect of
investor sentiment empirically. The same issue occurs when it comes to the measurement
of investor sentiment. Though I have brought up a new investor sentiment indicator based
on technical trading rules and verified this TA indicator by showing its ability to predict the
return momentum, reversal and future crash risk as a sentiment indicator would do, more
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identification tests are in need to demonstrate that the predictability of TA sentiment indicator
in the cross-section are due to investor sentiment rather than microeconomic characteristics
captured by technical trading signals. Another potential contribution the future studies could
made is to develop a theoretical model to demonstrate the connections between investor
sentiment and technical analysis. A certain degree of subjectivity remains in my argument
that technical analysis captures investor sentiment. It would be more convincing if in the
future a theoretical model demonstrate that investors can make more accurate inference about
investor sentiment from both current price and historical prices.
The third essay combines the effect of investor sentiment with the delayed arbitrage
theory. Unlike the literature that focuses on the reversal effect of investor sentiment, the third
essay argues that the delayed arbitrage makes the mispricing. While most behavioral papers
explore the reversal effect of investor sentiment, I find that a trading strategy that ride the
sentiment-induced momentum also generates substantial risk-adjusted abnormal returns. My
trading strategy is to shift investment allocation between sentiment-prone and sentiment-
immune stocks using trading signals based on VIX. To put it in a more straightforward way,
the trading strategy is to hold sentiment-prone asset when market is bullish (VIX is low)
and to hold sentiment-immune asset when market is bearish (VIX is substantially high).
This simple trading strategy that generates substantial abnormal returns after adjusting for
Fama-French five factors and Momentum factor. The average annualized risk-adjusted alpha
of applying trading strategies on four typical sentiment-based portfolios is higher than 10%.
TA sentiment trading strategy outperforms the well-known momentum strategy. I used the
break-even transaction costs and the higher than 50 basis points break-even transaction costs
indicate that my trading strategy could survive transaction cost adjustments.
The third essay has a strong practical value. The practitioners could apply this trading
strategy on any markets with implied volatility index available. To improve the profitability,
one can also test this trading strategy with the ETFs, especially switching asset allocation
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among the small-cap and large-cap ETFs and run more back-testing on the performance of
this trading strategy.
In summary, this thesis encompasses the explanation for a few gaps I found in previous
literature on investor sentiment. The three essays in this thesis deepen the understanding
in the relationship between investor sentiment and stock return in the cross-section. This
thesis especially emphasizes the delayed arbitrage theory and explore the momentum effect
of investor sentiment on stock return and test the profitability of riding the sentiment-induced
momentum in the cross-section.
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Appendix A
List of Abbreviations
• AAII American Association of Individual Investor
• ADS Aruoba, Diebold, and Scotti’s (2009) Daily Macroeconomic Activities Index
• AMEX American Stock Exchange
• ARIMA Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average
• Age Firm Age
• BE/ME Book-to-Market ratio
• BETC Break-Even Transaction Costs
• CAPM Captial Asset Pricing Model
• CBOE Chicago Board Options Exchange
• CCI Consumer Confidence Index
• CEFD Closed-End Fund Discount
• CMA Fama-French Conservative Minus Aggressive Factor
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176 List of Abbreviations
• CRSP Center for Research in Security Prices Database
• D/BE Dividend-to-Book ratio
• DJIA Dow Jones Industrial Average Index
• DP Dividend Premium
• DS Default Spread
• DSSW Delong, Shleifer, Summers, Waldmann (1990) noise trader risk model
• E/BE Earning-to-Book ratio
• EF/A External Finance over Assets
• EPU Baker, Bloom, and Davis’s (2013) Economic Policy Uncertainty Index
• ETF Exchange-Traded Fund
• FEARS Financial and Economic Attitudes Revealed by Search
• GS Sales Growth ratio
• H Top Three Deicles
• HML Fama-French High Minus Low Factor
• I The Most Sentiment-Immune Stock Decile Portoflio
• ICS Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index
• IRF Impulse Response Functions
• L Bottom Three Deciles
• M Middle Four Deciles
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177
• ME Market Capitalization
• NA Not Available
• NASDAQ National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations
• NBER National Bureau of Economic Research
• NIPO Jay Ritter’s Number of the First-Day IPOs
• NYSE New York Stock Exchange
• P The Most Sentiment-Prone Stock Decile Portoflio
• PLS Partial Least Square
• PPE/A Property, Plant and Equipment over Assets
• RD/A Research and Development over Assets
• REIT Real Estate Investment Trust
• RIPO Jay Ritter’s Return of the First-Day IPOs
• RMRF Market Return Premium
• RMW Fama-French Robust Minus Weak Factor
• RTA Return of the TA Trading Strategy
• S Percentage of Equity Shares in Total New Issues
• SMB Fama-French Small Minus Big Factor
• Sigma Total Risk
• TA Technical Analysis
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178 List of Abbreviations
• TAP Return Premium of the TA Trading Strategy over Corresponding Benchmark
Portfolio
• TED Yield Difference of Eurodollar Futures Contract over T-bill
• TS Term Spread
• UMD Carhart (1997) Winners Minus Losers Momentum Factor
• VAR Vector Autoregression
• VIX Implied Volatility Index conveyed from S&P index options
• VOL Detrended Trading Volume of S&P 500 Index
• VXD CBOE DJIA Volatility Index
• VXN CBOE Nasdaq Volatility Index
• VXO CBOE S&P 100 Volatility Index
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Appendix B
Sentiment-Prone Level Measures
Table B.1 gives a detailed description for the variables needed to construct the portfolios.
All the three essays in this thesis use the same ten sentiment-prone level measures as below
to construct sentiment-based portfolios in the cross-section. I try to follow the framework
of Baker and Wurgler (2006) as much as possible. Generally speaking, those sentiment-
prone level measures are closely associated with the stocks’ information opaqueness, the
attractiveness to speculative demands, and the difficulty to arbitrage. The portfolios are all
reconstructed every year. The variables used in the Calculation column in Table B.1 are all
from WRDS.
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Appendix C
Details of the Wild Bootstrap Procedures
I use the following wild bootstrap procedure to adjust for Stambaugh bias. A similar wild
bootstrap procedure has been employed by Huang et al. (2015) and Brown and Cliff (2004).
The null of this wild bootstrap p-values is that the independent variable has no predictability.
Take the regression in Table 2 as an example. The regression function is
Rt = α+β1ρLR,t+β2∆ρs,t+ γX+ut , (C.1)
where Rt is the relative returns of more sentiment-prone stocks over less sentiment-prone
stocks (Rt = Rt,1−Rt,2). To obtain the simulated data of dependent variable, I first run an
OLS regression of the original regression function to get the fitted residuals εˆt .
εˆt = Rt− (αˆ+ βˆ1ρLR,t+ βˆ2∆ρs,t+ γˆX) (C.2)
To obtain the simulated sample of independent variables, I assume the predictors follow an
AR(1) process and I run first-order autoregression and get the fitted residuals of the AR(1)
regression for each predictor.
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ϕˆρLR,t = ρLR,t− (ϑˆt−1,0+ ϑˆt−1,1ρLR,t−1) (C.3)
Then I generate a set of random number, ωt , from the standard normal distribution. I
build up a pseudo sample of observations for relative returns and the variables that have no
return predictability under the null hypothesis.
R˜t = R¯t+ εˆtωt , (C.4)
ρ˜LR,t = (ϑˆt−1,0+ ϑˆt−1,1ρLR,t−1)+ ϕˆρLR,tωt , (C.5)
where R¯t is the sample mean of Rt , and ωt is a drawn from a standard normal distribution.
With the pseudo sample, I estimate the coefficients and the corresponding Newey-West
t-statistics for each regressor. I then repeat this process for 500 times and store all the
Newey-West robust t-statistics for each regressor. I get a distribution of the bootstrapped
t-statistics for each regressor.
Because my model suggests a negative sign of β1 and a positive sign of β2, I test null
hypotheses H0: β1 = 0 and β2 = 0 against alternative hypotheses HA: β1 < 0 and β2 > 0.
The one-sided tests are more in line with my theory than the two-sided tests, and most of
my results remain significant if I consider two-sided tests instead. For a given regressor, the
empirical p-value is the proportion of the bootstrapped t-statistics larger (smaller) than the
t-statistics when using the original sample.
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Appendix D
Description of Technical Trading Rules
Employed in Constructing TA Sentiment
This part describes the 2127 technical trading rules that I used in constructing the TA
sentiment indicator. In Chapter 3, TA sentiment indicator is built based on Dr Qingwei
Wang’s PhD thesis on 2008. This thesis uses the same method to construct TA sentiment
indicator.
D.1 Filter Rules (FR)
Basic Filter Rules:
When the daily closing price of an asset moves up by over x% from its most recent low, the
rule generates a ’buy’ forecast. When the daily closing price moves down by at least x% from
a recent high, the rule generates a ’sell’ forecast. Otherwise, the forecast is ’neutral’.Define
the recent high (low) as the highest (lowest) price over the e most recent c is the number of
days in a case where a given long or short position is held and during which time all other
signals are ignored.
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x: increase in the log return required to generate a ’buy’ signal
x = 0.0005, 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 (6 values)
y: decrease in the log return required to generate a ’sell’ signal
y = 0.0005, 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05 (5 values)
e: the number of the most recent days needed to define a low (high) based on which the filters
are applied to generate a ’buy’ (’sell’) signal
e = 1, 2, 5, 10, 20 (5 values)
c: number of days a position is held during which all other signals are ignored
c = 1, 5, 10, 25 (4 values)
Note that y must be less than x, hence there are 15 (x,y) combinations
Number of rules in FR class= x*c+x*e+x*y+((x,y) combinations))= 24+30+15 = 69
D.2 Moving Average Rules (MA)
Basic Moving Average Rule:
First, to calculate the (equally-weighted) moving average of an asset prices for a given day
t over the n days. When the short moving average of the index is above the long moving
average by an amount larger than the band with b%, it generates a ’buy’ forecast; similarly,
when the short moving average is below the long moving average by b%, it generates a ’sell’
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forecast; otherwise, it generates a ’neutral’ forecast. In addition to this fixed percentage band
filter, d is a time delay filter that requires the long or short signals remain valid for d days
before one can any action.
n: number of days in a moving average
n = 2, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 50, 100, 150, 200, 250 (11 values)
m: number of fast-slow combinations of n
m= ∑n−1i=1 i= 55
b: fixed band multiplicative value
b = 0, 0.0005, 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05 (6 values)
c: number of days a position is held, ignoring all other signals during that time
c = 5, 10, 25 (3 values)
d: number of days for the time delay filter
d = 2, 3, 4, 5 (4 values)
Number of rules in MA class: = b(n+m)+d(n+m)+c(n+m)= 396+264+198 = 858
185
186 Description of Technical Trading Rules Employed in Constructing TA Sentiment
D.3 Support and Resistance (SR, or Trading Range Break)
Rules
Basic Support and Resistance Rule:
Under a trading range break rule, when the price of an asset moves above the maximum price
(resistance level) over the previous n days by b%, it generates a ’buy’ forecast. When the
price falls below the minimum price over the previous n days by b%, it generates a ’sell’
forecast. Otherwise, it generates a ’neutral’ forecast.
n: number of days in the support and resistance range;
n = 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 50, 100 (7 values);
e: used for an alternative definition of extreme where a low (high) can be defined as the most
recent closing price that is less (greater) than the n previous closing prices;
e = 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 25, 50 (7 values);
b: fixed band multiplicative value;
b = 0.0005, 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05 (5 values);
c: number of days a position is held, ignoring all other signals during that time c = 1, 5, 10,
25 (4 values);
d: number of days for the time delay filter;
d = 2, 3, 4, 5 (4 values);
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Number of rules in SR class = c*(n+e)+b*(n+e)*c+d*c*(n+e) = 100+800+320 =1220
D.4 Channel Breakout Rules (CBO)
Basic Channel Breakout Rules:
A channel occurs when the high price of an asset over the previous n days is within x% of the
low over the previous n days. Under a channel breakout rule, when the closing price of the
foreign currency exceeds the channel by b%, it generates a ’Buy’ forecast. Likewise, when
the closing price of an asset drops below the channel by b%, it generates a ’Sell’ forecast.
Otherwise, it generates a ’neutral’ forecast.
n: number of days for a channel
n = 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 50, 100, 200 (8 values)
x: difference between the high price and the low price (x times low price) required to form a
channel
x = 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 (5 values)
b: fixed band multiplicative value (b < x)
b = 0.0005, 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05 (5 values)
c: number of days a position is held, ignoring all other signals during that time
c = 1, 5, 10, 25 (4 values)
Note that b must be less than x. There are 15 (x,b) combinations.
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Number of rules in CBO class = n*x*c+n*c*((x,b) combinations)= 160+480 = 640
Therefore, the total number of trading rules = 2127
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Appendix E
Some Robustness Tests
This part I present the tables of some robustness tests mention in the three essays of this
thesis.
E.1 Robustness Tests for Chapter 3
I test the two hypotheses in Chapter 3 with other sentiment indicators. Table E.1 reports the
results when investor sentiment is measured by CCI, ICS, CEFD, and Sent_PLS. I also use
the smoothing average of 12-month period and 36-month period to measure the long-run
sentiment component.
Table E.2 reports the regression results of the two cases where long-run sentiment component
is measured with different horizon choices.
Table E.3 reports the regression results of separated high and low sentiment periods.
Table E.4 takes the effect of investor attention into consideration and find that the results
are robust to the effect of investor attention. Panel A of Table E.4 presents the regression
results when investor attention At,1 is constructed by abnormal trading volume and Panel
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B shows the results when Attention Disparity is constructed by abnormal return. Table
E.4 shows that the investor attention disparity does have a pronounced explanatory power
on the cross-sectional return premium. After taking the effect of investor attention into
account, the effect of decomposed sentiment components on returns remain strong. The
results in Panel A and Panel B are almost the same in terms of the sign and significance of
the coefficients for long- and short-run sentiment. The long-run sentiment negatively predicts
future cross-sectional returns as expected and the short-run sentiment positively contributes
to contemporaneous cross-sectional return premium as predicted.
Table E.5 reports the regression results when using value-weighted returns to mitigate the
size effect.
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Table E.1 Regressions of Monthly Cross-Sectional Returns on Other Decomposed Sentiment
Measures
This table reports the regressions of long-short portfolio returns on both the long-run and short-run sentiment.
Rt,1−Rt,2 = α+β1ρLR,t +β2(ηt −ηt−1)+ γX+ εt ,
Rt,1−Rt,2 represents the return disparity of more sentiment-prone portfolio over the less sentiment-prone
portfolio. The control variables (X) include the Fama-French Five factors (RMRF, HML, SMB, RMW, CMA),
and the momentum factor (UMD). SMB (HML) will not be included in regression when return premium is
constructed by ME (BE/ME). The first two columns show how the portfolio is constructed. H, M, L represents
the top three, middle four and bottom three decile portfolios respectively. The long-run sentiment component
ρLR,t is the standardised smoothing average of prior [−25,−2] monthly investor sentiment. All coefficients are
adjusted for Stambaugh-bias. The p-values reported in parentheses are obtained from wild bootstrap procedures
in which all stimulation uses Newey West robust t-statistics. See Appendix B for details of the bootstrap
simulation. ∗∗∗p< 0.01,∗∗ p< 0.05,∗p< 0.1.
Panel A ICS Panel B CCI Panel C CEFD Panel D PLS
ρLR,t ∆η ρLR,t ∆η ρLR,t ∆η ρLR,t ∆η
ME L-H
-0.17*** 0.75 -0.16*** 0.49 -0.014*** 0.309*** 0.050 0.410***
(0.000) (0.188) (0.000) (0.154) (0.000) (0.000) (0.290) (0.000)
Age L-H
0.01*** 0.31* 0.07*** 0.00** -0.035*** 0.111 -0.013*** 0.066
(0.000) (0.056) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.172) (0.000) (0.130)
Sigma H-L
-0.40*** 0.18*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.075*** 0.101** -0.096*** 0.039***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000)
E/BE <0->0
-0.12*** 0.32 -0.58 -0.06** -0.069*** 0.290* -0.078*** 0.088***
(0.000) (0.254) (0.309) (0.030) (0.000) (0.072) (0.000) (0.000)
D/BE =0->0
-0.29*** 0.30** -0.29*** -0.07*** -0.072*** 0.189* -0.090*** -0.020***
(0.000) (0.046) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.078) (0.000) (0.000)
PPE/A L-H
-0.03*** 0.17*** -0.02** -0.04*** -0.049*** 0.062*** -0.018*** 0.041***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RD/A H-L
0.22*** 0.00*** 0.22*** -0.06*** -0.011*** 0.061*** 0.012*** 0.090***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BE/ME H-L
-0.01*** 0.15*** -0.11*** 0.24*** -0.011*** 0.284*** -0.027*** -0.035***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EF/A H-L
0.14*** 0.00 0.16*** -0.13 -0.005*** 0.045*** 0.007*** -0.040***
(0.000) (0.137) (0.000) (0.126) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GS H-L
0.10*** -0.08 0.22*** -0.22*** -0.003*** -0.074*** 0.006*** -0.090***
(0.000) (0.295) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BE/ME L-M
0.04*** 0.03** 0.02*** -0.08 0.002*** -0.145*** 0.008** 0.020***
(0.000) (0.034) (0.000) (0.184) (0.000) (0.008) (0.033) (0.000)
EF/A H-M
-0.01*** 0.10** 0.02*** -0.05*** -0.017*** 0.032 -0.013*** -0.008***
(0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.424) (0.000) (0.000)
GS H-M
0.09*** 0.02* 0.18*** -0.07*** -0.024*** 0.022 -0.023*** -0.031***
(0.000) (0.079) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.229) (0.000) (0.000)
BE/ME H-M
0.03** 0.17*** -0.11*** 0.15 -0.014 0.139*** -0.017*** -0.012
(0.014) (0.001) (0.000) (0.216) (0.332) (0.000) (0.000) (0.176)
EF/A L-M
-0.13*** 0.10 -0.18*** 0.08*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 0.038***
(0.000) (0.241) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GS L-M
-0.04*** 0.10* -0.07*** 0.15*** -0.023*** 0.106*** -0.034*** 0.053***
(0.000) (0.057) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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Table E.2 Regression Results when Long-Run Sentiment Measured with Different Horizons
This table reports the regressions of long-short portfolio returns on both the long-run and short-run sentiment.
Rt,1−Rt,2 = α+β1ρLR,t +β2(ηt −ηt−1)+ γX+ εt ,
Rt,1−Rt,2 represents the return disparity of more sentiment-prone portfolio over the less sentiment-prone
portfolio. The control variables (X) include the Fama-French Five factors (RMRF, HML, SMB, RMW, CMA),
and the momentum factor (UMD). SMB (HML) will not be included in regression when return premium is
constructed by ME (BE/ME). The first two columns show how the portfolio is constructed. H, M, L represents
the top three, middle four and bottom three decile portfolios respectively. In Panel A (B), the long-run sentiment
component ρLR,t is the standardised smoothing average of prior [−13,−2] ([−37,−2] ) monthly investor
sentiment. All coefficients are adjusted for Stambaugh-bias. The p-values reported in parentheses are obtained
from wild bootstrap procedures in which all stimulation uses Newey West robust t-statistics. See Appendix B
for details of the bootstrap simulation. ∗∗∗p< 0.01,∗∗ p< 0.05,∗p< 0.1.
Panel A. Long-Run Compo-
nent Measured by 12-Month
Moving Average
Panel B. Long-Run Compo-
nent Measured by 36-Month
Moving Average
ρLR,t ηt −ηt−1 ρLR,t ηt −ηt−1
ME L-H
-0.202*** 0.280*** -0.378*** 0.356***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age L-H
-0.026* 0.194*** -0.029*** 0.215***
(0.053) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sigma H-L
-0.202*** 0.149*** -0.150*** 0.176***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
E/BE <0->0
-0.415*** 0.205*** -0.230*** 0.240***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
D/BE =0->0
-0.335*** 0.065*** -0.240*** 0.097***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PPE/A L-H
0.073*** -0.008 -0.048*** 0.047***
(0.000) (0.311) (0.000) (0.000)
RD/A H-L
-0.035*** 0.029*** 0.044*** -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.412)
BE/ME H-L
-0.071*** 0.120*** -0.050*** 0.115***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EF/A H-L
0.007*** -0.001 0.005** -0.005***
(0.000) (0.366) (0.011) (0.000)
GS H-L
-0.030*** -0.144*** -0.059*** -0.146***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BE/ME L-M
-0.024*** -0.055*** -0.000 -0.038***
(0.006) (0.000) (0.496) (0.000)
EF/A H-M
-0.102*** 0.005** -0.095*** 0.018***
(0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000)
GS H-M
-0.119*** 0.019*** -0.084*** 0.024***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BE/ME H-M
-0.095*** 0.065*** -0.051*** 0.078***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EF/A L-M
-0.109*** 0.005*** -0.099*** 0.022***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GS L-M
-0.089*** 0.163*** -0.025*** 0.170***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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Table E.3 Regression Results during High/Low Sentiment Periods
This table reports the regressions of long-short portfolio returns on both the long-run and short-run sentiment.
Rt,1−Rt,2 = α+β1ρLR,t +β2(ηt −ηt−1)+ γX+ εt ,
Rt,1−Rt,2 represents the return disparity of more sentiment-prone portfolio over the less sentiment-prone
portfolio. The control variables (X) include the Fama-French Five factors (RMRF, HML, SMB, RMW,
CMA), and the momentum factor (UMD). SMB (HML) will not be included in regression when return
premium is constructed by ME (BE/ME). The first two columns show how the portfolio is constructed.
H, M, L represents the top three, middle four and bottom three decile portfolios respectively. The long-
run sentiment component ρLR,t is the standardised smoothing average of prior [−25,−2] monthly investor
sentiment. Panel A (B) reports the regression results of a subsample when current sentiment is higher
(lower) than long-run sentiment. The coefficients are adjusted for Stambaugh-bias. The p-values reported
in parentheses are obtained from wild bootstrap procedures. See Appendix B for details of the bootstrap
simulation. ∗∗∗p< 0.01,∗∗ p< 0.05,∗p< 0.1.
Panel A. High Sentiment Pe-
riod
Panel B. Low Sentiment Period
ρLR,t ηt −ηt−1 ρLR,t ηt −ηt−1
ME L-H
-0.090*** 0.380*** 0.429*** 0.825***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age L-H
0.133*** 0.242*** 0.117*** 0.511***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sigma H-L
0.120*** 0.129*** -0.079*** 0.423***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
E/BE <0->0
-0.110*** 0.236*** -0.700*** 0.428***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
D/BE =0->0
-0.248*** -0.028** -0.347*** 0.342***
(0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000)
PPE/A L-H
0.063*** 0.105*** -0.186*** 0.414***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RD/A H-L
0.117*** -0.000*** -0.103*** 0.051***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
BE/ME H-L
-0.043*** 0.010 0.189*** 0.542***
(0.000) (0.339) (0.000) (0.000)
EF/A H-L
0.045*** -0.021*** 0.004*** 0.064***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
GS H-L
-0.050*** -0.119*** -0.204*** -0.294***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BE/ME L-M
0.064*** 0.014*** -0.000*** -0.137***
(0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000)
EF/A H-M
-0.043*** 0.038*** -0.032*** 0.112***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GS H-M
-0.020* 0.040*** -0.113*** 0.062***
(0.066) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BE/ME H-M
0.021*** 0.025*** 0.189*** 0.406***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EF/A L-M
-0.080*** 0.060*** -0.036*** 0.048***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GS L-M
0.027*** 0.159*** 0.091*** 0.356***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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Table E.4 Effects of Decomposed Investor Sentiment after Controlling for Investor Attention
This table reports the regressions of long-short portfolio returns on both the long-run and short-run sentiment.
Rt,1−Rt,2 = α+β1ρLR,t +β2(ηt −ηt−1)+β3(At,1−At,2)+ γX+ εt ,
Rt,1)−Rt,2 (At,1)−At,2) represents the return (investor attention) disparity of more sentiment-prone portfolio
over the less sentiment-prone portfolio. The control variables (X) include the Fama-French Five factors (RMRF,
HML, SMB, RMW, CMA), and the momentum factor (UMD). The first two columns show how the portfolio is
constructed. H, M, L represents the top three, middle four and bottom three decile portfolios respectively. The
long-run sentiment component ρLR,t) is the standardized smoothing average of prior [-25,-2] monthly investor
sentiment.ηt −ηt−1 is the standardized incremental change of sentiment deviation from long-run sentiment
average. Panel A (B) reports the results when At is measured by abnormal trading volume (abnormal return).
The p-values reported in parentheses are obtained from wild bootstrap procedures in which all stimulation uses
Newey-West robust t-statistics. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Panel A Investor Attention
Measured by Abnormal Trad-
ing Volume
Panel B Investor Attention
Measured by Abnormal Return
ρLR,t ηt −ηt−1 At,1−At,2 ρLR,t ηt −ηt−1 At,1−At,2
ME L-H -0.124*** 0.273*** 6.344*** -0.252*** 0.332*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age L-H 0.032*** 0.163*** 3.825*** -0.012** 0.191*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.043) (0.000) (0.000)
Sigma H-L -0.090*** 0.125*** 5.642*** -0.177*** 0.151*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
E/BE <0->0 -0.283*** 0.155*** 3.205*** -0.336*** 0.176*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
D/BE =0->0 -0.192*** 0.060*** 6.841*** -0.302*** 0.055*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PPE/A L-H 0.096*** 0.008 7.133*** 0.077*** 0.015*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.381) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RD/A H-L 0.027*** -0.021*** 4.626*** -0.032*** 0.010** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.130)
BE/ME H-L -0.024*** 0.079*** 5.302*** -0.074*** 0.115*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.124)
EF/A H-L -0.026*** -0.013*** 5.350*** 0.003*** -0.002 -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.128) (0.000)
GS H-L -0.071*** -0.122*** 3.502*** -0.048*** -0.130*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BE/ME L-M 0.013*** -0.057*** 5.769*** -0.003 -0.062*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.385) (0.000) (0.000)
EF/A H-M -0.095*** 0.006** 5.808*** -0.102*** 0.007*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.037) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GS H-M -0.094*** -0.006*** 5.890*** -0.111*** 0.019*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BE/ME H-M -0.007 0.019*** 5.638*** -0.076*** 0.056*** 0.001***
(0.257) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EF/A L-M -0.068*** 0.019*** 5.518*** -0.102*** 0.010*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GS L-M -0.030*** 0.127*** 3.655*** -0.061*** 0.151*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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Table E.5 Regressions of Monthly Value-Weighted Returns on Decomposed Sentiment
This table reports the regressions of long-short portfolio returns on both the long-run and short-run sentiment.
Rt = α+β1ρLR,t +β2∆ρs,t + γX+ εt ,
Rt represents the value-weighted return disparity of more sentiment-prone portfolio over the less sentiment-
prone portfolio. The control variables (X) include the Fama-French Five factors (RMRF, HML, SMB, RMW,
CMA), and the momentum factor (UMD). SMB (HML) will not be included in regression when return premium
is constructed by ME (BE/ME). The first two columns show how the portfolio is constructed. H, M, L
represents the top three, middle four and bottom three decile portfolios respectively. The long-run sentiment
component ρLR,t in Panel A and Panel B is the standardised smoothing average of prior [−25,−2] monthly
investor sentiment. Short-run component in Panel A and Panel B are respectively the standardised incremental
change of sentiment deviation from long-run sentiment average ηt −ηt−1 and the standardised incremental
sentiment orthogonalized to long-run sentiment (ρt −ρt−1)⊥. The long- and short-run sentiment in Panel C
are decomposed with Beveridge and Nelson (1981) method and noted as BN_LR and BN_SR respectively.
All coefficients are adjusted for Stambaugh-bias. The p-values reported in parentheses are obtained from wild
bootstrap procedures in which all stimulation uses Newey West robust t-statistics. See Appendix B for details
of the bootstrap simulation. ∗∗∗p< 0.01,∗∗ p< 0.05,∗p< 0.1.
Panel A Panel B
ρLR,t ηt −ηt−1 ρLR,t (ρt −ρt−1)⊥
ME L-H
-0.235*** 0.386*** -0.307*** 0.363***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age L-H
-0.099*** -0.045*** -0.091*** -0.042***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sigma H-L
-0.081*** 0.077*** -0.096*** 0.072***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
E/BE <0->0
-0.482*** -0.315*** -0.422*** -0.297***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
D/BE =0->0
-0.237*** -0.247*** -0.191*** -0.233***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PPE/A L-H
0.086*** -0.038*** 0.093*** -0.036***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RD/A H-L
0.353*** -0.325*** 0.414*** -0.305***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BE/ME H-L
-0.269*** 0.225*** -0.312*** 0.212***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EF/A H-L
0.147*** -0.056*** 0.157*** -0.052***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GS H-L
0.014*** -0.132*** 0.039*** -0.124***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BE/ME L-M
0.246*** -0.075*** 0.260*** -0.071***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EF/A H-M
-0.045*** 0.024*** -0.049*** 0.023**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.017)
GS H-M
-0.107*** -0.065*** -0.095*** -0.061***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BE/ME H-M
-0.024*** 0.150*** -0.052*** 0.141***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EF/A L-M
-0.191*** 0.080*** -0.206*** 0.075***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GS L-M
-0.121*** 0.067*** -0.134*** 0.063***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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196 Some Robustness Tests
E.2 Robustness Tests for Chapter 4
E.2.1 Validate TA Sentiment by Predicting Future Crash Risk
To test my hypothesis, I create a ’RANK’ variable to measure the extent to which a decile
portfolio is prone to investor sentiment.1 RANK is defined as the following:
RANK =

11−DR for portfolios sorted on ME, Age, E/BE, D/BE, PPE/A
DR for portfolios sorted on Sigma, R/DA
|DR−5.5| for portfolios sorted on BE/ME, EF/A, GS
(E.1)
where DR is the original decile rank. The high value of a stock’s RANK indicates that it is
sentiment-prone. Take the size portfolios as an example, the smallest decile portfolio (the
most sentiment-prone portfolio with DR = 1) has a RANK of 10, while the largest decile
portfolio (the least sentiment-prone portfolio with DR= 10) has a RANK of 1. For BE/ME
sorted portfolios, the two middle deciles (the least sentiment-prone portfolio with DR=5 or
6) have a RANK value of 0.5 while the bottom and top deciles (the most sentiment-prone
portfolio with DR= 1 or 10) have a RANK value of 4.5. Therefore, RANK is not a simple
decile rank, but it rather presents the rank of a decile portfolio’s sentiment-prone level among
the portfolios sorted by the same characteristics.
Following Chen et al. (2001), I use skewness (denoted as Skew) of returns as a proxy for
future crash risk. A lower value of Skew corresponds to higher crash risk. Unfortunately,
theories of synchronisation problem (Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2002; 2003) do not provide
clear guidance on when coordinated attacks take place. I calculate Skew over a 25-day
1I consider the skewness of the decile portfolios instead of the long-short portfolios because the skewness of
long-short portfolios depends on both the relative skewness and co-skewness of the long and short portfolios
(Albuquerque, 2012). Notwithstanding most of the long-short portfolios have higher future crash risk after an
increase in TA sentiment, consistent with my prediction.
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rolling window to strike a balance between two considerations: on one hand, the effect of
TA sentiment may play itself out over a short horizon; on the other hand, the estimation of
Skew over very short horizons invites estimation errors (Chen et al., 2001). As an attempt to
alleviate the concerns of the estimation errors from computing third moments (Skew) with
25 observations, I consider another measure adopted in Chen et al. (2001), the down-to-up
volatility (denoted as DUVOL), which requires estimation of only the second moments.
More specifically, I stratify the returns of the future 25 days into two groups, an ’up’ group
with returns higher than the period mean and a ’down’ group with returns lower than the
period mean. I then compute the standard deviation for each group and take the log of the
ratio of ’down’ group standard deviation to ’up’ group standard deviation as the DUVOL.
Higher DUVOL means higher crash risk. The formula for DUVOL is
DUVOLt = 2log(
SDdown
SDup
). (E.2)
I run regressions of the following specification:
CRt+25t+1 =α+β1TAt+β2RANK+β3TAtRANK+β4CR
t
t−24+β5SD
t
t−24
+β6TURNt+
5
∑
i=1
γiRett−i+ εt ,
(E.3)
where CRt+25t+1 is the measure of the crash risk (Skew or DUVOL) of future decile portfolio
returns from day t+1 to t+25, SDtt−24 is the standard deviation of the decile portfolio returns
from day t−24 to t, TURNt is the average turnover across stocks within a decile portfolio at
time t, detrended by its moving average in the prior one year, and Rett−1, . . . ,Rett−5 are the
daily decile portfolio returns at day t through t−5.
The primary variables of interest in the regression above are TA sentiment and its interaction
with RANK. Note that a low Skew or a high DUVOL value indicates high crash risk.
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Therefore, I expect the negative (positive) coefficients of TA sentiment, RANK, and their
interaction term when the dependent variable is measured by Skew (DUVOL). I include the
interaction term of TA sentiment and RANK in the regression to capture the cross-sectional
predictive power of TA sentiment on future crash risk. Conditional on the increase in TA
sentiment, I expect more sentiment-prone stocks to have higher future crash risk. Thus, I
predict a negative sign on the interaction term, β3. Other variables are control variables that
have been shown to affect return asymmetry in the prior literature. TURNt is added in the
regressions to control for the effect of the difference in opinion (Chen, Hong and Stein, 2001).
SDtt−24 is included to account for the volatility-feedback effect (Campbell and Hentschel,
1992). The lagged returns are included to control for the stochastic bubble explanation
by Blanchard and Watson (1982). Although past returns can also partially reflect investor
sentiment, adding the past returns into the regression will demonstrate that the incremental
predictive power of TA sentiment for crash risk beyond the past returns.
An inspection of Table E.6 reveals that high TA sentiment predicts high future crash risk.
Panel A shows that the coefficients of TA sentiment are negative and highly significant in all
of the regressions, indicating that portfolio returns become more negatively skewed over the
month following a TA sentiment increase.
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Table E.6 Forecasting Cross-Sectional Crash Risk
This table reports the results of the following regression:
CRt+25t+1 =α+β1TAt +β2RANK+β3TAtRANK+β4CR
t
t−24+β5SD
t
t−24
+β6TURNt +
5
∑
i=1
γiRett−i+ εt ,
(E.4)
where CRt+25t+1 is a measure of crash risk of the decile portfolio returns over the period from t+ 1 to t+ 25,
SDtt−24 is the standard deviation of the decile portfolio returns over the period from t−24 to t, TURNt is the
averaged decile portfolio turnover at time t, detrended by a moving average of portfolio turnover in the prior
one year. Rett ,Rett−1, . . . ,Rett−5 are the decile portfolio returns for days t, t−1, . . . , t−5, respectively. RANK
is a measure of the decile portfolio’s exposure to sentiment. Panel A presents regression results with Skewness
as the crash risk measure, respectively, while Panel B reports regression results with DUVOL as the crash risk
measure. The Newey and West (1987) robust t-statistics are in brackets. The sample period is from 1964/01/01
to 2008/12/31. The asterisks ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicates the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
Panel A Skewness Panel B DUVOL
β1 β2 β3 β1 β2 β3
ME
-0.30*** -0.023*** -0.0084** 0.45*** 0.037*** 0.012**
(-13.08) (-14.24) (-2.26) (14.20) (16.08) (2.33)
Age -0.30*** -0.018*** -0.0090** 0.44*** 0.028*** 0.014***(-13.00) (-10.98) (-2.39) (13.63) (12.29) (2.58)
Sigma
-0.27*** -0.011*** -0.014*** 0.43*** 0.019*** 0.015***
(-11.64) (-6.19) (-3.55) (13.09) (7.67) (2.74)
E/BE
-0.39*** -0.0034** 0.0029 0.59*** 0.0057** -0.0050
(-16.44) (-2.07) (0.78) (17.34) (2.46) (-0.94)
D/BE -0.29*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 0.44*** 0.020*** 0.015***(-12.08) (-6.60) (-3.14) (13.33) (8.17) (2.64)
PPE/A
-0.21*** -0.0065*** -0.023*** 0.29*** 0.0096*** 0.037***
(-8.74) (-3.95) (-6.09) (8.58) (4.18) (7.13)
RD/A
-0.30*** 0.00084 -0.0017 0.47*** -0.00025 -0.0012
(-11.71) (0.45) (-0.40) (13.00) (-0.10) (-0.21)
BE/ME
-0.45*** 0.0034** 0.019*** 0.66*** -0.0069*** -0.026***
(-18.07) (1.97) (4.89) (18.57) (-2.88) (-4.87)
EF/A
-0.36*** -0.013*** 0.0012 0.55*** 0.023*** -0.0093
(-16.16) (-3.87) (0.15) (17.61) (4.91) (-0.87)
GS -0.33*** -0.0099*** -0.010 0.48*** 0.017*** 0.012(-14.76) (-2.93) (-1.36) (15.38) (3.59) (1.12)
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Panel B depicts a similar picture for the role of TA sentiment. The coefficients of TA
sentiment are positive and highly significant in all of the regressions, suggesting higher
future crash risk following high TA sentiment. The coefficients of the interaction term also
reveal a stronger cross-sectional predictive power of TA sentiment on future crash risk for
sentiment-prone stocks than for sentiment-immune stocks. For 5 out of 10 regressions, the
coefficients of interaction terms are negative in Panel A and positive in Panel B, and are
statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that conditional on a high level of TA
sentiment, the future crash risk is higher for portfolios that are more sentiment-prone.
Several studies show that low BE/ME stocks tend to have more negatively skewed return
(e.g., Chen et al., 2001; Engle and Mistry, 2014; Harvey and Siddique, 2000). Therefore, I
run another test replacing RANK with original decile rank DR. When crash risk measured
by Skew, the regression results (unreported) show significant negative coefficients for the
interaction term, and there is no change for the coefficients of TA sentiment regarding their
sign and significance. This finding suggests that there is a monotonic instead of a U-shaped
pattern in the crash risk of BE/ME decile portfolios in the cross-section following high TA
sentiment periods.
Overall, high cross-sectional crash risk following a TA sentiment increase is consistent with
my hypothesis. TA indicator performs well in forecasting the future crash risk as a sentiment
proxy.
E.2.2 Robustness Tests on Predictive Regression
This section reports the predictive regression table after controlling for more variables. First,
I report the results for adding more lagged TA terms into the regression.
Second, I test the fundamental explanation by adding the macroeconomic variables into
the predictive regression. Table E.8 report the results of the predictive regression after
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controlling for the following daily macroeconomic variables: default spread (DS), TED
spread, macroeconomic activities index ADS, and economic uncertainty EPU.
Third, I control for the effect of liquidity. I calculate the bid-ask spread premium for each
long-short portfolio and use it as an additional control variable in the regression of its
corresponding long-short return premium on lagged TA sentiment. For example, in ME(L-H)
regression, the BAS control variable is constructed as the average bid-ask spread of bottom
three deciles minus that of top three deciles. Table E.9 report the regression results after
controlling for liquidity factor, FF five factors and Momentum factor.
Fourth, to see whether TA sentiment indicator performs better or provide additional contribu-
tion to the existing daily sentiment indicators, I add lagged VIX terms into the regression.
Table E.10 report the regression coefficients of both lagged TA sentiment and lagged VIX
sentiment after controlling for FF five factors. I find that VIX also predicts return in a similar
way as TA sentiment, but the predictive power of TA sentiment index could not be subsumed
by VIX. TA sentiment index provides more information than VIX in predicting the next day
return.
Last, in Table E.11, I use the rolling estimates of residuals of TAt−2 regressed on TAt−1
to replace TAt−2 to mitigate the multicollinearity issue. I use the rolling estimates is to
overcome the look-ahead bias. I find the results strongly consistent with our previous results
with positive and significant coefficients for TAt−1 and significantly negative coefficients for
orthogonalized TAt−2. The intuition here is that orthogonalized TAt−2 could be seen as the
negative value of sentiment changes from TAt−2 to TAt−1 . The negative coefficients means
that incremental sentiment increase will positively contribute to the return premiums, even
conditional on the high TAt−1 .
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Table E.7 Predictive Regressions of Portfolio Returns on More TA lags
This table reports the coefficients for lagged TA terms in the two regressions below.
Rt = α+∑3i=1βiTAt−i+ γCVt + εt .
Rt = α+β1TAt−1+β2SMTAt−2t−26+ γCVt + εt .
Rt is the daily return of the long-short portfolios constructed from the sentiment-prone variables. H, M, and L
are respectively the top three, middle four, and bottom three deciles.SMTAt−2t−26 is the smoothing average of
lagged TA terms from t−2 to t−26. CVt is a vector of control variables, which includes the Fama and French
five factors and the momentum factor (UMD). A factor is excluded from the list of control variables when it
is the dependent variable in the regressions. The Newey and West (1987) robust t-statistics are in brackets.
The sample period is from 1964/01/01 to 2008/12/31. The asterisks ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicates the statistical
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A Regress on three lagged
terms
Panel B Regress on TA
and Smoothing Average
β1 β2 β3 β1 β2
ME L-H
2.36*** -1.45*** -0.78*** 0.44*** -0.36***
(11.79) (-4.27) (-3.90) (13.51) (-10.29)
Age L-H
0.74*** -0.49** -0.18* 0.16*** -0.10***
(5.89) (-2.46) (-1.66) (9.05) (-5.54)
Sigma H-L
0.47*** -0.37 -0.062 0.091*** -0.066***
(3.16) (-1.64) (-0.53) (4.46) (-3.11)
E/BE <0->0
0.29 0.13 -0.32** 0.17*** -0.075**
(1.45) (0.45) (-2.10) (5.86) (-2.43)
D/BE =0->0
0.39** -0.13 -0.18 0.13*** -0.066***
(2.24) (-0.53) (-1.54) (5.79) (-2.74)
PPE/A L-H
0.62*** -0.66*** 0.048 0.071*** -0.074***
(4.94) (-3.30) (0.43) (3.55) (-3.67)
RD/A H-L
0.19* -0.18 -0.011 0.013 -0.020
(1.84) (-1.07) (-0.12) (0.89) (-1.28)
BE/ME H-L
0.35*** -0.19 -0.11 0.10*** -0.061***
(2.94) (-0.95) (-1.00) (5.82) (-3.15)
EF/A H-L
0.073 -0.14 0.047 -0.026*** 0.0091
(0.92) (-1.01) (0.65) (-2.66) (0.85)
GS H-L
0.16** -0.37*** 0.18** -0.032*** 0.00091
(2.09) (-2.80) (2.47) (-2.96) (0.08)
BE/ME L-M
0.19* -0.29* 0.087 0.00017 -0.0074
(1.90) (-1.73) (0.99) (0.01) (-0.50)
EF/A H-M
0.23*** -0.11 -0.097 0.047*** -0.033***
(2.79) (-0.81) (-1.34) (5.08) (-3.19)
GS H-M
0.17* -0.19 0.032 0.021** -0.011
(1.90) (-1.26) (0.41) (2.13) (-1.04)
BE/ME H-M
0.55*** -0.48*** -0.026 0.10*** -0.068***
(5.90) (-3.02) (-0.30) (7.67) (-4.84)
EF/A L-M
0.15** 0.028 -0.14** 0.074*** -0.042***
(2.09) (0.21) (-2.01) (7.56) (-4.01)
GS L-M
0.0077 0.18 -0.14* 0.053*** -0.012
(0.09) (1.29) (-1.90) (4.66) (-1.01)
202
Table E.8 Predictive Regressions of Portfolio Returns on TA Sentiment Controlled for
Macroeconomic Variables
This table reports the coefficients for lagged TA sentiment after controlling for macroeconomic effect.
Rt = α+∑βiTAt−i+ γCVt + εt .
Rt is the daily return of the long-short portfolios constructed from the sentiment-prone variables. H, M, and
L are respectively the top three, middle four, and bottom three deciles. CVt is a vector of control variables,
which includes the Fama and French five factors, the momentum factor (UMD) and macroeconomic variables
including default spread (DS), TED spread, macroeconomics activities (ADS), and economic policy uncertainty
(EPU). A control factor will be excluded from the list of control variables when it is the dependent variable in
the regressions. This table reports the results of the regressions with the two lagged TA terms, FF five factors,
Momentum factor, and four macroeconomics factors. The number of observations is 5,769. The Newey and
West (1987) robust t-statistics are in brackets. The asterisks ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicates the statistical significance
at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
β1 β2 γds γted γads γepu
ME L-H
2.18*** -2.06*** 0.044 -0.11*** -0.043** 0.000062
(8.41) (-7.89) (1.08) (-2.84) (-2.30) (0.43)
Age L-H
1.12*** -1.05*** -0.038 -0.039** -0.011 0.00028***
(7.43) (-6.82) (-1.58) (-2.53) (-1.04) (3.51)
Sigma H-L
1.54*** -1.47*** -0.0084 -0.018 -0.011 0.00016**
(9.10) (-8.73) (-0.29) (-1.02) (-0.96) (2.05)
E/BE <0->0
1.68*** -1.55*** -0.014 -0.033 0.0089 0.00032***
(7.00) (-6.43) (-0.34) (-1.37) (0.55) (3.00)
D/BE =0->0
1.63*** -1.51*** -0.014 -0.043** -0.00100 0.00021**
(7.64) (-7.06) (-0.41) (-2.08) (-0.07) (2.25)
PPE/A L-H
0.44*** -0.44*** -0.052** 0.019 -0.036*** 0.00022**
(3.32) (-3.34) (-2.10) (0.67) (-2.81) (2.49)
RD/A H-L
0.47*** -0.47*** -0.0061 0.0014 -0.0023 -0.000050
(4.54) (-4.57) (-0.36) (0.11) (-0.30) (-0.84)
BE/ME H-L
0.37*** -0.32** 0.0020 -0.047*** -0.0058 -0.000029
(2.71) (-2.34) (0.07) (-2.83) (-0.54) (-0.33)
EF/A H-L
0.32*** -0.32*** -0.0095 0.020** -0.0081 0.000029
(3.64) (-3.77) (-0.79) (2.33) (-1.57) (0.64)
GS H-L
0.16* -0.18** -0.026* 0.029*** -0.0067 0.000019
(1.79) (-2.05) (-1.88) (3.03) (-1.25) (0.37)
BE/ME L-M
0.46*** -0.46*** -0.0028 0.0035 -0.0033 0.00012*
(4.12) (-4.13) (-0.14) (0.32) (-0.43) (1.96)
EF/A H-M
0.67*** -0.63*** -0.0095 -0.015** -0.0066 0.00013***
(7.28) (-6.88) (-0.73) (-1.98) (-1.18) (3.03)
GS H-M
0.57*** -0.54*** -0.014 -0.0046 -0.0062 0.000095**
(6.33) (-5.96) (-1.05) (-0.59) (-0.98) (2.10)
BE/ME H-M
0.83*** -0.78*** -0.00082 -0.044*** -0.0090 0.000088
(8.53) (-8.04) (-0.05) (-4.15) (-1.26) (1.38)
EF/A L-M
0.35*** -0.31*** 0.000034 -0.034*** 0.0016 0.000098**
(4.18) (-3.68) (0.00) (-4.30) (0.30) (2.15)
GS L-M
0.41*** -0.36*** 0.013 -0.034*** 0.00056 0.000076
(4.08) (-3.52) (0.74) (-2.98) (0.08) (1.53)
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Table E.9 Predictive Regressions of Portfolio Returns Controlled for Liquidity
This table reports the coefficients for lagged TA sentiment after controlling for the liquidity factor.
Rt = α+∑βiTAt−i+ γCVt +λBAS+ εt .
Rt is the daily return of the long-short portfolios constructed from the sentiment-prone variables. H, M, and L
are respectively the top three, middle four, and bottom three deciles. CVt is a vector of control variables, which
includes the Fama and French five factors, the momentum factor (UMD) and BAS. A factor is excluded from
the list of control variables when it is the dependent variable in the regressions. Panel A reports the results of
the regressions with the previous period TA as the only independent variables, i.e., i= 1. Panel B reports results
of regressions with two TA lags as the independent variables, i.e., i= 2. The Newey and West (1987) robust
t-statistics are in brackets. The sample period is from 1964/01/01 to 2008/12/31. The asterisks ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗
indicates the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A Panel B
No CV With CV No CV With CV
β1 β1 β1 β2 β1 β2
ME L-H
0.14*** 0.11*** 2.51*** -2.38*** 2.36*** -2.25***
(5.37) (4.28) (10.13) (-9.54) (9.90) (-9.51)
Age L-H
0.13*** 0.070*** 2.72*** -2.60*** 1.08*** -1.01***
(4.50) (4.04) (10.75) (-10.15) (7.28) (-6.71)
Sigma H-L
0.12*** 0.051*** 3.15*** -3.05*** 1.32*** -1.27***
(3.23) (2.94) (12.05) (-11.55) (8.42) (-8.11)
E/BE <0->0
0.16*** 0.14*** 2.11*** -1.97*** 1.33*** -1.19***
(5.19) (5.12) (8.61) (-7.86) (5.88) (-5.27)
D/BE =0->0
0.14*** 0.11*** 2.51*** -2.39*** 1.32*** -1.21***
(4.64) (5.17) (10.60) (-9.90) (6.73) (-6.13)
PPE/A L-H
0.0084 -0.0090 1.14*** -1.14*** 0.45*** -0.46***
(0.40) (-0.55) (7.11) (-7.05) (3.61) (-3.74)
RD/A H-L
0.014 0.00053 1.06*** -1.05*** 0.46*** -0.46***
(0.76) (0.05) (6.76) (-6.66) (4.71) (-4.77)
BE/ME H-L
0.038 0.059*** -0.67*** 0.71*** 0.26** -0.20
(1.50) (3.65) (-3.45) (3.62) (1.99) (-1.57)
EF/A H-L
-0.0098 -0.017** 0.76*** -0.78*** 0.26*** -0.28***
(-0.74) (-2.34) (6.77) (-6.81) (3.25) (-3.48)
GS H-L
-0.032** -0.031*** 0.55*** -0.59*** 0.11 -0.14*
(-2.49) (-3.69) (4.57) (-4.81) (1.39) (-1.79)
BE/ME L-M
0.012 -0.0086 1.06*** -1.06*** 0.43*** -0.44***
(0.58) (-0.70) (7.38) (-7.23) (4.13) (-4.27)
EF/A H-M
0.044*** 0.027*** 1.18*** -1.14*** 0.58*** -0.56***
(3.08) (3.42) (10.37) (-9.83) (6.97) (-6.61)
GS H-M
0.043** 0.022** 1.25*** -1.21*** 0.47*** -0.45***
(2.53) (2.56) (9.64) (-9.18) (5.66) (-5.38)
BE/ME H-M
0.052*** 0.054*** 0.39*** -0.34*** 0.69*** -0.64***
(4.73) (5.25) (3.30) (-2.88) (7.44) (-6.97)
EF/A L-M
0.052*** 0.042*** 0.41*** -0.36*** 0.32*** -0.28***
(6.97) (5.88) (4.98) (-4.31) (4.13) (-3.58)
GS L-M
0.076*** 0.053*** 0.70*** -0.62*** 0.35*** -0.30***
(6.26) (5.36) (6.32) (-5.57) (3.89) (-3.29)
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Table E.10 Predictive Regressions of Portfolio Returns Controlled for VIX
This table reports the coefficients for lagged TA sentiment and lagged VIX terms in the regressions.
Rt = α+∑βiTAt−i+∑βiVIXt−i+ γCVt + εt .
Rt is the daily return of the long-short portfolios constructed from the sentiment-prone variables. H, M, and L
are respectively the top three, middle four, and bottom three deciles. CVt is a vector of control variables, which
includes the Fama and French five factors and the momentum factor (UMD). A factor is excluded from the list
of control variables when it is the dependent variable in the regressions. i= 2. The Newey and West (1987)
robust t-statistics are in brackets. The sample period is from 1964/01/01 to 2008/12/31. The asterisks ∗∗∗, ∗∗
and ∗ indicates the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
TA1 TA2 VIX1 VIX2
ME L-H
2.18*** -2.10*** 0.83 -0.95
(6.99) (-6.72) (0.74) (-0.84)
Age L-H
1.29*** -1.19*** -0.67 0.82
(7.36) (-6.73) (-1.15) (1.45)
Sigma H-L
1.75*** -1.64*** -1.68*** 1.94***
(9.32) (-8.78) (-3.51) (4.18)
E/BE <0->0
1.88*** -1.68*** -2.97*** 3.25***
(6.95) (-6.25) (-3.32) (3.86)
D/BE =0->0
1.78*** -1.62*** -2.83*** 2.95***
(7.75) (-7.04) (-3.68) (3.87)
PPE/A L-H
0.34* -0.36* -0.26 0.32
(1.74) (-1.84) (-0.33) (0.39)
RD/A H-L
0.49*** -0.48*** -0.52 0.57
(4.09) (-3.99) (-1.37) (1.50)
BE/ME H-L
-0.11 0.14 -2.31*** 2.01**
(-0.54) (0.74) (-2.74) (2.55)
EF/A H-L
0.32*** -0.32*** -0.18 0.32
(3.26) (-3.32) (-0.60) (1.00)
GS H-L
0.16 -0.18 0.40 -0.37
(1.37) (-1.60) (0.98) (-0.86)
BE/ME L-M
0.69*** -0.68*** 0.48 -0.27
(4.87) (-4.82) (0.89) (-0.52)
EF/A H-M
0.75*** -0.71*** -0.42 0.51*
(7.34) (-6.96) (-1.52) (1.91)
GS H-M
0.64*** -0.60*** -0.55** 0.65**
(6.09) (-5.70) (-2.03) (2.37)
BE/ME H-M
0.59*** -0.54*** -1.83*** 1.74***
(4.58) (-4.32) (-4.03) (4.10)
EF/A L-M
0.43*** -0.39*** -0.24 0.19
(4.29) (-3.86) (-0.86) (0.63)
GS L-M
0.49*** -0.42*** -0.95** 1.02***
(4.11) (-3.53) (-2.52) (2.66)
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Table E.11 Predictive Regressions of Portfolio Returns on Orthogonalized TA lagged Terms
This table reports the coefficients for orthogonalized lagged TA sentiment terms in the regressions.
Rt = α+β1TAt−1+β2TA⊥t−2+ γCVt + εt .
Rt is the daily return of the long-short portfolios constructed from the sentiment-prone variables. H, M, and L
are respectively the top three, middle four, and bottom three deciles. CVt is a vector of control variables, which
includes the Fama and French five factors and the momentum factor (UMD). A factor is excluded from the
list of control variables when it is the dependent variable in the regressions. TA⊥t−2 is orthogonalized to TAt−1.
Panel A (B) report the results without (with) control variables. The Newey and West (1987) robust t-statistics
are in brackets. The sample period is from 1964/01/01 to 2008/12/31. The asterisks ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicates the
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A No CV Panel B With CV
TA1 TA⊥t−2 TA1 TA
⊥
t−2
ME L-H
0.16*** -2.34*** 0.15*** -2.69***
(8.79) (-12.95) (8.64) (-14.82)
Age L-H
0.14*** -2.30*** 0.078*** -0.78***
(8.55) (-14.15) (7.17) (-7.15)
Sigma H-L
0.12*** -2.91*** 0.039*** -0.48***
(5.35) (-15.01) (3.30) (-3.76)
E/BE <0->0
0.15*** -1.36*** 0.11*** -0.38**
(7.82) (-7.50) (6.26) (-2.17)
D/BE =0->0
0.13*** -1.87*** 0.082*** -0.43***
(7.16) (-11.17) (5.80) (-2.81)
PPE/A L-H
0.040*** -1.45*** 0.012 -0.58***
(2.86) (-11.76) (1.03) (-5.09)
RD/A H-L
0.0094 -0.84*** -0.0025 -0.20**
(0.76) (-7.03) (-0.29) (-2.38)
BE/ME H-L
0.032** 0.68*** 0.055*** -0.37***
(1.97) (4.70) (4.88) (-3.45)
EF/A H-L
-0.0065 -0.62*** -0.019*** -0.064
(-0.77) (-7.68) (-3.81) (-1.04)
GS H-L
-0.022** -0.62*** -0.031*** -0.082
(-2.54) (-7.13) (-5.41) (-1.33)
BE/ME L-M
0.012 -0.84*** -0.0054 -0.15*
(0.98) (-8.05) (-0.65) (-1.74)
EF/A H-M
0.043*** -0.96*** 0.022*** -0.27***
(4.78) (-11.81) (4.01) (-4.11)
GS H-M
0.039*** -1.03*** 0.013** -0.14**
(3.79) (-11.30) (2.20) (-2.05)
BE/ME H-M
0.043*** -0.16* 0.050*** -0.51***
(5.66) (-1.91) (6.99) (-6.67)
EF/A L-M
0.049*** -0.34*** 0.040*** -0.20***
(9.17) (-5.49) (8.06) (-3.49)
GS L-M
0.061*** -0.41*** 0.044*** -0.056
(7.98) (-5.25) (6.78) (-0.83)
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E.2 Robustness Tests for Chapter 4 207
E.2.3 Construct TA Sentiment (Returns) with Different Methods
TA sentiment index is constructed with the forecasts of technical trading rules applied on
the overall market index. I replicate the two key tables in Chapter 4 to demonstrate that
TA sentiment still has strong predictability and profitability when TA sentiment is based on
DJIA. Table E.12 report the predictive regression results when using the TA sentiment index
constructed from DJIA index instead of S&P 500 index. Table E.13 reports the profitability
of TADJ (DJIA-Based TA Sentiment Index).
I also use the performance-weighted average of the technical trading rule forecasts to measure
TA sentiment. The test results on predictability and profitability are reported in Table E.14
and Table E.15 separately.
To mitigate the size effect, I also construct the long-short portfolio returns using value-
weighted average return. Table E.16 and Table E.17 respectively reports the predictability
and profitability of TA sentiment on the value-weighted cross-sectional return.
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Table E.12 Predictive Regressions of Portfolio Returns on DJIA-Based TA Sentiment
This table reports the coefficients for lagged DJIA-Based TA sentiment of regressions of long-short portfolio
returns on lagged DJIA-Based TA sentiment and a set of control variables.
Rt = α+∑βiTADJt−i+ γCVt + εt .
Rt is the daily return of the long-short portfolios constructed from the sentiment-prone variables. H, M, and L
are respectively the top three, middle four, and bottom three deciles. CVt is a vector of control variables, which
includes the Fama and French five factors and the momentum factor (UMD). A factor is excluded from the list
of control variables when it is the dependent variable in the regressions. TADJ is the DJIA-Based TA sentiment.
Panel A reports the results of the regressions with the previous period TADJ as the only independent variables,
i.e., i= 1. Panel B reports results of regressions with two TA lags as the independent variables, i.e., i= 2. The
Newey and West (1987) robust t-statistics are in brackets. The sample period is from 1964/01/01 to 2008/12/31.
The asterisks ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicates the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A Panel B
No Control
Variables
With Control
Variables
No Control Vari-
ables
With Control Vari-
ables
β1 β1 β1 β2 β1 β2
ME L-H
0.13*** 0.12*** 2.07*** -1.95*** 2.32*** -2.20***
(8.99) (8.25) (12.75) (-12.00) (13.71) (-13.13)
Age L-H
0.11*** 0.062*** 1.84*** -1.74*** 0.57*** -0.51***
(8.31) (7.69) (12.89) (-12.25) (5.94) (-5.33)
Sigma H-L
0.079*** 0.028*** 2.26*** -2.19*** 0.30*** -0.27**
(4.25) (3.07) (12.92) (-12.60) (2.76) (-2.53)
E/BE <0->0
0.11*** 0.085*** 1.10*** -0.99*** 0.26 -0.17
(8.06) (6.73) (6.90) (-6.21) (1.60) (-1.09)
D/BE =0->0
0.093*** 0.062*** 1.40*** -1.32*** 0.25* -0.19
(6.54) (5.86) (9.70) (-9.12) (1.83) (-1.40)
PPE/A L-H
0.024** 0.0060 1.16*** -1.14*** 0.49*** -0.48***
(2.08) (0.64) (10.43) (-10.28) (4.78) (-4.76)
RD/A H-L
0.0031 0.00035 0.65*** -0.65*** 0.19** -0.19**
(0.30) (0.05) (6.10) (-6.12) (2.52) (-2.55)
BE/ME H-L
0.043*** 0.050*** -0.40*** 0.45*** 0.36*** -0.31***
(3.54) (5.62) (-3.20) (3.53) (3.97) (-3.44)
EF/A H-L
-0.013* -0.016*** 0.39*** -0.40*** -0.0047 -0.012
(-1.92) (-3.98) (5.31) (-5.47) (-0.09) (-0.23)
GS H-L
-0.028*** -0.029*** 0.43*** -0.46*** 0.058 -0.088*
(-3.89) (-6.11) (5.59) (-5.95) (1.11) (-1.68)
BE/ME L-M
-0.0035 -0.0095 0.55*** -0.56*** 0.054 -0.063
(-0.40) (-1.53) (6.09) (-6.13) (0.73) (-0.86)
EF/A H-M
0.028*** 0.017*** 0.72*** -0.70*** 0.19*** -0.17***
(3.99) (3.87) (9.88) (-9.49) (3.38) (-3.11)
GS H-M
0.021** 0.0063 0.80*** -0.78*** 0.11* -0.10*
(2.54) (1.41) (9.63) (-9.44) (1.92) (-1.83)
BE/ME H-M
0.039*** 0.041*** 0.15** -0.11 0.41*** -0.37***
(6.21) (6.79) (2.00) (-1.48) (6.17) (-5.63)
EF/A L-M
0.041*** 0.033*** 0.33*** -0.29*** 0.19*** -0.16***
(9.09) (7.85) (6.38) (-5.59) (3.93) (-3.28)
GS L-M
0.049*** 0.036*** 0.37*** -0.32*** 0.051 -0.016
(7.79) (6.80) (5.64) (-4.93) (0.89) (-0.28)
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Table E.13 Profitability of DJIA-Based TA Trading Strategies
This table reports the summary statistics of the original long-short portfolio returns, the DJIA-Based TA timing returns, and the TAP returns. The
original portfolios are constructed by longing the most sentiment-prone deciles and shorting the least sentiment-prone deciles. TA timing rule
represents holding the original portfolio when current TA sentiment is no less than the average TA sentiment over prior five trading days and
shorting the original portfolio otherwise. TAP is the abnormal returns on the sentiment timing strategy over original portfolio returns. AvgRet is
the average return. SRatio is the Sharpe ratio. SD is the standard deviation. Skew is the return skewness. Success in Panel C is the percentage of
non-negative TAP returns. All the returns are annualised and in percentages. The sample period is between 01/1964 and 12/2008. The asterisks
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicates the t-test significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A Original Portfolio Panel B TA Timing Strategy Panel C TAP
Avg Ret SD Skew SRatio Avg Ret SD Skew SRatio Avg Ret SD Skew Success
ME 1-10 18.73*** 13.34 -0.85 1.4 35.31*** 13.2 0.91 2.67 16.58*** 19.53 2.34 0.77
Age 1-10 7.21*** 9.9 -0.26 0.73 22.47*** 9.81 0.48 2.29 15.25*** 14.48 1.09 0.78
Sigma 10-1 12.80*** 13.17 -0.19 0.97 24.85*** 13.1 0.17 1.9 12.05*** 20.09 0.48 0.76
E/BE 1-10 9.71*** 7.06 -0.04 1.37 10.14*** 7.06 0.37 1.44 0.43 10.02 0.57 0.76
D/BE 1-10 9.05*** 8.4 -0.26 1.08 17.29*** 8.35 0.21 2.07 8.23*** 12.31 0.7 0.77
PPE/A 1-10 -2.39** 8.13 0.03 -0.29 7.11*** 8.12 0.23 0.88 9.51*** 11.52 0.44 0.78
RD/A 10-1 5.34*** 11.01 0.03 0.49 5.97*** 11 -0.21 0.54 0.62 16.17 -0.29 0.8
BE/ME 10-1 17.13*** 10.15 -0.33 1.69 4.65*** 10.21 0.25 0.46 -12.48*** 15.05 0.59 0.75
EF/A 10-1 -12.66*** 7.36 0.17 -1.72 1.8 7.4 0.09 0.24 14.46*** 10.76 0.13 0.79
GS 10-1 -10.90*** 6.87 0.17 -1.59 -2.21** 6.9 0.01 -0.32 8.69*** 9.98 -0.06 0.78
BE/ME 1-5 -2.41** 7.83 0.35 -0.31 2.17* 7.83 -0.18 0.28 4.58*** 11.63 -0.59 0.77
EF/A 10-5 -4.34*** 7.34 0.12 -0.59 10.56*** 7.31 0.13 1.44 14.90*** 10.89 0.21 0.78
GS 10-5 -3.81*** 7.76 0.07 -0.49 7.73*** 7.75 0.12 1 11.54*** 11.62 0.21 0.77
BE/ME 10-5 14.72*** 6.48 0.15 2.27 6.82*** 6.53 0.34 1.04 -7.91*** 8.99 0.11 0.74
EF/A 1-5 8.32*** 5.32 0.09 1.56 8.76*** 5.32 0.14 1.65 0.44 7.47 0.09 0.76
GS 1-5 7.09*** 6.53 0.09 1.08 9.94*** 6.52 0.16 1.52 2.85** 9.28 0.16 0.77
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Table E.14 Predictive Regressions of Portfolio Returns on Performance-Weighted TA Senti-
ment
This table reports the coefficients for lagged Performance-Weighted TA sentiment of regressions of long-short
portfolio returns on lagged Performance-Weighted TA sentiment and a set of control variables.
Rt,1−Rt,2 = α+∑βiTAPWt−i+ γCVt + εt .
Rt is the daily return of the long-short portfolios constructed from the sentiment-prone variables. H, M, and L
are respectively the top three, middle four, and bottom three deciles. CVt is a vector of control variables, which
includes the Fama and French five factors and the momentum factor (UMD). A factor is excluded from the list
of control variables when it is the dependent variable in the regressions. TAPW is the Performance-Weighted
TA sentiment. Panel A (B) reports the results of the regressions with one (two) lagged TA terms, i.e. i = 1
(i= 2). The Newey and West (1987) robust t-statistics are in brackets. The sample period is from 1964/01/01
to 2008/12/31. The asterisks ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicates the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
Panel A Panel B
No CV With CV No CV With CV
β1 β1 β1 β2 β1 β2
ME L-H
0.062*** 0.067*** 0.12*** -0.065** 0.19*** -0.13***
(6.65) (7.17) (3.92) (-2.19) (6.23) (-4.46)
Age L-H
0.061*** 0.030*** 0.17*** -0.11*** 0.046*** -0.017
(7.02) (5.49) (6.72) (-4.48) (3.52) (-1.32)
Sigma H-L
0.060*** 0.0092* 0.26*** -0.21*** 0.0055 0.0039
(5.49) (1.66) (8.78) (-7.10) (0.36) (0.27)
E/BE <0->0
0.046*** 0.026*** 0.069*** -0.024 -0.016 0.044**
(4.88) (3.02) (3.05) (-1.02) (-0.84) (2.33)
D/BE =0->0
0.051*** 0.023*** 0.14*** -0.092*** -0.0030 0.027*
(5.57) (3.24) (6.05) (-3.92) (-0.19) (1.78)
PPE/A L-H
0.021*** 0.0043 0.14*** -0.12*** 0.050*** -0.048***
(3.26) (0.86) (7.49) (-6.44) (3.92) (-3.76)
RD/A H-L
0.0062 -0.0052 0.084*** -0.082*** 0.0054 -0.011
(1.08) (-1.41) (5.12) (-4.86) (0.53) (-1.15)
BE/ME H-L
-0.0052 0.015*** -0.12*** 0.12*** 0.016 -0.0013
(-0.70) (3.02) (-6.03) (5.81) (1.47) (-0.12)
EF/A H-L
0.0028 -0.0073*** 0.069*** -0.070*** -0.0032 -0.0043
(0.73) (-3.20) (5.65) (-5.45) (-0.40) (-0.55)
GS H-L
0.0036 -0.0058** 0.095*** -0.096*** 0.022*** -0.029***
(0.91) (-2.23) (8.32) (-8.20) (2.91) (-3.88)
BE/ME L-M
0.014** 0.00073 0.10*** -0.094*** 0.013 -0.012
(2.42) (0.19) (6.63) (-5.59) (1.26) (-1.22)
EF/A H-M
0.020*** 0.0069*** 0.083*** -0.066*** 0.0080 -0.0011
(4.71) (2.74) (6.90) (-5.28) (0.99) (-0.14)
GS H-M
0.022*** 0.0044 0.12*** -0.099*** 0.018* -0.014
(4.43) (1.64) (8.38) (-6.99) (1.88) (-1.53)
BE/ME H-M
0.0090*** 0.015*** -0.019* 0.029*** 0.029*** -0.014
(2.70) (4.84) (-1.73) (2.69) (3.25) (-1.58)
EF/A L-M
0.017*** 0.014*** 0.014* 0.0034 0.011 0.0031
(6.25) (5.62) (1.75) (0.43) (1.50) (0.43)
GS L-M
0.018*** 0.010*** 0.021** -0.0031 -0.0047 0.016*
(4.92) (3.35) (2.00) (-0.29) (-0.55) (1.87)
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Table E.15 Profitability of Performance-Weighted TA Trading Strategies
This table reports the summary statistics of the original long-short portfolio returns, the Performance-Weighted TA timing returns, and the TAP
returns. The original portfolios are constructed by longing the most sentiment-prone deciles and shorting the least sentiment-prone deciles. TA
timing rule represents holding the original portfolio when current Performance-Weighted TA sentiment is no less than the average TA sentiment
over prior five trading days and shorting the original portfolio otherwise. TAP is the abnormal returns on the sentiment timing strategy over original
portfolio returns. AvgRet is the average return. SRatio is the Sharpe ratio. SD is the standard deviation. Skew is the return skewness. Success in
Panel C is the percentage of non-negative TAP returns. All the returns are annualised and in percentages. The sample period is between 01/1964
and 12/2008. The asterisks ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicates the t-test significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A Original Portfolio Panel B TA Timing Strategy Panel C TAP
Avg Ret SD Skew SRatio Avg Ret SD Skew SRatio Avg Ret SD Skew Success
ME 1-10 18.54*** 13.58 -0.83 1.36 19.26*** 13.58 0.2 1.42 0.73 18.91 1.54 0.75
Age 1-10 7.15*** 10.06 -0.25 0.71 16.41*** 10.02 0.3 1.64 9.26*** 14.08 0.93 0.77
Sigma 10-1 12.36*** 13.36 -0.19 0.93 23.96*** 13.3 0.45 1.8 11.60*** 19 0.98 0.75
E/BE 1-10 9.95*** 7.13 -0.03 1.4 1.24 7.16 0.32 0.17 -8.71*** 9.8 0.36 0.74
D/BE 1-10 9.00*** 8.53 -0.26 1.06 14.73*** 8.49 0.57 1.73 5.73*** 12.08 1.25 0.76
PPE/A 1-10 -2.80** 8.22 0.03 -0.34 8.93*** 8.2 0.06 1.09 11.73*** 11.26 0.27 0.78
RD/A 10-1 5.35*** 11.01 0.03 0.49 10.76*** 10.99 0.52 0.98 5.40** 15.62 0.76 0.79
BE/ME 10-1 17.62*** 10.3 -0.34 1.71 -5.39*** 10.35 -0.25 -0.52 -23.02*** 14.49 -0.19 0.73
EF/A 10-1 -12.77*** 7.42 0.18 -1.72 6.72*** 7.45 0.38 0.9 19.50*** 10.36 0.69 0.79
GS 10-1 -11.00*** 6.89 0.18 -1.6 4.78*** 6.92 0.2 0.69 15.77*** 9.6 0.37 0.79
BE/ME 1-5 -2.87** 7.96 0.36 -0.36 6.23*** 7.95 0.32 0.78 9.10*** 11.13 0.11 0.77
EF/A 10-5 -4.53*** 7.43 0.13 -0.61 9.97*** 7.41 0.5 1.34 14.50*** 10.36 0.82 0.78
GS 10-5 -4.07*** 7.85 0.07 -0.52 9.36*** 7.84 0.44 1.19 13.43*** 11 0.77 0.78
BE/ME 10-5 14.76*** 6.48 0.16 2.28 0.84 6.55 0.03 0.13 -13.92*** 8.8 -0.55 0.72
EF/A 1-5 8.24*** 5.32 0.07 1.55 3.25*** 5.34 0.25 0.61 -5.00*** 7.32 0.14 0.74
GS 1-5 6.93*** 6.58 0.07 1.05 4.58*** 6.59 0.51 0.7 -2.35* 8.9 0.65 0.75
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Table E.16 Predictive Regressions of Value-Weighted Returns on TA Sentiment
This table reports the coefficients for lagged Performance-Weighted TA sentiment of regressions of long-short
portfolio returns on lagged Performance-Weighted TA sentiment and a set of control variables.
Rvt,1−Rvt,2 = α+∑βiTAt−i+ γCVt + εt .
Rvt,1−Rvt,2 is the daily value-weighted return of the long-short portfolios constructed from the sentiment-prone
variables. H, M, and L are respectively the top three, middle four, and bottom three deciles. CVt is a vector of
control variables, which includes the Fama and French five factors and the momentum factor (UMD). A factor
is excluded from the list of control variables when it is the dependent variable in the regressions. Panel A (B)
reports the results of the regressions with one (two) lagged TA terms, i.e. i= 1 (i= 2). The Newey and West
(1987) robust t-statistics are in brackets. The sample period is from 1964/01/01 to 2008/12/31. The asterisks
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicates the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A Panel B
No CV With CV No CV With CV
β1 β1 β1 β2 β1 β2
ME L-H
0.14*** 0.13*** 2.68*** -2.55*** 2.87*** -2.75***
(8.08) (7.26) (14.65) (-13.87) (15.30) (-14.68)
Age L-H
0.095*** 0.0076 2.88*** -2.80*** 0.53*** -0.52***
(4.28) (0.67) (15.62) (-14.84) (4.28) (-4.19)
Sigma H-L
0.062** -0.041** 2.70*** -2.65*** -0.65*** 0.61***
(2.05) (-2.52) (10.33) (-10.06) (-3.90) (3.67)
E/BE <0->0
0.098*** 0.013 1.91*** -1.82*** -0.57*** 0.59***
(3.59) (0.60) (8.34) (-7.86) (-2.70) (2.77)
D/BE =0->0
0.063*** -0.0043 1.79*** -1.73*** -0.65*** 0.65***
(2.69) (-0.29) (8.28) (-7.93) (-3.90) (3.89)
PPE/A L-H
0.020 -0.016 1.50*** -1.49*** 0.20 -0.21
(0.96) (-0.98) (8.17) (-8.06) (1.23) (-1.36)
RD/A H-L
-0.030 -0.031* -0.046 0.016 -0.61*** 0.58***
(-1.30) (-1.73) (-0.20) (0.07) (-3.22) (3.08)
BE/ME H-L
0.032* -0.0057 0.39** -0.36** -0.13 0.13
(1.71) (-0.37) (2.26) (-2.08) (-0.76) (0.75)
EF/A H-L
0.00027 -0.021*** 0.26* -0.26* -0.65*** 0.63***
(0.02) (-2.59) (1.84) (-1.83) (-6.64) (6.50)
GS H-L
-0.023 -0.023** 0.048 -0.072 -0.54*** 0.52***
(-1.33) (-2.08) (0.29) (-0.43) (-4.73) (4.59)
BE/ME L-M
-0.018 -0.0032 -0.18 0.16 -0.11 0.11
(-1.32) (-0.28) (-1.44) (1.29) (-1.02) (1.00)
EF/A H-M
0.024 -0.012 1.13*** -1.11*** -0.083 0.070
(1.61) (-1.46) (8.36) (-8.10) (-0.80) (0.68)
GS H-M
0.027* -0.0042 0.73*** -0.71*** -0.48*** 0.47***
(1.76) (-0.45) (5.08) (-4.88) (-4.50) (4.48)
BE/ME H-M
0.014 -0.0089 0.21* -0.20 -0.25* 0.24*
(1.12) (-0.72) (1.71) (-1.62) (-1.80) (1.77)
EF/A L-M
0.024*** 0.0091 0.87*** -0.85*** 0.57*** -0.56***
(2.69) (1.14) (9.71) (-9.50) (6.39) (-6.33)
GS L-M
0.050*** 0.019** 0.68*** -0.64*** 0.065 -0.046
(4.41) (2.02) (6.28) (-5.80) (0.69) (-0.49)
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Table E.17 Profitability of TA Trading Strategies on Value-Weighted Portfolio
This table reports the summary statistics of the original value-weighted long-short portfolio returns, the TA timing returns, and the TAP returns.
The original portfolios are constructed by longing the most sentiment-prone deciles and shorting the least sentiment-prone deciles. TA timing
rule represents holding the original portfolio when current TA sentiment is no less than the average TA sentiment over prior five trading days and
shorting the original portfolio otherwise. TAP is the abnormal returns on the sentiment timing strategy over original portfolio returns. AvgRet is
the average return. SRatio is the Sharpe ratio. SD is the standard deviation. Skew is the return skewness. Success in Panel C is the percentage of
non-negative TAP returns. All the returns are annualised and in percentages. The sample period is between 01/1964 and 12/2008. The asterisks
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicates the t-test significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A Original Portfolio Panel B TA Timing Strategy Panel C TAP
Avg Ret SD Skew SR Avg Ret SD Skew SR Avg Ret SD Skew Success
ME 1-10 12.02*** 12.94 -1.2 0.93 36.86*** 12.75 1.2 2.89 24.83*** 19.04 3.14 0.78
Age 1-10 -0.22 12.22 0.08 -0.02 25.08*** 12.11 0.75 2.07 25.30*** 17.7 1.1 0.79
Sigma 10-1 1.82 20.46 0.25 0.09 22.09*** 20.41 0.27 1.08 20.27*** 30.19 0.13 0.77
E/BE 1-10 1.5 10.88 0.33 0.14 11.62*** 10.86 0.01 1.07 10.13*** 15.63 -0.32 0.78
D/BE 1-10 1.03 13.65 0.61 0.08 13.55*** 13.62 0.48 0.99 12.51*** 19.84 -0.07 0.77
PPE/A 1-10 -1.84 14.21 0.89 -0.13 5.32** 14.2 -0.52 0.37 7.15** 20.86 -1.73 0.78
RD/A 10-1 0.98 14.16 0.04 0.07 -7.31*** 14.15 -0.07 -0.52 -8.29** 20.5 -0.21 0.8
BE/ME 10-1 8.13*** 12.62 0.01 0.64 12.60*** 12.61 0.09 1 4.47 18.35 0.15 0.77
EF/A 10-1 -6.43*** 11.38 0.64 -0.57 -1.37 11.38 0.3 -0.12 5.06** 16.53 -0.39 0.77
GS 10-1 -1.8 11.3 0.24 -0.16 -3.01* 11.3 0.05 -0.27 -1.21 16.09 -0.28 0.76
BE/ME 1-5 -2.23 10.06 0.25 -0.22 -5.49*** 10.05 0.04 -0.55 -3.26 14.5 -0.32 0.76
EF/A 10-5 -3.86** 10.72 0.28 -0.36 10.13*** 10.71 0.21 0.95 13.99*** 15.94 0.05 0.78
GS 10-5 -1.83 11.05 -0.05 -0.17 6.62*** 11.05 0.11 0.6 8.45*** 16.25 0.29 0.78
BE/ME 10-5 5.90*** 9.64 0.21 0.61 7.11*** 9.64 0.2 0.74 1.21 13.39 0.01 0.77
EF/A 1-5 2.57** 7.7 -0.16 0.33 11.50*** 7.66 0.14 1.5 8.93*** 10.9 0.57 0.78
GS 1-5 -0.03 9.43 -0.1 0 9.63*** 9.41 0.11 1.02 9.66*** 13.06 0.46 0.78
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214 Some Robustness Tests
E.2.4 Robustness Tests on Profitability of TA Sentiment
This section reports the robustness tests on the TA Sentiment trading strategy profit. I first
compare the TA Trading Strategy returns with Momentum Trading Strategy. I calculate the
annual average of the TA Trading Strategy profit for each long-short portfolio and the annual
average of the Momentum Trading Strategy return. In Figure E.1, each graph reports the
annual return of TA Trading Strategy with solid line and reports the Momentum Trading
Strategy return as a benchmark with a dashed line. Figure E.2 also shows the persistency
of my trading strategy. In those graphs, I set the benchmark return as the S&P 500 index
annual returns. Both Figure E.1 and Figure E.2 show that the TA trading strategy consistently
outperforms the momentum trading strategy or the overall market for the first six long-short
portfolios.
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(a) ME(L-H) (b) Age(L-H) (c) Sigma(H-L) (d) E/BE(L-H)
(e) D/BE(L-H) (f) PPE/A(L-H) (g) RD/A(H-L) (h) BE/ME(H-L)
(i) EF/A(H-L) (j) GS(H-L) (k) BE/ME(L-M) (l) EF/A(H-M)
(m) GS(H-M) (n) BE/ME(H-M) (o) EF/A(L-M) (p) GS(L-M)
Annual Profits of TA Trading Strategy and Momentum Trading Strategy The solid line is the annual returns of TA trading signal. The dashed line is the
annual Momentum Trading Strategy returns. The sample period is from 1964 to 2008.
Fig. E.1 TA Trading Strategy Profit Compared with Momentum Returns
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(a) ME(L-H) (b) Age(L-H) (c) Sigma(H-L) (d) E/BE(L-H)
(e) D/BE(L-H) (f) PPE/A(L-H) (g) RD/A(H-L) (h) BE/ME(H-L)
(i) EF/A(H-L) (j) GS(H-L) (k) BE/ME(L-M) (l) EF/A(H-M)
(m) GS(H-M) (n) BE/ME(H-M) (o) EF/A(L-M) (p) GS(L-M)
Annual Profits of TA Trading Strategy and S&P 500 Returns The solid line is the annual returns of TA trading signal. The dashed line is the annual S&P
500 returns. The sample period is from 1964 to 2008.
Fig. E.2 TA Trading Strategy Profit Compared with S&P 500 Index Returns
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E.3 Robustness Tests for Chapter 5
This section contains some key robustness tests on the predictability and profitability of VIX
as a sentiment indicator.
Table E.18 reports the predictive power of VIX after controlling for macroeconomic variables
(Default Spread and TED Spread) in addition to the FF five factors and momentum factor
in Panel A. Panel B of Table E.18 reports the abnormal alphas of the excess return of
VIX Trading Strategy over the benchmark portfolio adjusted for macroeconomic variables.
The predictive power of VIX remains strong after taking macroeconomic conditions into
consideration. Interestingly, the Default Spread performs well in explaining the excess
returns of VIX trading strategy. Yet, the macroeconomic variables could not fully explain the
abnormal returns of VIX trading strategy for all the sixteen cases.
Table E.19 has a similar structure as Table E.18. In Table E.19, Panel A documents the
predictive power of VIX controlled for the cross-sectional liquidity disparity, and Panel B tests
whether the cross-sectional liquidity disparity is the explanation for the strong profitability of
VIX in the cross-section. BAS is the bid-ask spread difference of a sentiment-prone decile over
a sentiment-immune decile. For each regression, BAS is calculated separately, corresponding
to the construction of sentiment-prone and sentiment-immune decile portfolio. For example,
in the regression of RVIX (ME 1-10), the BAS is the bid-ask spread of the small stock decile
minus the bid-ask spread of the large stock decile. The predictive regression results in Panel
A show that bid-ask spread difference in the cross-section significantly correlates with the
cross-sectional return premium. However, Panel B shows that the profitability of my VIX
trading strategy is not a result of the asymmetric liquidity in the cross-section.
Table E.20 to Table E.22 test the profitability of designing the trading strategy with the
same trading philosophy and different implied volatility index, namely VXO, VXN, and
VXD. VXO is available from 1986, VXN starts from 2001/02/01, and VXD is available from
217
218 Some Robustness Tests
1997/10/07. The results provide strong evidence that the trading philosophy works well with
other implied volatility index.
Table E.23 use value-weighted portfolio returns to mitigate the size effect. VIX still shows
demonstrated profitability when used in timing the value-weighted portfolios in the cross-
section.
I conduct the sensitivity analysis on the threshold choices for the definition of substantially
high VIX. Table E.24 report the performance of VIX trading strategy and the BETCs when
using 0%, 5%, 15% and 20% as alternative thresholds.
Table E.25 reports the profitability of VIX on the long-short portfolios. Table E.26 shows
that applies the VIX timing signal on the decile portfolios. These two tables show that VIX
is more profitable when I use the signal to shift asset allocation in the cross-section.
Figure E.3 compares the annual performance of my VIX trading strategy with the S&P 500
index returns from 1990 to 2016. My VIX trading strategy persistently outperforms the
market index.
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Table E.18 Regressions of Portfolio Returns Controlled for Controlled for Macroeconomic
Variables
Panel A reports the predictive power of VIX on long-short portfolio returns after controlling for default spread
and TED spread.
RP−I,t = α+β1VIXt−1+ γCVt +λ1DSt +λ2TEDt + εt .
Panel B reports the profitability of RVIX adjusted for DS and TED.
RVIXt = α+λ1DSt +λ2TEDt + εt .
The first two columns indicate the decile rank of sentiment-prone and sentiment-immune portfolios. CVt is a
vector of control variables, which includes the Fama and French five factors, the momentum factor (UMD) and
acroeconomic variables, default spread (DS) and TED spread. A factor is excluded from the list of control
variables when it is the dependent variable in the regressions. The Newey and West (1987) robust t-statistics are
in brackets. ***, ** and * indicates the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The
sample period is from 1990/01/01 to 2008/12/31.
Panel A Panel B
VIXt−1 DSt TEDt α DSt TEDt
ME 1-10
-0.077*** 0.167** -0.148*** 22.283 0.026 -0.096
(-3.349) (2.438) (-3.487) (0.860) (0.251) (-0.520)
Age 1-10
-0.015 -0.004 -0.049* 19.380 0.090 -0.194
(-0.920) (-0.100) (-1.797) (0.980) (1.092) (-1.292)
Sigma 10-1
-0.036** 0.066 -0.030 17.938** 0.042 -0.073**
(-2.095) (1.291) (-0.790) (2.370) (1.073) (-1.977)
E/BE 1-10
-0.021 -0.016 -0.022 26.011 0.072 -0.196
(-1.436) (-0.389) (-0.722) (1.170) (0.771) (-1.319)
D/BE 1-10
-0.030** 0.024 -0.019 30.543 0.039 -0.182
(-2.071) (0.558) (-0.616) (1.470) (0.460) (-1.492)
PPE/A 1-10
-0.006 0.009 0.102 65.258** 0.016 -0.346*
(-0.360) (0.187) (1.482) (2.460) (0.153) (-1.781)
RD/A 10-1
0.015 -0.005 0.015 30.606 0.083 -0.221**
(1.085) (-0.130) (0.511) (1.620) (1.058) (-2.028)
BE/ME 10-1
-0.033*** 0.017 -0.069** 35.316 0.038 -0.198
(-2.712) (0.491) (-2.153) (1.410) (0.336) (-1.318)
EF/A 10-1
0.003 -0.033 -0.039** 40.154 0.015 -0.223
(0.438) (-1.114) (-2.457) (1.440) (0.121) (-1.547)
GS 10-1
-0.001 -0.006 -0.035** 37.136 0.037 -0.217
(-0.190) (-0.243) (-2.023) (1.420) (0.322) (-1.449)
BE/ME 1-5
0.006 0.025 -0.030* 32.968* 0.050 -0.183*
(0.550) (0.897) (-1.652) (1.730) (0.578) (-1.756)
EF/A 10-5
-0.016 0.029 -0.025 31.042* 0.066 -0.164*
(-1.513) (0.856) (-1.190) (1.810) (0.889) (-1.709)
GS 10-5
-0.014 0.020 -0.012 32.433** 0.067 -0.184**
(-1.463) (0.662) (-0.546) (2.010) (0.967) (-2.093)
BE/ME 10-5
-0.027*** 0.042 -0.099*** 2.864 0.059 -0.112
(-2.823) (1.487) (-3.940) (0.130) (0.552) (-0.917)
EF/A 1-5
-0.013* -0.004 -0.064*** 34.508* 0.039 -0.163
(-1.701) (-0.171) (-3.929) (1.830) (0.479) (-1.545)
GS 1-5
-0.016 0.015 -0.046* 37.820** 0.033 -0.184*
(-1.334) (0.411) (-1.753) (2.130) (0.462) (-1.817)
219
Table E.19 Regressions of Portfolio Returns Controlled for Liquidity
Panel A reports the predictive power of VIX on long-short portfolio returns after controlling for bid-ask spread.
RP−I,t = α+β1VIXt−1+ γCVt +λBAS+ εt .
Panel B reports the profitability of RVIX adjusted for liquidity.
RVIXt = α+λBAS+ εt .
The first two columns indicate the decile rank of sentiment-prone and sentiment-immune portfolios. CVt is a
vector of control variables, which includes the Fama and French five factors, the momentum factor (UMD) and
BAS. A factor is excluded from the list of control variables when it is the dependent variable in the regressions.
The Newey and West (1987) robust t-statistics are in brackets. ***, ** and * indicates the statistical significance
at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The sample period is from 1990/01/01 to 2008/12/31.
Panel A Panel B
VIXt−1 BASt α BASt
ME 1-10
-0.069*** 0.024*** 21.323*** -0.006
(-3.813) (3.280) (2.980) (-0.640)
Age 1-10
-0.024** 0.003 17.309*** -0.003
(-2.152) (0.937) (4.230) (-0.580)
Sigma 10-1
-0.024* 0.035*** 20.619*** -0.006
(-1.767) (4.100) (5.300) (-0.705)
E/BE 1-10
-0.030*** 0.017*** 18.104** 0.001
(-3.451) (3.473) (2.470) (0.099)
D/BE 1-10
-0.031*** 0.018*** 13.628** 0.008
(-3.107) (3.309) (2.560) (0.973)
PPE/A 1-10
0.013 0.019 25.703*** -0.089**
(0.958) (1.282) (5.580) (-2.228)
RD/A 10-1
0.018* -0.039* 17.865*** -0.040
(1.878) (-1.666) (3.070) (-0.915)
BE/ME 10-1
-0.048*** 0.011 10.791 0.021
(-3.645) (1.332) (1.180) (0.915)
EF/A 10-1
-0.015* -0.014*** 2.110 -0.063***
(-1.923) (-2.731) (0.240) (-2.907)
GS 10-1
-0.014** -0.012** 8.584 -0.032
(-2.388) (-2.380) (0.960) (-1.538)
BE/ME 1-5
0.005 -0.005 21.705*** -0.007
(0.632) (-0.282) (5.940) (-0.247)
EF/A 10-5
-0.012 -0.003 28.821*** -0.049
(-1.407) (-0.165) (7.200) (-1.624)
GS 10-5
-0.011 -0.003 25.211*** -0.019
(-1.614) (-0.300) (7.680) (-0.752)
BE/ME 10-5
-0.045*** 0.034*** 6.626 -0.009
(-5.141) (4.316) (0.750) (-0.448)
EF/A 1-5
-0.024*** 0.029*** 17.873*** 0.020
(-4.061) (5.332) (3.060) (1.367)
GS 1-5
-0.023*** 0.024*** 18.426*** 0.014
(-2.948) (2.999) (3.050) (0.927)
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Table E.20 Profitability of VXO Trading Strategies
This table reports average returns (Avg Ret), the standard deviation (Std Dev), skewness (Skew) and the Sharpe ratio (SRatio) for benchmark
portfolios, VXO timing strategy, and the RVXO returns. RVXO is the excess returns of VXO strategy return over the benchmark long-short
portfolio return. The benchmark portfolio is to long the sentiment-prone decile (P) and short the sentiment-immune decile (I), and that the timing
strategy is to hold the sentiment-prone decile after low VXO and hold the sentiment-immune decile after high VXO. VIX-based trading strategy is
to buy and hold the sentiment-immune decile following a high VXO trading day and to buy and hold the sentiment-prone decile otherwise. A high
VXO trading day is defined as current VIX is at least 10% higher than its prior 25-day average. Last column, the success ratio (Success), is the
percentage of non-negative RVXO return. All the average returns are annualised and are in percentages. ***and ** indicates the t-test significance
at 1% and 5% level, respectively. The sample period is from 1986/01/01 to 2016/04/30.
Panel A Original Long-Short Portfolio Panel B VIX Strategy Return Panel C RVIX
Avg Ret SD Skew SR Avg Ret SD Skew SR Avg Ret SD Skew Success
ME 1-10 19.73*** 14.39 -0.84 1.37 42.22*** 15.79 -0.74 2.67 22.54*** 24.41 0.26 0.55
Age 1-10 8.47*** 11.33 -0.24 0.75 28.18*** 16.76 -0.91 1.68 19.75*** 18.6 -1.21 0.56
Sigma 10-1 16.21*** 14.9 -0.23 1.09 36.49*** 17.24 -0.33 2.12 20.32*** 10.03 -0.17 0.6
E/BE 1-10 12.25*** 7.71 -0.02 1.59 31.89*** 17.56 -0.6 1.82 19.65*** 18.71 -0.48 0.57
D/BE 1-10 9.96*** 8.66 -0.45 1.15 30.02*** 16.47 -0.5 1.82 20.11*** 16.16 -0.24 0.57
PPE/A 1-10 -5.02*** 9.75 -0.15 -0.51 21.34*** 15.49 -0.38 1.38 26.35*** 19.1 -0.12 0.58
RD/A 10-1 7.61*** 12.01 -0.05 0.63 29.60*** 19.62 -0.4 1.51 22.00*** 15.08 -0.36 0.6
BE/ME 10-1 17.62*** 11.46 -0.24 1.54 39.08*** 17.19 -0.37 2.27 21.48*** 23.33 0.05 0.58
EF/A 10-1 11.87*** 8.32 -0.19 1.43 27.99*** 17.41 -0.65 1.61 16.13*** 22.12 -0.38 0.58
GS 10-1 11.65*** 7.38 -0.13 1.58 30.16*** 17.94 -0.6 1.68 18.51*** 21.74 -0.36 0.58
BE/ME 1-5 9.03*** 12.84 -0.09 0.7 20.62*** 18.83 -0.47 1.1 11.61*** 8.83 -0.47 0.58
EF/A 10-5 6.97*** 13.17 -0.35 0.53 21.99*** 18.25 -0.5 1.21 15.04*** 7.99 -0.15 0.59
GS 10-5 7.22*** 13.45 -0.35 0.54 21.29*** 18.14 -0.44 1.17 14.09*** 7.65 -0.21 0.6
BE/ME 10-5 26.64*** 8.9 0.15 2.99 40.09*** 15.83 -0.5 2.53 13.47*** 10.54 -0.19 0.58
EF/A 1-5 18.84*** 8.88 -0.57 2.12 31.87*** 15.61 -0.62 2.04 13.05*** 8.49 -0.35 0.58
GS 1-5 18.88*** 10.37 -0.49 1.82 33.16*** 16.04 -0.52 2.07 14.31*** 8.28 -0.06 0.59
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Table E.21 Profitability of VXN Trading Strategies
This table reports average returns (Avg Ret), the standard deviation (Std Dev), skewness (Skew) and the Sharpe ratio (SRatio) for benchmark
portfolios, VXN timing strategy, and the RVXN returns. RVXN is the excess returns of VXN strategy return over the benchmark long-short
portfolio return. The benchmark portfolio is to long the sentiment-prone decile (P) and short the sentiment-immune decile (I), and that the timing
strategy is to hold the sentiment-prone decile after low VXN and hold the sentiment-immune decile after high VXN. VIX-based trading strategy is
to buy and hold the sentiment-immune decile following a high VXN trading day and to buy and hold the sentiment-prone decile otherwise. A high
VXN trading day is defined as current VIX is at least 10% higher than its prior 25-day average. Last column, the success ratio (Success), is the
percentage of non-negative RVXN return. All the average returns are annualised and are in percentages. ***and ** indicates the t-test significance
at 1% and 5% level, respectively. The sample period is from 2001/02/01 to 2016/04/30.
Panel A Original Long-Short Portfolio Panel B VIX Strategy Return Panel C RVIX
Avg Ret SD Skew SR Avg Ret SD Skew SR Avg Ret SD Skew Success
ME 1-10 15.09*** 13.68 -0.7 1.1 30.53*** 17.35 0.12 1.76 15.60** 25.39 0.74 0.54
Age 1-10 1.57 10.4 -0.31 0.15 19.39*** 19.75 -0.13 0.98 17.78*** 20.21 0.31 0.55
Sigma 10-1 4.78 16.28 -0.04 0.29 26.05*** 21.15 -0.13 1.23 21.14*** 11.36 0.09 0.57
E/BE 1-10 5.78*** 7.61 0.07 0.76 23.24*** 20.67 -0.23 1.12 17.44*** 21.49 -0.12 0.55
D/BE 1-10 4.42** 7.76 -0.17 0.57 22.04*** 19.97 -0.18 1.1 17.57*** 19.23 -0.05 0.55
PPE/A 1-10 -3.94 11.16 -0.05 -0.35 12.79*** 19.23 -0.08 0.66 16.64*** 24.28 -0.07 0.55
RD/A 10-1 3.19 11.29 -0.06 0.28 21.73*** 22.21 -0.18 0.98 18.38*** 19.23 -0.26 0.56
BE/ME 10-1 14.63*** 12.09 -0.03 1.21 31.07*** 19.68 -0.13 1.58 16.66** 25.23 -0.08 0.55
EF/A 10-1 9.36*** 8.54 -0.36 1.1 20.09*** 20.35 -0.29 0.99 10.86* 24.4 -0.05 0.55
GS 10-1 8.79*** 7.63 -0.27 1.15 21.93*** 20.82 -0.23 1.05 13.23** 24.65 0 0.55
BE/ME 1-5 4.97 13.77 -0.02 0.36 15.76*** 22.47 -0.14 0.7 10.63*** 10.57 -0.03 0.55
EF/A 10-5 2.93 14.63 -0.13 0.2 16.59*** 21.78 -0.16 0.76 13.53*** 9.44 -0.11 0.56
GS 10-5 2.37 15.11 -0.1 0.16 15.47*** 21.88 -0.18 0.71 12.95*** 9.22 -0.08 0.57
BE/ME 10-5 19.60*** 10.43 0.3 1.88 33.86*** 19.05 -0.1 1.78 14.32*** 12.29 0.23 0.55
EF/A 1-5 12.29*** 10.62 -0.4 1.16 24.42*** 19.06 -0.26 1.28 12.12*** 9.63 0.02 0.55
GS 1-5 11.17*** 11.72 -0.31 0.95 25.53*** 19.4 -0.27 1.32 14.32*** 9.72 0.05 0.57
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Table E.22 Profitability of VXD Trading Strategies
This table reports average returns (Avg Ret), the standard deviation (Std Dev), skewness (Skew) and the Sharpe ratio (SRatio) for benchmark
portfolios, VXD timing strategy, and the RVXD returns. RVXD is the excess returns of VXD strategy return over the benchmark long-short
portfolio return. The benchmark portfolio is to long the sentiment-prone decile (P) and short the sentiment-immune decile (I), and that the timing
strategy is to hold the sentiment-prone decile after low VXD and hold the sentiment-immune decile after high VXD. VIX-based trading strategy is
to buy and hold the sentiment-immune decile following a high VXD trading day and to buy and hold the sentiment-prone decile otherwise. A high
VXD trading day is defined as current VIX is at least 10% higher than its prior 25-day average. Last column, the success ratio (Success), is the
percentage of non-negative RVXD return. All the average returns are annualised and are in percentages. ***and ** indicates the t-test significance
at 1% and 5% level, respectively. The sample period is from 1997/10/07 to 2016/04/30.
Panel A Original Long-Short Portfolio Panel B VIX Strategy Return Panel C RVIX
Avg Ret SD Skew SR Avg Ret SD Skew SR Avg Ret SD Skew Success
ME 1-10 16.17*** 15.02 -0.54 1.08 36.23*** 17.7 0.08 2.05 20.05*** 26.38 0.86 0.54
Age 1-10 4.55 12.21 -0.16 0.37 22.84*** 19.49 -0.18 1.17 18.30*** 19.85 0.39 0.55
Sigma 10-1 9.47** 17.42 -0.09 0.54 30.09*** 20.94 -0.25 1.44 20.63*** 11.43 -0.16 0.57
E/BE 1-10 8.40*** 8.36 0 1 27.06*** 20.45 -0.3 1.32 18.65*** 20.78 -0.12 0.55
D/BE 1-10 6.56*** 9.54 -0.24 0.69 25.70*** 19.49 -0.23 1.32 19.14*** 18.54 0.06 0.55
PPE/A 1-10 -4.15 11.03 -0.1 -0.38 14.74*** 18.38 -0.1 0.8 18.90*** 22.95 -0.06 0.55
RD/A 10-1 9.03*** 13.62 0.01 0.66 27.16*** 22.92 -0.3 1.18 18.12*** 18.14 -0.3 0.57
BE/ME 10-1 14.50*** 13.42 -0.24 1.08 33.98*** 19.65 -0.1 1.73 19.48*** 27 0.15 0.56
EF/A 10-1 10.24*** 9.19 -0.31 1.11 22.66*** 20.07 -0.31 1.13 12.41** 25.09 -0.06 0.55
GS 10-1 11.11*** 7.86 -0.3 1.41 24.95*** 20.79 -0.31 1.2 13.82** 24.7 -0.06 0.55
BE/ME 1-5 7.11** 15.16 0.07 0.47 17.89*** 22.51 -0.19 0.79 10.80*** 10.31 -0.19 0.55
EF/A 10-5 4.33 15.24 -0.13 0.28 18.88*** 21.49 -0.22 0.88 14.56*** 9.15 -0.16 0.56
GS 10-5 3.63 15.51 -0.11 0.23 17.75*** 21.41 -0.21 0.83 14.15*** 8.89 -0.11 0.58
BE/ME 10-5 21.61*** 10.08 0.25 2.14 36.29*** 18.31 -0.19 1.98 14.70*** 12.07 0.15 0.55
EF/A 1-5 14.57*** 10.4 -0.44 1.4 27.35*** 18.33 -0.33 1.49 12.78*** 9.38 0.02 0.56
GS 1-5 14.74*** 12.19 -0.33 1.21 29.37*** 18.98 -0.36 1.55 14.65*** 9.33 0.05 0.57
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Table E.23 Profitability of VIX Trading Strategy on Value-Weighted Portfolios
This table reports average value-weighted returns (Avg Ret), the standard deviation (Std Dev), skewness (Skew) and the Sharpe ratio (SRatio) for
benchmark portfolios, VIX timing strategy, and the RVIX returns. RVIX is the excess returns of VIX strategy return over the benchmark long-short
portfolio return. The benchmark portfolio is to long the sentiment-prone decile (P) and short the sentiment-immune decile (I), and that the timing
strategy is to hold the sentiment-prone decile after low VIX and hold the sentiment-immune decile after high VIX. VIX-based trading strategy is to
buy and hold the sentiment-immune decile following a high VIX trading day and to buy and hold the sentiment-prone decile otherwise. A high
VIX trading day is defined as current VIX is at least 10% higher than its prior 25-day average. Last column, the success ratio (Success), is the
percentage of non-negative RVIX return. All the average returns are annualised and are in percentages. ***and ** indicates the t-test significance
at 1% and 5% level, respectively. The sample period is from 1990/01/01 to 2008/12/31.
Panel A Original Long-Short Portfolio Panel B VIX Strategy Return Panel C RVIX
Avg Ret SD Skew SR Avg Ret SD Skew SR Avg Ret SD Skew Success
ME 1-10 15.80*** 13.97 -0.54 1.13 34.96*** 15.92 0.15 2.2 19.15*** 23.08 1.16 0.53
Age 1-10 -2.46 15.23 0.47 -0.16 13.58*** 20.42 0.01 0.67 15.98*** 17.74 0.47 0.53
Sigma 10-1 3.44 26.36 0.39 0.13 16.49*** 26.9 0.02 0.61 13.14*** 19.93 -0.6 0.53
E/BE 1-10 -1.33 13.48 0.4 -0.1 13.37*** 20.95 -0.13 0.64 14.68*** 19.7 0.3 0.53
D/BE 1-10 1.52 17.98 0.84 0.08 13.10*** 21.28 0.06 0.62 11.59*** 19.27 -0.53 0.53
PPE/A 1-10 -2.07 19.58 0.82 -0.11 10.07** 22.04 -0.01 0.46 12.16** 22.67 0.17 0.52
RD/A 10-1 3.95 16.6 -0.08 0.24 8.95* 23.6 0.02 0.38 5.05 21.03 0.03 0.53
BE/ME 10-1 6.03* 14.92 0 0.4 23.59*** 19.14 0.17 1.23 17.55*** 23.3 0.9 0.53
EF/A 10-1 7.49** 14.16 -0.93 0.53 15.10*** 20.12 0.2 0.75 7.56 28.21 0.98 0.53
GS 10-1 0.91 13.72 -0.28 0.07 12.61** 21.69 0.13 0.58 11.69* 27.44 0.44 0.54
BE/ME 1-5 -1.93 11.88 0.35 -0.16 5.74 19.99 0.22 0.29 7.70* 20.19 0.38 0.53
EF/A 10-5 -7.07** 12.98 0.53 -0.54 5.26 22.19 0.07 0.24 12.39*** 17.6 0.52 0.54
GS 10-5 -2.79 13.11 0.06 -0.21 9.56* 22.79 0.04 0.42 12.36*** 18.27 0.19 0.53
BE/ME 10-5 4.09* 10.48 0.01 0.39 19.84*** 18.85 0.11 1.05 15.76*** 19.72 0.9 0.54
EF/A 1-5 0.42 8.14 -0.09 0.05 15.02*** 17.8 0.12 0.84 14.61*** 18.31 0.46 0.54
GS 1-5 -1.88 11.26 -0.07 -0.17 11.90*** 19.81 -0.06 0.6 13.77*** 19.11 0.37 0.53
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Table E.24 Returns and BETCs with Different Thresholds to Define High VIX
This table reports the returns and break-even transaction costs of VIX-based trading strategies if I choose
alternative horizons to compare the VIX with its past average. For instance, I define a high VIX day if current
VIX is higher than x% its prior 25-day average. In this table, I show the results when x equals 0, 5, 10, 15, 20.
Panel A reports the returns of my VIX-based trading strategies when using different horizon average to define
high VIX, and the returns are in percentages. Panel B reports the corresponding break-even transaction costs
and the costs are in basis points. The sample period is from 1990/01/01 to 2016/04/30.
Panel A. Profitability on different trading signal horizons
P I 0% 5% 10% 15% 20%
ME 1 10 39.47 43.43 42.38 40.43 39.59
Age 1 10 30.03 30.95 28.35 27.8 27.25
Sigma 10 1 40.28 41.34 38.25 37.4 36.38
E/BE 1 10 32.7 34.34 33.41 32.87 32.88
D/BE 1 10 31.28 33.02 30.83 30.16 29.75
PPE/A 1 10 24.05 22.76 22.38 22.35 22.72
RD/A 10 1 34.19 34.22 31.43 30.95 31.21
BE/ME 10 1 34.4 37.43 40.49 40.4 40.38
EF/A 1 10 23.34 26.53 29.67 30.8 31.14
GS 1 10 27.83 30.59 31.82 32.14 32.83
BE/ME 1 5 25.11 24.49 22.05 22.25 21.92
EF/A 10 5 27.38 26.14 23.02 22.04 21.53
GS 10 5 27.1 25.35 22.73 21.52 20.71
BE/ME 10 5 38.27 40.69 41.31 41.42 41.07
EF/A 1 5 30.96 32.91 32.93 33.08 32.9
GS 1 5 35.48 36.48 35.11 34.21 34.09
Panel B. BETC on different trading signal horizons
ME 1 10 89.54 112.07 137.66 192.55 258.67
Age 1 10 68.11 79.86 92.1 132.4 178.08
Sigma 10 1 91.36 106.68 124.25 178.13 237.71
E/BE 1 10 74.18 88.62 108.53 156.54 214.83
D/BE 1 10 70.95 85.21 100.16 143.65 194.42
PPE/A 1 10 54.55 58.73 72.68 106.43 148.44
RD/A 10 1 77.54 88.31 102.09 147.4 203.92
BE/ME 10 1 78.03 96.6 131.51 192.41 263.87
EF/A 1 10 52.94 68.48 96.37 146.69 203.49
GS 1 10 63.12 78.93 103.37 153.04 214.54
BE/ME 1 5 56.95 63.2 71.64 105.97 143.23
EF/A 10 5 62.11 67.47 74.79 104.96 140.65
GS 10 5 61.46 65.41 73.84 102.5 135.32
BE/ME 10 5 86.82 105 134.18 197.25 268.36
EF/A 1 5 70.22 84.94 106.96 157.52 214.99
GS 1 5 80.47 94.16 114.04 162.92 222.78
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Table E.25 VIX Timing Strategy on Cross-Sectional Long-Short Portfolios
This table reports average returns (Avg Ret), the standard deviation (Std Dev), skewness (Skew) and the Sharpe ratio (SRatio) for the long-short
portfolios, VIX timing strategy on long-short portfolio, and the RVIX returns. RVIX is the excess returns of VIX strategy return over original
long-short portfolio return. The first three columns indicate the construction of the long-short portfolio. The benchmark portfolio is to long the
sentiment-prone decile and short the sentiment-immune decile. In this table, VIX Timing Strategy is to buy (short) sentiment-immune decile and
short (long) sentiment-immune decile following a high (low) VIX trading day. A high VIX trading day is defined as current VIX is at least 5%
higher than its prior 25-day average. Last column, the success ratio (Success), is the percentage of non-negative RVIX return. All the average
returns are annualised and are in percentages. ***and ** indicates the t-test significance at 1% and 5% level, respectively. The sample period is
from 1990/01/01 to 2016/04/30.
Panel A Original Long-Short Portfolio Panel B VIX Strategy Return Panel C RVIX
Avg Ret SD Skew SR Avg Ret SD Skew SR Avg Ret SD Skew Success
ME 1-10 23.12*** 13.95 -0.53 1.66 40.40*** 13.8 0.65 2.93 17.28*** 17.88 2.45 0.87
Age 1-10 10.93*** 11.21 -0.2 0.98 23.95*** 11.13 0.26 2.15 13.02*** 13.74 1.28 0.87
Sigma 10-1 18.80*** 15.55 -0.2 1.21 32.89*** 15.46 0.03 2.13 14.09*** 19.87 0.64 0.86
E/BE 1-10 13.37*** 7.91 -0.03 1.69 19.57*** 7.86 0.4 2.49 6.20*** 9.35 1.25 0.86
D/BE 1-10 11.57*** 8.85 -0.26 1.31 21.85*** 8.77 0.24 2.49 10.28*** 11.24 1.22 0.86
PPE/A 1-10 -3.18 10.12 -0.12 -0.31 -3 10.12 -0.05 -0.3 0.17 12.43 0.16 0.86
RD/A 10-1 9.23*** 12.58 -0.05 0.73 14.63*** 12.56 0.01 1.17 5.40* 15.48 0.24 0.86
BE/ME 10-1 17.57*** 12.04 -0.24 1.46 14.83*** 12.06 0.43 1.23 -2.74 15.25 1.27 0.85
EF/A 10-1 -11.85*** 8.55 0.24 -1.39 -1.68 8.58 -0.14 -0.2 10.17*** 10.42 -0.53 0.87
GS 10-1 -12.37*** 7.56 0.17 -1.64 -9.90*** 7.58 -0.12 -1.31 2.47 8.98 -0.59 0.86
BE/ME 1-5 10.39*** 13.41 -0.02 0.77 15.19*** 13.39 -0.31 1.13 4.8 18.18 -0.41 0.85
EF/A 10-5 8.59*** 13.6 -0.24 0.63 19.26*** 13.55 -0.08 1.42 10.68*** 18.12 0.42 0.85
GS 10-5 8.07*** 13.88 -0.22 0.58 17.05*** 13.85 -0.06 1.23 8.98** 18.38 0.4 0.86
BE/ME 10-5 27.96*** 9.2 0.2 3.04 30.01*** 9.17 0.49 3.27 2.06 10.84 0.77 0.85
EF/A 1-5 20.44*** 9.24 -0.53 2.21 20.95*** 9.24 0.18 2.27 0.51 11.93 1.34 0.85
GS 1-5 20.44*** 10.81 -0.42 1.89 26.96*** 10.75 0.2 2.51 6.51** 13.76 1.33 0.85
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Table E.26 Summary Statistics of VIX Timing Decile Portfolios
This table reports summary statistics for the decile portfolios, VIX timing strategy on decile portfolio, and the RVIX returns. Panel A and for all the most
sentiment-immune deciles in Panel B. The first two column show the choice of decile portfolios as original portfolios. The first column shows the characteristics
used to form the decile portfolio. The second column reports the decile rank. VIX Timing Strategy is to buy (short) original decile following a high (low) VIX
trading day. A high VIX trading day is defined as current VIX is at least 5% higher than its prior 25-day average. Success is the percentage of non-negative RVIX
return. All the average returns are annualised and are in percentages. ***and ** indicates the t-test significance at 1% and 5% level, respectively. The sample
period is from 1990/01/01 to 2016/04/30.
Panel A Original Long-Short Portfolio Panel B VIX Strategy Return Panel C RVIX
SP Decile Avg Ret Std Dev Skew SRatio Avg Ret SD Skew SRatio Avg Ret SD Skew Success
Panel A
ME 1 34.79*** 13.18 -0.64 2.42 38.57*** 13.14 0.2 2.72 3.78 17.58 1.46 0.84
Age 1 24.44*** 17.23 -0.48 1.25 30.30*** 17.2 -0.02 1.6 5.87 22.85 0.84 0.85
Sigma 10 34.29*** 21.14 -0.39 1.49 41.32*** 21.09 -0.03 1.82 7.03 28.05 0.67 0.85
E/BE 1 31.24*** 17.76 -0.44 1.6 35.02*** 17.73 0 1.81 3.78 23.62 0.79 0.84
D/BE 1 27.88*** 17.57 -0.44 1.42 29.73*** 17.56 -0.03 1.53 1.85 23.61 0.69 0.85
PPE/A 1 22.67*** 15.07 -0.2 1.31 19.57*** 15.09 -0.12 1.11 -3.1 20.03 0.08 0.84
RD/A 10 31.52*** 21.97 -0.28 1.3 34.57*** 21.95 -0.04 1.44 3.05 29.07 0.44 0.85
BE/ME 1 38.80*** 15.44 -0.33 2.33 39.14*** 15.44 0.18 2.35 0.34 19.75 0.98 0.85
BE/ME 10 21.23*** 20.71 -0.22 0.89 24.31*** 20.7 -0.17 1.04 3.08 28.11 0.11 0.85
EF/A 1 19.76*** 20.33 -0.31 0.83 28.36*** 20.29 -0.08 1.26 8.59 27.34 0.45 0.85
EF/A 10 31.62*** 16.19 -0.54 1.78 30.04*** 16.2 0.04 1.68 -1.58 21.45 0.98 0.84
GS 1 31.82*** 17.08 -0.52 1.7 35.52*** 17.05 0.08 1.92 3.7 22.48 1.09 0.85
GS 10 19.45*** 20.39 -0.29 0.81 25.61*** 20.36 -0.07 1.12 6.16 27.32 0.41 0.85
Panel B
ME 10 11.67*** 19.19 0.17 0.46 -1.83 19.2 -0.4 -0.24 -13.50*** 26.64 -0.96 0.84
Age 10 13.50*** 16.13 -0.16 0.66 6.35** 16.15 -0.26 0.22 -7.15* 22.02 -0.22 0.84
Sigma 1 15.49*** 9.19 -0.32 1.37 8.43*** 9.23 -0.24 0.6 -7.06*** 12.66 0 0.84
E/BE 10 17.87*** 17.69 -0.3 0.85 15.46*** 17.7 -0.08 0.71 -2.42 24.08 0.32 0.85
D/BE 10 16.31*** 15.8 -0.13 0.85 7.87** 15.82 -0.13 0.32 -8.43** 21.22 -0.09 0.84
PPE/A 10 25.85*** 17.67 -0.29 1.3 22.57*** 17.69 -0.11 1.11 -3.28 23.46 0.26 0.84
RD/A 1 22.29*** 15.49 -0.37 1.25 19.94*** 15.5 -0.11 1.1 -2.35 20.78 0.4 0.84
BE/ME 5 21.68*** 17.31 -0.31 1.09 18.26*** 17.32 -0.08 0.89 -3.43 22.82 0.37 0.85
EF/A 5 22.36*** 15.83 -0.27 1.23 18.19*** 15.85 -0.1 0.97 -4.16 20.85 0.26 0.85
GS 5 22.75*** 15.36 -0.22 1.29 17.11*** 15.39 -0.05 0.93 -5.63 20.37 0.21 0.84
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(a) ME(L-H) (b) Age(L-H) (c) Sigma(H-L) (d) E/BE(L-H)
(e) D/BE(L-H) (f) PPE/A(L-H) (g) RD/A(H-L) (h) BE/ME(H-L)
(i) EF/A(H-L) (j) GS(H-L) (k) BE/ME(L-M) (l) EF/A(H-M)
(m) GS(H-M) (n) BE/ME(H-M) (o) EF/A(L-M) (p) GS(L-M)
Annual Profits of VIX Trading Strategy and S&P 500 Returns The solid line is the annual returns of VIX trading signal. The dashed line is the annual S&P
500 returns. The sample period is from 1990 to 2016.
Fig. E.3 VIX Trading Strategy Profit Compared with S&P 500 Index Returns
228
